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Frederic 
BOYER DE LA G1RODAY 
Frederic Boyer de la Giroday was born in September 1918 on the island of Mauritius. He 
studied economics first in Paris and then at Oxford. In 1949 he entered the International 
Monetary Fund and left it in 1958 to join the Commission of the European Communities 
at the time when the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs was being 
formed. 
The whole of his professional career was from then on spent at- the Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, and was devoted to monetary questions. Having 
started in 1958 as a principal administrator, he was appointed Director in 1968 and at the 
time of his departure in 1981 he was head of a Directorate of four divisions dealing with 
the whole range of monetary and financial questions. In the intervening years, he took an 
active part in each of the major debates or projects which marked the history of 
international monetary relations: he participated with people such as Ossola, Mundell, 
Triffin, etc. in the great debates which marked the reform of the international monetary 
systems, the creation of the special drawing right, the introduction of the general 
arrangements to borrow. He made a special contribution, in his role of respected adviser 
to men directly involved such as Robert Marjolin, Raymond Barre or Fran~ois-Xavier 
Ortoli to the Werner Plan, to the creation of the 'snake', to Community loans and to the 
European Monetary System. 
Fascinated by economic history, he was a popular and respected lecturer at the Universit6 
Libre de Bruxelles. He was an expert in the literature on international monetary questions, 
was familiar with the classical authors on the subject, and took an active part in the 
renewal of ideas and theories, persistent in communicating his taste for research to his 
coI1eagues. His personality was strong, his temperament generous and communicative. 
His strength of character was equalled only by his soundness of judgment. 
Shortly before his death, on 29 December 1981 in Arosa, Switzerland, he had been 
appointed honorary Director-General and Special Adviser to Commission President 
Thorn. He intended to devote his time to writing on subjects which had always interested 
him, such as the European capital market, the Eurocurrency system, the Bank for 
International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and the future of 
international monetary relations. 
An earnest and enthusiastic supporter of European monetary integration, he never ceased 
to demonstrate its advantages. A lucid observer of the difficulties of this undertaking, he 
never allowed himself to be discouraged by the interruptions, the false starts or the 
setbacks in the monetary construction of Europe. For him, therefore, who had shared the 
hopes aroused by the Werner Plan, and the subsequent disappointments, the 
establishment of the European Monetary System was a matter of great satisfaction. 
Foreword 
This issue of 'European Economy' analyses how the EMS has functioned in its first three years and presents 
a dossier of the studies and discussions which have taken place within the Community on the development 
of the system. It is built around three topics which are the product of the experience and reflection to date: 
economic convergence in relation to the system in its existing form (Part One), the development of the 
system within its present institutional framework (Part Two), and the institutional phase of the system 
(Part Three). The public is thus given access to hitherto unpublished technical studies and documents. 
The three topics are treated in the logical order of the system's development, from the present phase to the 
final stage. Chronologically, the work on the institutional phase-a task whichfthe European Council 
explicitly assigned to the Community institutions-preceded the studies which culminated in the 
proposals for non-institutional development, which were presented in March 1982. 
Except for those documents whose status is clearly defined (Commission communication, opinion of the 
Committees, etc.), the analyses and assessments presented in this issue of 'European Economy· are those of 
the departments of the Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. They 
cannot be regarded as positions taken by the Commission. This is particularly true for Part Three, which is 
a preliminary synthesis of the ideas put forward on the main areas of the institutional phase. The specific 
proposals have been discussed in detail by the Alternates of the Monetary Committee, but the preliminary 
synthesis is the fruit of the work of Commission departments. Certain assessments may be modified in the 
light of changing circumstances and of a more detailed analysis some time in the future. 
* 
* • 
The EMS represents the most recent stage in the process, initiated by the Community in the late 1960s, of 
providing itself with its own monetary identity and organization. The Treaties were devised and signed at a 
time when the Community countries were integrated into a highly structured monetary system, that of 
Bretton Woods. The organization provided by this system was a mainstay of the Community's 
construction and its existence was so taken for granted that it was not even mentioned in the Treaty. 
However once this support started to weaken, the Community realized that a monet:iry organization was a 
necessary complement to a commercial and agricultural organization. With varying success, it launched a 
series of initiatives to try to make good the deficiency. 
The EMS has been the most successful of these initiatives. It has maintained the unity of the Common 
Market and has made a substantial contribution to closer monetary convergence in a period when 
economic crisis and commercial strains have reached a degree of gravity unprecedented in the 
Community's history. It is nevertheless still insufficient; its structures not being strong enough to 
encompass national economic policies within a common monetary discipline, to free commercial 
competitiveness from monetary constraints, or to give the Community a role in international monetary 
relationships commensurate with its industrial and commercial weight. 
Aware of these inadequacies, the system's originators from the beginning intended it to be dynamic, 
destined to evolve and to grow in strength. This dynamism has been one of the strong points of the system's 
operation in its first three years. It also provided the driving force for the discussions and studies presented 
here. 
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The proposals put forward by the Commission in March 1982 mark an-unfinished-step along the road 
which leads eventually but inevitably towards European monetary inegration. 
* 
* * 
This issue is dedicated to the memory of Frederic BOYER DE LA G1RODAY who, from his very earliest days 
at the Commission in 1958 until his untimely death in December 1981, placed his great erudition, his 
profound idealism and his extraordinary capacity for work at the service of the monetary construction of 
Europe. 
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PART ONE . 
Economic convergence and the European Monetary System 
Convergence of economic performance is one of the objectives of tjie European Monetary 
System and is at the same time a basic precondition for its successful operation. This dual 
relationship is clearly brought out in the documents which prepared the way for or set up the 
system. In particular, the final report I on the EMS, presented by the Monetary Committee 
to the Council and the Commission on 7 November 1978, said that, 'The European 
Monetary System ought to contribute to reducing divergences in economic performance,' 
adding immediately afterwards, 'The credibility of the new system depends on progressive 
convergence of economic performance.' It is this very relationship which is at the heart of 
the present discussions on the appraisal of the system a little over three years after its 
inception and the possible ways of developing it further. The complexity of the links 
between economic convergence itnd exchange rate stability needs to be examined closely, 
particularly in the light of past experience, if the objectives and the operations of the EMS in 
this area are to be viewed in a proper perspective and the progress to be achieved properly 
measured. It is similarly against this background that the recent realignments between 
various participating currencies should be assessed. 
Annex 1 to the Twentieth report on the activities of the Monetary Committee, OJ C 240, 25.9.1979. 
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CHAPTER I 
The links between economic convergence and 
exchange rate stability 
The very concept of convergence is ambiguous, depending as 
it does on the economic variables that are taken as objectives 
and on the rate at which such objectives are to be achieved. In 
view of the twin concerns jointly underlying the establish-
ment of the EMS, monetary stability and progress towards 
economic integration, a distinction should be made between 
on the one hand the immediate need to ensure a convergence 
of nominal variables-a downward alignment of cost and 
price trends-and on the other the longer-term pursuit of a 
convergence of real variables, i.e. alignment upwards of 
living standards and the quality of life. This distinction, 
which is convenient for the purposes of analysis, does not, 
however, obviate the need to take account of the interactions 
between nominal and real developments in determining the 
desirable degree of exchange rate stability. Similarly, 
emphasizing the urgency of the need to combat inflation does 
not mean that less importance is attached to growth and 
employment or that the two types of measures should not be 
pursued jointly. 
Section 1 - Convergence of living standards: 
long-term trends 
A detailed comparison1 of the performance of each economy 
in relation to the other member countries and their main 
industrialized trading partners is beyond the scope of this 
study. Such an analysis would require a large number of 
interdependent factors to be taken into account (endowment 
in natural resources, demographic trends, technological 
progress, etc.), and the results might be subject to different 
interpretations depending on the criteria applied. Table 1 
and Graphs l(a) and l(b) simply show the development of 
average living standards during the past few decades, by 
tracing the relationship between per capita GDP in each 
country and the Community as a whole. This indicator may 
be measured, first, in terms of the purchasing power parities 
established by the Statistical Office of the European 
Community.' Subject to statistical imperfections, per capita 
GDP is measured here in terms of domestic purchasing 
power. Alternatively, the indicator may be calculated on tl)e 
basis of current exchange rates, thus reflecting the external 
purchasing power of each currency. It will, however, then be 
affected by movements in real exchange rates which are 
sometimes excessive relative to the basic economic situation 
of each country. 
Eurostat - National Accounts ESA - Aggregates - 1982. 
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GRAPH 1 (a): Per capita GDP at 1975prices and purchasing 
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Table 1 
RelatiYe changes in per capita GDP 
At current prices and 
purchasing power standards 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1980 
B 98,0 100,3 101,7 106,7 105,6 106,2 
DK 114,8 118,7 117,9 113,6 112,5 110,7 
D 113,4 113,7 112,6 110,5 112,6 114,8 
GR 37,3 44,4 50,4 56,2 57,7 57,0 
F 99,2 102,2 105,1 110,5 110,7 110,1 
IRL 62,2 61,1 61,7 63,0 63,6 61,7 
I 78,7 81,3 87,9 85,3 84,2 87,7 
L 152,6 133,5 137,7 126,5 121,1 119,6 
NL 104,8 103,1 104,9 104,8 108,2 104,9 
UK 116,7 109,3 99,9 98,7 96,9 92,9 
EC lO 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Dispersion 
EC 10 2 22,7 19,4 18,0 16,9 16,8 16,7 
USA 165,4 160,4 146,4 142,8 146,0 138,4 
Japan (53) 3 68,7 93,1 97,1 99,0 103,1 
' 
Commission extrapolation based on the economic budgets (May 1982). 
2 A vernge of absolute differences from the mean. 
' 
Commission estimate. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission departments. 
Among the JO present members of the Community, average 
living standards measured in terms of purchasing power 
parities showed significant convergence between 1960 and 
1975. After that date, as a result of the divergent economic 
and monetary policies pursued since 1972-73 and of differing 
reactions to the economic crisis, this measure of convergence 
showed only very modest progress. If average living 
standards are measured in terms of current exchange rates, 
the slowdown in the convergence process was more marked 
and began earlier, reflecting from 1970 onwards the 
weakening in the discipline previously imposed by the 
Bretton Woods system. The process resumed with the 
introduction of the EMS. This overall pattern has been 
accompanied by considerable changes in the relative 
positions of each country. Germany, the Netherlands and 
Ireland have, at very different levels, more or less maintained 
their initial positions, measured in terms of purchasing 
power parities. Belgium, France and, particularly, Greece 
improved their positions distinctly at least up to the middle of 
the 1970s. By contrast, there has been an appreciable 
deterioration, in relative terms, in average livjng standards in 
the United Kingdom and in Luxembourg (where the figure is 
of limited significance because of the weight of the steel 
industry in that small economy). Denmark and Italy have 
seen a slight deterioration in their relative positions as from 
1975-78. It is interesting to note, in the case of Italy, that the 
Indices EC JO = JOO 
At current prices 
and exchange rates 
1982 1 1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1980 1982 l 
104,3 107,0 103,0 107,1 120,8 128,0 114,3 98,9 
113,1 113,4 124,9 131,2 142,5 146,9 125,3 123,9 
114,8 113,9 114,9 125,0 130,2 138,6 128,7 121,8 
55,5 36,9 41,1 46,3 44,1 44,8 40,6 45,9 
111,0 115,2 117,8 113,4 123,0 118,2 117,4 118,0 
61,6 54,7 54,8 53,9 49,7 49,7 50,2 58,9 
88,1 64,8 70,6 76,6 65,9 61,3 66,8 69,7 
116,3 144,8 124,2 130,3 125,7 130,3 121,6 101,3 
104,3 84,0 89,4 99,3 116,1 130,6 114,6 109,0 
92,2 119,1 107,3 90,0 79,3 74,8 90,2 97,0 
100 100 JOO 100 100 100 100 100 
16,7 27,3 23,6 24,1 31,9 36,2 27,4 20,4 
135,1 244,8 207,8 197,2 137,9 129,2 109,7 145,2 
106,1 (40,1)' 53,5 80,5 85,7 111,6 86,1 103,1 
rise in living standards coincided during the 1960s with a 
period of sharp inflation and monetary turbulence and did 
not come to a halt until 1978 with the return to greater 
monetary discipline. 
In relation to the Community's two major industrialized 
trading partners, the same phenomenon of rapid conver-
gence in living standards can be observed, even more 
markedly, up to 1970, followed by some subsequent 
slowdown. In 1960, per capita GDP in the United States, 
measured in terms of purchasing power parities, was about 
65% above the Community average; the difference has 
narrowed today to only 35%. Japan, whose living standards 
in 1960 were only half those of the Community, caught up 
with and overtook the Community in spect.icular fashion 
towards the end of the 1970s. 
It would be dangerous to draw hard and fast conclusions 
from such a brief survey. However, the above facts do justify 
a number of general observations. In the first place, it was 
during the 1960s, when the growth of the world economy was 
sustained and relative exchange rate discipline maintained, 
that the clearest progress towards convergence was achieved. 
Secondly, convergence of real variables is a very long-term 
process which, while benefiting considerably from lasting 
stability in international monetary relationships, is also 
15 
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dependent on the development strategies pursued by each 
country. For example, the different growth rates between the 
various areas may be attributable, among many other 
factors, to significant long-term differences in investment 
ratios as between the Community (from 20% to 23%), the 
United States (17% to 19%) and Japan (30% to 35%). The 
scale of these differences and, above all, their persistence over 
several decades provides a measure of what convergence 
implies in terms of allocation of resources, the functional 
distribution of incomes, and the formation and use of 
savings. 
There are many ways in which the Community as such can 
contribute to achieving gradual alignment in living stan-
dards. One obvious way is in freedom of trade. Another more 
modest but not insignificant way is in the financial area. As 
may be seen from Table 2, the Community's financial 
instruments, in the form of subsidies or loans for structural 
purposes, are beginning to become significant at macroecon-
omic level. The aid granted amounted in 1981 to I, I% of 
GDP in Italy, 1,4% in Greece and 4, 7% in Ireland. In Ireland, 
it represented some 15% of fixed capital formation. 
Section 2 - The interactions between real and 
nominal developments and 
exchange rate stability 
The degree of exchange rate stability depends on the 
combined effect of the economic performances of the various 
countries and their relative price trends, with these two 
factors being able either to offset or to reinforce one another. 
Clearly, underlying economic trends such as those briefly 
described above, which are based on differing levels of 
productivity, the discovery or exhaustion of natural 
resources and lasting changes in the terms of trade, cannot 
but be reflected sooner or later in exchange rates. This long-
term phenomenon may be illustrated by two significant 
examples. 
The first example is provided by the devaluation of sterling in 
1967. As a result in particular of the strict monetary policy 
pursued, the rise in prices in the United Kingdom had 
followed a trend that was very close to those of its main 
partners (see Table 3 and Graph 2). During the 17 years 
preceding the devaluation, the total cumulative differential 
in prices was less than 5%. The devaluation was due therefore 
not so much to a lack of nominal convergence as to real 
divergences between the United Kingdom economy and 
those of its trading partners. With its investment ratio being 
distinctly below those of its partners (17% of GDP between 
1958 and 1966 as against 21,5% for the Community as a 
whole), it was not possible for the modernization and 
extension of productive capacity to keep pace. Any attempt 
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to reflate the economy came up against the weakness of the 
productive apparatus and resulted in considerable external 
deficits (1951, 1955, 1960 and 1964), obliging the authorities 
to adopt a restrictive stance once again (stop-go policies). It is 
only recently, with the advent of North Sea oil and the efforts 
to achieve structural stabilization of the United Kingdom 
economy, that these trends have been reversed. 
Table 2 
Breakdown of subsidies I and loans 2 for structural 
purposes granted by the Community institutions 
As% of GDP As% ofGFCF 
Country 
Subsi- Loans Total Subsi- Loans Total 
dres dies 
1981 
B 0,05 0,47 0,52 0,25 2,42 2,67 
DK 0,12 0,28 0,40 0,76 1,72 2,48 
D 0,04 0,02 0,06 0,17 0,07 0,24 
GR 0,90 0,48 1,38 4,42 2,36 6,78 
F 0,09 0,09 0,18 0,42 0,44 0,86 
IRL 2,32 2,33 4,65 7,58 7,60 15,18 
I 0,45 0,60 1,05 2,14 2,82 4,56 
L 0,14 0,00 0,14 0,49 0,01 0,50 
NL 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,21 0,00 0,21 
UK 0,16 0,07 0,23 0,98 0,43 1,41 
EC 10 0,16 0,17 0,33 0,80 0,84 l,64 
1974 
B 0,05 0,06 O,ll 0,21 0,26 0,47 
DK 0,08 0,07 0,15 0,33 0,30 0,63 
D 0,03 0,08 0,10 0,12 0,35 0,47 
F 0,05 0,12 0,17 0,19 0,51 0,70 
IRL 0,50 0,80 1,30 2,00 3,22 5,22 
I 0,10 0,24 0,34 0,43 1,07 1,50 
L 0,05 0,02 0,07 0,20 0,08 0,28 
NL 0,04 0,06 0,10 0,18 0,26 0,44 
UK 0,06 0,13 0,19 0,27 0,65 0,92 
EC 9 0,05 0,13 0,18 0,23 0,55 0,78 
EAGGF (Guidance Section), Social Fund and, for 1981, Regional Fund and EMS 
interest rate subsidies. 
2 EIB, ECSC and, for 1981, Euratom and NCI. 
Source: Commission departments. 
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Table 3 
GDP price deflators and effective exchange rates from 1950 to 1982, in relation to 17 major partners 
Movement of prices Effective Real eJ1change 
(in national currency) exchange rate 
rate I (Indices) 
Country in each in partner Relative {Indices) 
country countries prices (% p.a.) (% p.a.) l (Indices) 
2 3 = I : 2 4 5 = 3 X 4 
(a) 1960 in relation to 1950 
B 1,8 4,0 80,3 106,7 85,7 
OK 3,6 4,0 97,0 103,8 100,6 
0 3,1 3,9 92,l 106,1 97,6 
F 6,6 3,3 137,4 73,3 100,7 
IRL 4,6 4,3 102,7 102,0 104,8 
I 3,4 3,8 96,2 107,2 103,1 
NL 3,7 3,4 103,6 104,4 108,1 
UK 4,3 3,8 104,2 102,9 107,2 
(b) 1968 in relation to 1960 
B 3,2 3,9 94,9 99,1 94,0 
OK 6,0 3,6 120,1 95,3 114,5 
0 3,1 4,0 93,6 105,6 98,9 
F 3,9 3,6 102,7 100,1 102,7 
IRL' 4,7 3,6 106,9 100,4 107,3 
I 4,3 3,5 106,7 100,1 106,8 
NL 4,9 3,5 111, I 105,8 117,5 
UK' 3,7 3,6 100,5 99,6 100,0 
(c) 1978 in relation to 1968 
B 7,1 7,8 93,1 115,8 107,9 
OK 9,5 8,3 111,8 109,9 122,9 
0 5,4 8,3 76,0 159,1 120,9 
F 8,5 8,1 103,7 83,4 86,5 
IRL' 11,2 8,7 131,1 75,7 99,2 
I 12,2 7,4 154,8 52,5 81,3 
NL 7,9 7,5 103,5 118,0 122,2 
UK' 10,3 7,2 141,0 54,1 76,4 
(d) 1982 in relation to 1978 4 
B 5,3 8,2 89,7 '87,8 78,7 
OK 9,1 9,0 100,3 81,0 81,3 
0 4,4 9,0 84,2 107,2 90,3 
F 11,6 8,5 111,8 87,1 97,4 
IRL 15,9 10,8 119,7 86,9 104,0 
I 17,2 7,8 139,8 76,9 107,5 
NL 5,3 7,7 91,5 104,2 95,3 
UK 13,4 8,6 118,8 116,0 137,8 
I Export weighting, variable from year to year until 1977. 
2 UK and Ireland: 1966/60. 
3 UK and Ireland: 1978/66. 
4 1982 effective exchange rate using June 1982 central rates for EMS countries and forecasts for other countries appearing in economic budgets (May 1982). 
Source: Eurostat and Commission departments. 
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GRAPH 2: Re~tive price and cost movements in relation to 17 trading partners 
(Indices: 1970 - 100) I 
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ULC = Unit labour costs for the whole economy(= ratio between wages and salaries per employee and overall productivity per person employed, in indices). 
EXR = Effective exchange rate. 
PC = GDP deflator, in common currency. 
ULCC = Unit labour costs for the whole economy in common currency. 
I Export weighting, variable from year to year. 
( 1981-82-83: Economic budgets of8.6.1982. 
L~~~n~~~ates_:_from_:1une 198:_onwards, ~n1ral rates as at 14.6.19_8_2. ___ _ 
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GRAPH 2 (continued): Relative price and cost mo"Vements in relation to 17 trading partners 
(Indices: 1970 ~ IOO) I 
(a) in national currency (b) in common currency 
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GRAPH 2 (continued): Relative price and cost movements in relation to 17 trading partners 
(Indices: 1970 = 100) ' 
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1981-82·83: Economic budgets of 8.6.1982. 
Exchange rates: from June 1982 onwards, central rates as at 14.6.1982. 
Japan provided a different illustration of the long-term effect 
of basic economic variables on exchange rates. The rapid 
establishment of an industry characterized by high produc-
tivity and high profitability allowed the Japanese economy, 
where the growth rate of real GDP rose from the already high 
level of 7,2% a year in the early i950s (1952 to 1955) to 12,9% 
towards the end of the 1960s (]966 to 1969), to cover most of 
the gap in living standards which separated it from the 
United States and the Community. Throughout this period, 
the effective exchange rate of the yen remained remarkably 
stable (see Graph 2). The high level of growth did not lead to 
an external deficit: the productivity gains allowed the 
necessary resources to be made available for the development 
of exports and prevented a rate of inflation higher than those 
20 
of its trading partners (a difference of 1,6% a year during the 
period on average) from harming its competitiveness. A 
similar, though less dramatic, development occurred in the 
Netherlands in the process of the country's rapid indus-
trialization and of the exploitation of natural gas and the rise 
in its price. 
Differences in relative economic performance may thus fully 
justify changes in exchange rates. Deferring them too long 
results in costly distortions in the allocation of resources. 
This was no doubt the case in the example of the United 
Kingdom cited above, where the overvaluation of sterling, in 
connection with its initial status as a reserve currency under 
the Bretton Woods system, considerably reduced growth 
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potential. Conversely, such differences in economic perform-
ance may allow price divergences to continue without having 
an impact on current accounts and exchange rates. It should 
be emphasized, however, that the exchange rate shifts and 
the inflation differentials implied by the movements in the 
real economy are by their nature of limited size. As stated 
previously, the long-term growth path of an economy is 
determined by long-run policy options and by fundamental 
factors. Changes in the long-term growth path can only be 
gradual, barring severe economic or political shocks. 
Moreover, at least during a transitional period and within 
certain limits, compensatory capital flows may facilitate the 
necessary restructuring and reduce pressure on exchange 
rates (see Chapter 2, Section 4 below). In the search for 
stable exchange rates, the main effort in the short and the 
medium term inust therefore be concentrated on the 
convergence of prices; the fact of the matter is that, at 
present, divergences of costs and prices within the EMS are 
well in excess of what might be expected from the real 
phenomena described above. 
Section 3 - The need for, and implications of, 
exchange rate stability 
The development of international trade, and in particular of 
intra-Community trade, has been based to a large extent on 
exchange rate stability. It is difficult to imagine how frontiers 
could have been opened up and common policies established 
at European level if there had not been a substantial degree of 
certainty about economic variables as important as the 
relative prices of currencies. This achievement must be 
safeguarded and reinforced. The adoption of protectionist 
policies and the fragmentation of capital markets would turn 
the present stagnation into a deep depression aggravated by 
an international financial crisis. Growing commercial and 
financial interdependence is an enormous asset, but it implies 
responsibilities, which are themselves growing, towards 
other countries, especially in the area of exchange rates. 
The need for stable exchange rates derives not only from the 
requirements of economic integration. Recent experience 
shows that attempts to shake off the policy constraints 
imposed on economic policies by the need to maintain 
currency parities may rapidly prove fruitless, and indeed 
harmful. The switch to a system of floating exchange rates 
gave national authorities greater freedom in the conduct of 
economic and monetary policy. This room for manoeUvre 
was used in very different ways by Member States, 
particularly when they faced major problems of domestic 
adjustment and of restoring external balances following the 
first oil price shock. A look at Graph 2 shows the extent of 
the resultant divergences in terms of relative prices and 
exchange rates. Some countries, such as Italy and the United 
Kingdom, thought ·they could tolerate greater monetary 
expansion and Price increases than their partners, in the hope 
that they could thus underpin their growth and prevent a fall 
in employment. In the Federal Republic of Germany and, to 
a lesser extent, in the other countries making up the 'snake', it 
was thought preferable to contain monetary expansion and 
inflationary pressures, in the belief that more moderate price 
trends provided a better basis for investment, growth and 
employment. France for its part adopted a middle course. 
The result of these differing options was that nominal 
divergences steadily increased and fed on themselves; a 
cumulative process involving exchange rates, prices and costs 
became established and contributed nothing to the solution 
of the underlying problems. At least, the establishment of 
'virtuous circles' of revaluation and price stabilization had 
the advantage of bringing such problems out into the open; 
conversely, countries that allowed themselves to get caught 
in a spiral of devaluation and revaluation were in danger of 
masking the scale and urgency of the adjustments required 
and of increasing their cost by delaying them. The cost and 
price divergences resulting from these differirig economic 
and monetary options have proved extremely difficult to 
reduce, and their effect is still felt today within the EMS. 
The fact that such wide divergences have developed since the 
abandonment of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system 
and the move to floating exchange rates raises the question as 
to which system served better to promote the convergence of 
economic policy, while avoiding excessive rigidity. In 
examining this question, practical arrangements governing 
the application of such systems are more important than the 
principles which led to their introduction. Clearly, exchange 
rate fluctuations since 1973 have been erratic and on a larger 
scale than the advocates of floating exchange rates had 
anticipated. The introduction of that system did not in itself 
mean the abandonment of the disciplines that were necessary 
for stability. Experience has shown, however, that people 
seriously underestimated the danger that certain trends 
which corrected in many cases a back-log of delayed and 
necessary adjustment would be magnified. 
The exchange rate system established at Bretton Woods was 
accompanied by fairly remarkable stability and convergence 
of prices (see Table 2 and Graph 2). Divergences in relative 
prices between 1950 and 1968 above or below an average 
Community inflation rate of less than 4% were rarely in 
excess ofan annual rate of2%, the average divergence being 
close to l %- Nevertheless, the accumulation of such sffiall 
divergences led, because of the relative rigidity of nominal 
exchange rates, to the undervaluation or overvaluation of 
currencies over long periods. The persistence of such 
situations produces disequilibria: the export industries in 
countries with undervalued currencies develop too fast while 
countries with overvalued currencies, failing adjustment 
through a fall in relation to prices, are forced to restrict their 
growth so as to prevent their external deficits from growing. 
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The floating of currencies should have allowed gradual 
correction of such situations. The differing options chosen 
for economic and monetary policy, though not an inevitable 
by-product of floating currencies, contributed greatly to the 
phenomenon of overadjustment. However, the risk of 
exchange rate instability would have been there even if there 
had been greater convergence. In the absence of fixed 
margins offluctuation, the markets were led to adopt a very 
short-term view of economic performance and to overreact 
to the signals given by the direction of economic and 
monetary policies. Graph 2 show that in many cases, 
particularly in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, 
exchange rate fluctuation went well beyond the point 
justified by inflation differentials-great as these were-and 
by the correction of unsatisfactory initial positions. The 
disadvantages of excessive exchange rate rigidity were 
replaced by the undoubtedly graver disadvantages of 
disorderly movements around highly divergent medium-
term trends. 
Despite recent experience, and whatever the exchange rate 
system operated, it is entirely feasible that nominal variables 
should converge towards greater price stability. The success 
of a number of countries within and outside the Community 
in the fight against inflation proves this, as does the 
satisfactory convergence of prices and costs during the 1950s 
and 1960s. However, the extent of the difficulties to be 
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overcome must not be underestimated. The nature and scale 
of the problems to be solved will be examined in greater detail 
in Chapter II. It is, however, possible at this point to outline 
in broad terms the measures to be pursued. 
The defence of stable exchange rates rests primarily with 
national monetary policies and their close coordination. To 
put an extreme case, monetary policy may successfully be 
used to defend the parity of a currency even where an 
unfavourable inflation differential has built up vis-a-vis 
trading partners. In such circumstances, the pressures on the 
exchange rate will require an ever more restrictive stance of 
monetary policy. Such a tightening is beneficial, and indeed 
essential, in thwarting inflationary expectations and reveal-
ing the need for domestic adjustment. However, just as a 
relaxation of monetary discipline cannot in itself generate a 
lasting resumption of growth, so a tightening of monetary 
policy, unaccompanied by budgetary rigour and moderation 
in the growth of nominal incomes, will not be sufficient to 
establish a secure process of disinflation, save through a 
renewed depression in economic activity. These general 
considerations explain why the pursuit of convergence is 
often seen as incompatible with the requirements of growth 
and employment. In point of fact, it is not so much in the 
stance to be adopted by policy as in the formation of the mix 
of the various measures that the risks of incompatibility arise 
at present. 
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CHAPTER II 
The convergence of economic and monetary 
policies under the EMS: the progress to be 
achieved 
The setting up of the EMS was a defensive reaction designed 
to ward off the dangers of disintegration posed in the late 
1970s by monetary disorder and growing uncertainty in the 
international economic environment. It was a positive 
reaction, since it did not mean a return to isolation, but a 
difficult effort to establish jointly a zone of stability. It wasa 
realistic reaction·, because past experience prompted a certain 
degree of modesty in its declared ambitions. 1 The first task 
was to redefine intervention rules and credit mechanisms, 
adapting them or broadening them as the case might be, so as 
to achieve greater symmetry between the obligations of the 
·strong' currencies and those of the 'weak' currencies. There 
was above all a need to reaffirm in practice the principle 
already laid down in the Treaty whereby policies with regard 
to rates of exchange must be treated _as a matter of common 
concern (Article 107) and to draw from this principle the 
fullest conclusions for the convergence of economic policies. 
By rejecting fixed parities and deciding to make changes in 
central rates a matter of mutual agreement rather than the 
automatic application of pre-established economic criteria, a 
pragmatic approach was adopted based on the coordination 
of national policies and aimed at endowing the system with 
sufficient flexibility. Such an approach was necessary, 
because trends as divergent as those which had recently 
developed could not be changed immediately, while the 
Bretton Woods system had shown the disadvantages of 
excessive exchange rate rigidity. 
Section l - Insufficient convergence towards 
stability 
Recent assessments of the operation of the EMS from its 
introduction on 13 March 1979 up to the end of 1981 2 
highlight the fact that the greater exchange rate stability and 
improved monetary management attributable to it have not 
resulted in increased convergence in the area of costs and 
prices. The available forecasts for 1982 confirm. the 
persistence of a high average inflation rate for the 
Community and marked divergences between Member 
States. 
On the setting up of the EMS, see European Economy No 3, July 1979 .. 
2 See Chapter 5 of the Annual Economic Review 1981-82, European 
Economy No JO. November 1981, and Part Two below entitled 'The 
development of the EMS in its present institutional framework'. 
Price rises in 1981 and those anticipated for 1982 (see 
Table 4(a) and (b) indicate only a modest change in the 
inflation rate for the Community as a whole. In 1982, the 
Community consumer price deflator will have risen again by 
I 0%, whereas the increase will have slowed down distinctly in 
the United States (6,4% as against 8,3% the previous year) 
and will have stayed at a low level in Japan (4,3%). The 
persistence of these differentials may be expected to affect the 
competitiveness of European products on export markets 
and to mean that the European currencies will show a 
continued tendency to weaken, thus limiting the scope for a 
fall in interest rates, even if they were to fall in the United 
States. 
This mediocre performance for the Community as a whole is 
the result of the very uneven performance achieved in this 
area in the various Member States. Price differentials within 
the Community are today wider than those recorded on 
average during the period 1974-78 following the first oil price 
shock. In 1981, taking only the Member States effectively 
participating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism, there 
was a difference of close to 15 percentage points between the 
most stable country, Germany, and the country in which 
inflation was highest, Ireland. The inflation rate in France is 
twice, and in Italy three times, the rate in Germany. The 
forecasts for 1982 indicate that the Member States with a low 
level of inflation, such as Germany and the Netherlands, will 
improve their performances. In the other Member States, 
progress will be uneven. In Italy and Ireland, though there 
will be an appreciable improvement, the rise in prices will still 
be in excess of 15%. In the United Kingdom, the inflation 
rate will fall below 10%. There will be no major deceleration 
in France and Denmark, and Belgium will feel the effect of 
the devaluation of the Belgian franc which occurred early in 
the year. 
Beyond a certain threshold such divergences in inflation rates 
will inevitably have an impact on the nominal exchange rates 
of the EMS currencies. During the three and a half years of 
its operation, the EMS has seen six concerted realignment 
operations, the main features of which are set out in 
Table 5(a). Taking the last two realignments (of February 
and June this year) into account, the variations in effective 
exchange rates between the participating currencies have 
been close on average to those which occurred between 1973 
and 1979 (see Table 5(b). At first sight, this might prompt 
doubts as to the capacity of the system to establish greater 
exchange rate stability. The recent trend towards more 
frequent and more extensive realignments provided serious 
cause for concern (see Chapter III below). However, taking 
the period of operation as a whole, the results achieved may 
be seen to be positive. 
First, there has been a reduction in the very short-term 
variability of exchange rates between currencies participat-
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Table 4 
Price changes within the Community: annual rates of 
change(%) 
1968 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 
1960 1968 1974 1978 1979 1980 
(a) Consumer prices 
B 3,2 5,9 7,9 3,9 6,5 7,6 
DK 5,3 8,6 9,9 9,6 11,5 10,7 
D 2,9 5,4 4,5 4,0 5,3 5,9 
GR 2,3 8,3 12,6 l 7,7 23,7 24,4 
F 3,9 7,2 9,8 10,9 13,2 12,5 
IRL 3,8 10,3 15,l 13,4 18,3 20,5 
I 3,8 8,7 16,7 15,0 20,4 19,0 
NL 3,9 7,8 7,4 4,3 6,6 6,7 
UK 3,5 8,7 15,6 14,3 15,5 10,7 
EC: mean 2 3,5 7,3 10,4 9,7 12,l l l,O 
EC: weighted <lisper-
sion 3 0,4 1,2 4,l 4,3 4,9 3,7 
(b) GDP deflator 
B 3,2 6,8 7,6 4,3 4,4 5,0 
DK 5,7 9,2 10,2 7,7 8,4 9,6 
D 3,0 6,1 4,3 3,9 4,7 4,3 
GR 3,0 9,0 13,4 18,7 18,4 20,2 
F 4,0 7,2 10,5 10,6 11,5 11,8 
IRL 4,5 10,6 16,2 12,4 14,1 18,l 
I 4,3 9,0 17,1 15,7 20,4 17,6 
NL (4,9) 7,9 7,9 4,2 5,3 6,0 
UK 3,7 8,7 16,5 15,l 18,9 11,8 
EC: mean 2 3,8 7,6 10,8 9 ,9 11,8 10,2 
EC: weighted <lisper-
sion 3 0,5 l, I 4,3 4,5 5,6 4,1 
Forecasts: economic budgets, May 1982. 
Weighted by GDP valued at 1975 purchasing power parities. 
Weighted averages of absolute differences from the mean (see Note 2). 
Source: Eurostat and Commission departments. 
1982 1 
1981 
10,2 
10,l 
4,7 
24,0 
13,3 
18,5 
15,0 
5,8 
9,5 
10,0 
3,6 
8,2 
10,6 
4,4 
23,2 
12,7 
18,6 
15,8 
6,2 
8,5 
9,6 
3,9 
ing in the system, including the Italian lira, which enjoys a 
wider margin of fluctuation about its central rate (see 
Table 6). By contrast, the exchange rates of the non-
participating currencies have remained highly volatile and 
and this short-term instability has been part of very large 
long-term fluctuations: since the middle of 1980, the yen has 
appreciated by some 50% against the ECU, following a 
similar fall during 1979 and early 1980; in June 1982, I ECU 
was worth less than USO I as against USO 1,45 in July 1980, 
equivalent to a depreciation of the order of 50% in the ECU 
against the dollar. 
Secondly, Table 5(b) shows that the fall in effective exchange 
rates in countries such as France, Italy and Ireland, which 
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have experienced more rapid inflation than the other 
countries, has been constrained within narrower limits 
during the period of operation of the EMS than the previous 
period. The adjustments in central rates have only partly 
compensated for the movement in relative costs and prices. 
This has resulted in a gradual real appreciation of these 
currencies, particularly the Irish pound (see Table 7). The 
establishment of the EMS has thus put an end to the 
phenomena of overadjustment previously observed and has 
made for a return to more normal conditions and a less 
tolerant approach to inflation. This same concern to correct 
· initial situations which were not sustainable in the long run 
justified the downward adjustments in the central rates for 
the Danish krone and the Belgian franc. On the other hand, 
the relative positions of Germany and the Netherlands 
altered little between 1978 and 1982, protecting these 
countries against imported inflation and preserving a 
necessary pole of stability within the system as a whole. 
Table 5 
Changes in exchange rates within the .EMS 
(a) Realignments in central rates, 
percentage change against the group of currencies 
whose bilateral parities were not changed 
Dates of realignments 
24 30 22 5 22 14 
September November March October February June 
1979 1979 1981 1981 1982 1982 
BFR/LFR -8,5 
DKR -2,9 -4,8 -3 
DM +2 +5,5 +4,25 
FF -3 -5,75 
IRL 
LIT -6 -3 -2,75 
HFL +5,5 +4,25 
(b) Variations in effective e,i:change rates 1 
relative to EMS partners, 
annual percentages 
1979 1982 2 1980 1981 1982 2 
1973 1979 1979 1980 1981 
B + 1,3 -3,l -0,l -0,4. - 9,l 
DK -1,1 -3,9 -6,8 +0,1 - 4,7 
D + 4,6 +4,7 + 1,2 +3,0 + 10,0 
F -3,0 -2,2 + 1,0 -1,1 -.6,4 
IRL -6,l +0,2 +O,l -0,5 +0,9 
I -9,4 -4,8 -3,5 -5,0 -5,9 
NL + 1,7 +2,6 +0,7 +0,7 +6,5 
UK' -4,9 +6,5 +9,9 +9,9 -0,0 
E,i:port weighting, variable from year to year until 1977. 
Forecasts: economic budgets, May 1982. The realignment of central rates on 14 June 
1982 is taken into account. 
In relation to Community countries. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission departments. 
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Table 6 
Monthly nriability of major currencies against the 
ECUI 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
BFR/LFR 38,5 6,2 11,4 8,4 9,0 8,3 
DKR 33,8 32,4 7,7 32,7 4,5 8,4 
DM 42,7 11,6 11, 7 8,6 9,6 19,7 
FF 30,1 9,6 18,0 7,4 6,1 13,8 
JRL 63,5 11,3 23,8 7,7 9,2 6,3 
LIT 55,5 21,1. 24,8 9,8 17,9 21,8 
HFL 39,0 5,7 11,3 9,0 4,4 21,0 
EMS average 2 43,3 13,9 15,5 11,9 8,7 14,2 
UKL 63,2 11,3 23,8 32,2 44,7 40,3 
USD 20,1 24,9 49,1 28,1 34,4 62,3 
Yen 34,1 39,2 70,8 87,5 82,2 25,9 
Coefficient of variation ( standard deviation of end-of-month rates for each currency in 
ECU, divided by the annual average of such rates). Results multiplied by I 000. 
Unweightcd average. 
Source: Commission departments. 
Table 7 
It may be concluded that despite the instability of the 
international monetary environment, the disruptions caused 
by the second oil price shock and persistent divergences in 
nominal variables, the EMS has succeeded in reestablishing a 
more orderly structure of exchange rates between particip-
ants and in reducing volatility. This achievement, the fruit of 
an initial phase during which order was restored, will be 
seriously compromised if greater convergence in economic 
policies is not established. Greater exchange rate stability 
requires more moderate and more closely aligned growth of 
nominal variables, and this achievement cannot without 
damage be put off any longer. Failing this, the EMS would 
gradually change in nature to become something similar to a 
crawling peg system of parities. 
The measures to be taken towards this end are in no way 
inconsistent with the efforts which, irrespective of the EMS, 
must be made in all the Member States to promote 
employment and growth. Appropriately applied, they are on 
the contrary likely to reinforce them. 
Adjustment of relative changes I in costs and prices in relation to EMS partners 
Country 
B 
DK 
D 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
UK' 
(a) Relative change in unit labour costs 2 
- whole economy; indices 
in common currency 
Relative level Relative level 
-in 1978 in 1982 3 ( = available margins ( = margins sti!I 
relative to available relative 
different base to different base 
periods = 100) periods = 100) 
1978 1978 1978 1982 1982 
1970 061-70 0 68-72 1970 061-70 
117,8 111,4 115,1 99,0 93,9 
!02,7 104,8 !02,7 90,3 92,1 
99,1 !06,4 !03,0 94,6 !02,0 
92,6 B 1, 1 89,3 103,0 90,2 
77,9 74,8 82,2 !03,0 99,0 
82,7 81,4 82,7 95,7 94,2 
112,9 121,7 111,5 112,6 121,3 
76,3 69,8 77,7 112,2 !02,6 
Export weighting, variable from year lo year until 1977. 
(b) Relative change in GDP price: 
indices in common currency 
Relative level Relative level 
in 1978 in 1982 3 
( = available margins ( = margins still 
relative to available relative 
different base to different base 
periods = 100) periods = 100) 
1982 1978 1978 1978 1982 1982 
0 68-72 1970 061-70 0 68-72 1970 061-70 
96,9 105,6 !02,5 !05,7 87,8 85,2 
90,3 110,2 112,5 I I0,3 I00,7 !02,9 
98,8 !04,0 111,2 !07,2 IOl,9 !09,0 
99,3 92,9 B3,3 89,9 98,6 88,4 
!06,2 82,6 80,1 83,4 II0,4 !07,0 
95,8 77,6 76,5 78,0 90,9 89,6 
111,2 119,1 123,2 116,3 121,2 125,2 
114,2 80,1 73,4 80,6 117,8 !07,9 
Index of compensation of employees per employee divided by the index of productivity per person employed. 
ForccaslS: economic budgets, May 1982. The realignments of 14 June 1982 arc taken into account. 
Change relative to Community countries. 
Sources: Eurostat and Commission departments. 
1982 
0 68-72 
87,9 
I00,8 
!05,0 
95,4 
111,5 
91,4 
118,3 
118,5 
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Section 2 - Stronger action and a wider range 
of measures to control inflation 
As earlier reviews show, 1 the EMS has provided a major 
incentive to improved coordination of monetary policies. 
First, domestic monetary conditions have been adjusted on 
several occasions, in an orderly and carefully judged way, to 
enable the margins to be respected. In this day-to-day 
management, interest rates were often changed to avoid 
breaches of fluctuation margins or a need for substantial 
intervention. Moreover, in spite of occasional strains, the 
extreme volatility of US interest rates has not been reflected 
in the nominal interest rates for EMS currencies, which have 
been approximately parallel even though at different levels 
because of differences in rates of inflation. Secondly, in the 
longer-term perspective adopted in this study, policies to 
regulate monetary aggregates have been more closely 
convergent than in the past. 
Between 1979 and 1981, most of the Member States reacted 
to the inflationary strains resulting from. the further rise in 
the price of oil products by considerably reducing the rate of 
expansion of the money supply. During those three years, the 
growth oftlie broadly-defined money supply (M2-M3) was 
much slower in most of the Member States than it had been 
from 1974 to 1978, and about the same as it was in the 1960s 
(see Table 8). The slowdown was particularly marked in 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. It was less marked 
in the other Member States, especially in Ireland and Italy, 
where the money supply continued to expand by over 15% a 
year. 
In present conditions, monetary policy has very little room 
for manreuvre. Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom have already taken advantage of the scope for a 
gradual reduction in interest rates opened up by lower 
inflation and improved external balance. In the other 
member countries, however, although the slower rate of 
monetary expansion was reflected in stable or declining 
liquidity ratios, the regulation of monetary aggregates has on 
balance been fairly accommodating towards inflation, to 
judge by the trend of the money supply per unit of output (see 
Table 8), which has continued to expand at the same rate as 
previously or only slightly less. In these countries, any easing 
of quantitative monetary policy could only lead to further 
inflationary surges. On the other hand, a marked decline in 
the rate of monetary growth would lead to a significant 
decline in the rate of inflation only at the cost of a further, 
damaging fall in economic activity. 
Monetary policy cannot bear the burden of the fight against 
inflation alone. If the constraints on monetary policy are 19 
Sec note 2 on page 23 .. 
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be loosened and a fall of interest rates is to get under way, 
then support must come from other types of action. 
Convergence must be sought in two other areas of economic 
policy, where progress has been more modest and results very 
varied: the control of budget deficits and the moderation of 
wage costs. 
In 1981 and 1982, the general government borrowing 
requirement for the Community as a whole reached 5% of 
GDP, a figure previously recorded only in 1975, after the first 
oil shock. None of the Member States can boast a general 
government surplus, but the deficits vary from less than 2% 
of GDP in the United Kingdom to over 14% in Ireland. 
These large budget deficits make it much more difficult to 
control monetary expansion, since rising interest rates or 
stricter credit controls have adverse effects on private 
investment expenditure and real growth. The longer these 
deficits last, the less likely it is that the public will believe that 
a stabilizing monetary policy will be persisted in. Quite apart 
from the bad effect of the budget deficit on the current 
account of the balance of payments, these expectations 
aggravate the downward pressure on the exchange rate and 
push interest rates still higher. The increase in the cost of 
servicing the debt then further swells budgetary expenditure. 
Table 9 shows, for the various Member States, the ratio of 
the absolute value of the general government borrowing 
requirement to that of the annual change in the money 
supply. These ratios are not directly comparable from one 
country to another, since they depend also on the structural 
liquidity ratio of each economy. However, the changes of the 
ratio in any given country can serve as an indicator of the 
restrictiveness of monetary policy in relation to changes in 
fiscal balance. It is a more significant indicator than a 
breakdown of the means of financing the budgetary deficit 
into categories of lenders (banking sector, non-banking 
sector and external sector); it allows for compensatory 
mov_ements between the various counterparts of the money 
supply and the banks' opportunities for developing non-
monetary commitments. 
From 1979-80, the general government borrowing require-
ment increased in relation to the extra monetary financing 
put at the disposal of the economy each year in all the 
Member States except the United Kingdom. The increase 
was particularly large in Belgium, where a marked expansion 
of the public deficit coincided with a substantial slowdown in 
the rate of increase of monetary financing. The phenomenon 
was less noticeable in Germany and the Netherlands, where 
the general government borrowing requirement has re~ 
mained fairly stable as a percentage of GDP. In Denmark 
and in Ireland, and to a lesser extent in Italy, the financial 
pressure resulting from fast-growing or very large budget 
deficits was partly offset because the rate of monetary 
expansion slowed down less. In France, the rate of monetary 
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Table 8 
Monetary aggregates: annual percentage changes 
1968 1974 1978 1979 1980 
1960 1968 1974 1978 1979 
Belgium 
I. Money supply 1 8,3 11,8 12,7 7,9 4,3 
2. Liquidity ratio 0,4 -0,6 2,9 1,0 -2,5 
3. Money supply per unit 
of output 3,6 6,1 10,7 5,4 1,8 
FR of Germany 
I. Money supply I 10,3 10,9 9,2 9,6 5,3 
2. Liquidity ratio 2,7 0,1 2,2 1,1 -1,4 
3. Money supply per unit 
of output 5,8 6,2 6,7 5,0 3,2 
Ireland 
1. Money supply 1 9,2 15,2 17,7 29,2 14,5 
2. Liquidity ratio 0,3 -0,4 -3,0 12,2 -1,5 
3. Money supply per unit 
of output 4,8 10,2 12,8 26,1 12,4 
The Netherlands 
I. Money supply 1 8,5 13,7 10,6 4,8 8,0 
2. Liquidity ratio -1,4 0,3 0,2 -1,l 2,0 
3. Money supply per unit 
of output 3,5 8,3 8,1 3,0 7,4 
Average money supply. 
DK, F. NL: M2 
D, I, IRL: M3 
B: M2H 
UK: UKL M3 
Commissiort staff forecast. 
Source: Commission departments. 
expansion has followed the changes in the fiscal balance 
fairly closely, and only at the end of the period did signs of 
crowding out rrbegin to appear on the capital markets. In the 
United Kingdom, in contrast to other member countries, the 
capital market pres.sure coming from general government 
has been progressiVely reduced, without any relaxation of 
monetary policy, since fiscal deficits are gradually being 
eliminated. This schematic analysis demonstrates that 
reducing government deficits, or at least keeping them under 
control, could make monetary stabilization easier; in the 
countries where the rate of monetary expansion is suf-
ficiently low and where inflation rates are beginning to 
decline, such action could restore a margin for real growth; 
in the other countries, it would make it possible to slow down 
the rate of monetary expansion without creating intolerably 
restrictive effects. 
1981 ~ 1968 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 ~ 
1980 1981 1960 1968 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Denmark 
5,4 7,4 10,5 9,8 13,6 9,3 8,4 11,8 12,0 
1,6 -1,2 -0,5 -2,6 0,8 -1,6 0,2 2,2 -1,6 
6,6 6,9 5,2 6,3 11,1 6,1 8,6 12,0 8,8 
France 
6,5 5,6 13,7 14,1 14,9 13,5 11,8 12,6 14, I 
2,1 0,2 3,8 0,9 1,0 -0,4 -1,0 0,5 -0,8 
6,5 4,6 7,9 8,1 11,6 10,1 10,4 12,4 11,8 
Italy 
21,5 17,5 13,6 16,2 22,4 22,8 19,9 17,9 15,8 
1,1 -3,1 3,0 2,0 2,8 1,2 -4,2 0,5 -1,8 
19,4 15,0 7,4 11, I 20,4 17,1 15,3 18,1 13,7 
United Kingdom 
6,6 6,8 5,4 13,7 9,9 12,8 14,9 15,6 12,4 
2,0 0,0 -1,4 2,1 -7,3 -3,4 -2,0 4,7 2,3 
8,1 6,2 2,3 11,0 7,9 11,2 · 16,5 17,0 11,0 
The limits encountered in the implementation of stability-
oriented monetary policies and the varying degree of success 
attained are also due to the difficulty of containing nominal 
increases in income, particularly wages. The simultaneous 
achievement of lower inflation and rising levels of employ-
ment depends in fact on a shift in the functional distribution 
of incomes which changed markedly in the first half of the 
1970s. After increasing rapidly during this period, the real 
wage gap (the gap between changes in real wages and changes 
in productivity adjusted for changes in the terms of trade) 
afterwards narrowed only very slowly in the Community as a 
whole (see Table 10). This general tendency covers divergent 
trends in the different Member States. In Belgium, the fairly 
satisfactory development of prices was not accompanied by 
an equivalent slowdown in nominal wages. In France, Italy 
and Ireland, the real wage gapp was wider in 1981 than in 
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Table 9 
Budget deficits and changes in money Supply 1 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 2 
Belgium 
I. D/6M(l = 2:3) 32,8 31,0 41,2 60,5 81,2 86,7 170,7 515,9 297,8 244,6 
2. D/Y (as%) 3,0 2,0 4,3 5,l 5,3 5,7 7,0 9,4 13,l 12,4 
3. 6 M/Y (as %) 9,2 6,8 10,6 8,6 6,7 6,8 4,2 l,9 4,5 5,2 
Denmark 
I. D/6M (l = 2:3) - ll5,0 -48,8 19,9 16,l 40,3 78,7 77,5 130,4 163,8 171,2 
2. D/Y (as%) -5,9 -1,8 2,0 0,8 1, 7 2,2 3,1 5,9 7,2 8,8 
3. 6 M/Y (as %) 5,1 3,7 10,0 4,9 4,3 2,9 4,0 4,5 4,4 5,2 
FR of Germany 
I. D/6M(l = 2:3) -28,5 38,2 154,6 97,6 49,2 54,5 106,8 l 18,9 189,l 151, l 
2. D/Y (as%) -1,2 l,4 5,8 3,6 2,4 2,8 3,0 3,5 4,5 3,9 
3. 6M/Y (as%) 4,2 3,6 3,7 3,7 5,0 5,1 2,8 2,9 2,4 2,6 
France 
I. D/6M (l = 2:3) -14,l -8,8 27,l 8,l 12,4 31,2 12,4 -9,9 36,7 47,9 
2. D/Y (as%) -0,9 -0,6 2,2 0,5 0,8 l,8 0,8 -0,5 - l,9 -2,9 
3. 6 M/Y (as %) 6,7 7,l 8,3 6,0 6,5 5,7 6,6 4,5 5,2 6,l 
Ireland 
I. D/6M (l = 2:3) 29,l 59,9 105,6 97,0 79,8 56,2 108,0 124,1 144,9 166,5 
2. D/Y (as%) 3,9 7,2 l 1,3 7,7 7,l 8,6 ll,9 12,8 15,l 14,4 
3. 6 M/Y (as %) 13,2 12,0 10,7 7,9 9,0 15,2 l l,O 10,3 10,4 8,6 
Italy 
l. D/6M(l = 2:3) 37,2 56,l 60,2 48,3 40,4 46,0 46,l 56,3 84,3 84,7 
2. D/Y (as%) 7,0 7,0 l l,7 9,0 8,0 9,7 9,5 8,4 ll,9 11,1 
3. 6 M/Y (as %) 18,8 12,5 19,4 18,6 19,7 21,2 20,7 14,9 14, l 13,l 
The Netherlands 
l. D/6M (l = 2:3) -18,2 l,5 144,5 34,5 116,7 160,l 139,3 248,7 288,0 261,9 
2. D/Y (as%) - l,l O,l 2,7 2,4 l,4 2,2 3,1 3,4 4,6 4,2 
3. 6 M/Y (as %) 6,l 6,0 l,9 6,8 l,2 l,4 2,2 l,4 l,6 l,6 
United Kingdom 
l. D/6M (l = 2:3) 38,0 97,3 223,9 172,9 ll8,7 103,8 94,l 72,9 62,6 65,8 
2. D/Y (as%) 3,5 3,8 4,9 5,0 3,4 4,3 3,3 2,5 2,4 l,9 
3. 6M/Y (as%) 9,2 3,9 2,2 2,9 2,9 4,l 3,4 4,9 3,8 2,9 
D: General government borrowing requirement ( +) or finllncial surplus ( - ). 
Y: GDP at current prices. 
2 
6. M: Change in money supply during the year (absolute value). The money supply is defined as in Table 8, Note I. 
Forecasts by Commission departments (economic budgets for May-June 1982). 
Source: Eurostat and Commission deparunents. 
1975, when it was already very wide compared to the average 
level of the 1960s. The forecasts for 1982, however, indicate 
an improvement in these countries, especially in Ireland and, 
thanks to the recovery plan introduced after the realignment 
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of the Belgian franc, in Belgium. In the other Member States, 
the real wage gap should continue to improve. 
There is no alternative but to persevere in the attempt to 
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control wage costs, and to suppOrt such restraint by 
measures to promote saving, if the foundations of a 
Table 10 
Compensation of employees 
B DK D F 
sustainable recovery of investment are to be laid and the rise 
in unemployment held back. 
IRL NL UK EC 
(a) Per capita compensation I: annual change as % 
1960-1968 4,1 5,0 4,7 5,1 4,6 6,6 6,0 2,7 4,5 
1968-1974 6,2 3,5 6,3 4,6 5,5 5,7 5,6 3,9 5,3 
1974-1978 3,9 0,9 2,7 4,1 4,3 2,9 2,3 0,9 2,5 
1979 1,8 -0,4 1,5 2,4 3,9 2,4 1,5 3,0 2,1 
1980 1,3 -2,9 1,2 0,9 1,9 1,3 -1,1 4,1 1,4 
1981 1,1 -0,7 -0,6 1,3 -1,9 0,7 -2,7 2,7 0,4 
1982 3 -2,6 1,7 0,0 0,7 -2,1 2,1 -0,1 -0,6 0,1 
(b) Real wage gap 2: annual average 1961-70 = 100 
1961-1970 !00.0 100,0 IOO,O !00,0 !00,0 !00,0 !00,0 !00,0 !00,0 
1975 116,6 111,1 110,5 !07,1 !08,2 117,8 115,3 116,4 112,5 
1978 119,6 !03,0 !06,9 !08,2 !02,9 117,5 114,0 !04,8 !09,1 
1979 120,4 IOl,8 106,1 !07,3 !08,4 115,6 116,7 !06,5 109,0 
1980 121,8 98,7 107,7 !08,6 113,4 114,5 116,6 !09,3 107,9 
1981 124,3 97,6 !07,4 110,7 !09,7 117,5 113,5 !07,4 !08,0 
1982 3 119,3 96,2 !04,9 110,2 102,9 118,1 110,0 !04,5 !06,2 
Compensation of employees per employee divided by retail price index. 
Compensation of employees per employee divided by retail price index and aggregate productivity (real GDP per person employed) adjusted for changes in the terms of trade. 
Forecasts: Economic budgets, May 1982. 
Sourn': Eurostat and Commission departments. 
Section 3 - Correcting structural macro-
economic disequilibria 
Apart from a brief pause in 1978-79 following a moderate 
recovery of economic activity, unemployment has been rising 
steadily in the Community since 1973. As a percentage of the 
labour force, the average rate of unemployment in 1982 will 
be twice as high as that observed from 1975 to 1978 (see 
Table 11). The deterioration of the labour market began 
earlier and was more gradual in Belgium, France, Italy and 
Ireland; it began later but was even more brutal in other 
countries and it now affects all the Member States. Cyclical 
recovery alone will not reverse so strong and persistent a 
trend and such a recovery appears uncertain at present in 
view of the international economic and monetary environ-
ment. The restoration of a durable growth vigorous enough 
to reduce unemployment depends on an internal adjustment 
which will require great effort. To achieve this aim, all the 
instruments of economic policy must be deployed to a single 
end. The specific measures needed in areas as varied as 
industrial policy, employment and the improvement of 
financial flows must be part of a general macroeconomic 
approach designed to correct the growing structural 
disequilibria which have gradually come to disfigure the 
European economies. 
A comparison of the present breakdown of the uses of GDP 
with that prevalent from 1968 to 1972, when growth, 
employment and the current balance of payments position 
were satisfactory in most of the Member States, shows how 
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Table 11 
Unemployment and growth 
1960- 1969- 1975- 1979 1980 1981 
1968 1974 1978 
(a) Rate of unemployment 
as % of labour force 2 
B 2,2 2,7 6,3 8,7 9,4 l l,5 
DK l,2 l,3 4,7 5,3 6,2 8,5 
D 0,9 l ,l 3,7 3,4 3,4 4,8 
GR (2,2) (2,8) (3,l) 
F 0,8 l,6 4,l 6,0 6,4 7,6 
IRL 4,4 5,4 8,3 7,4 8,3 8,7 
I 5,6 4,8 5,8 7,5 8,0 8,8 
L O,l 0,0 0,3 0,7 0,7 l,O 
NL 0,8 l,8 3,9 4,l 4,8 7,5 
UK l,8 2,7 4,6 5,3 6,9 l0,6 
EC 2,P 2,43 4,63 5,4 6,0 7,9 
I Forecasts by Commission departments: Economic budgets, May 1982. 
2 SOEC definition. 
3 Excluding Greece. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission departments. 
the allocation of resources has become distorted (see 
Table 12). 
The figures show that the adjustments made after external 
shocks were insufficient to keep the current account of the 
Community as a whole in surplus. The expansion in the 
volume of exports of goods and services served only partially 
to offset the deterioration in the terms of trade and the 
growing debt service payments caused by rising interest rates 
and the expansion of foreign borrowing. 
During this period, the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands managed to improve their balance of payments 
positions on goods and services, by developing their oil and 
gas and obtaining higher prices for them. In Denmark also 
the balance on goods and services improved, but this was not 
reflected in an improved current balance, because of the cost 
of servicing the external debt. With the exception of these 
countries and of Germany, where the deficit is shrinking, the 
balance on goods and services in the Member States was in 
deficit in 1981. In particular, foreign trade has deteriorated 
considerably in recent years in Belgium and Ireland. The 
deficits of these countries reached disproportionate levels in 
I 981. Belgium is the only Member State where the balance on 
goods and services, adjusted for changes in the terms of 
trade, has not improved since 1968-72. In France and Italy, 
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1982 I 1968 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1 
1960 l968 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 
(b) Annual growth rate 
of real GDP (as %) 
13,4 4,5 5,3 l,8 2,3 2,5 - l,l 0,5 
8,9 5,0 3,5 2,5 3,0 -0,2 -0,2 2,9 
6,7 4,2 4,3 2,3 4,3 2,0 0,0 l,O 
(3,6) 7,3 6,2 5,5 3,8 l,7 -0,7 0,8 
8,7 5,4 5,4 2,8 3,0 l,3 0,2 2,2 
l0,8 4,2 4,3 4,l 2,4 l,9 l,8 2,2 
9,6 5,7 4,5 l,6 4,9 4,0 -0,2 l,8 
l,3 2,7 5,2 -0,2 4,l 0,7 -2,4 0,6 
9,9 4,8 5,0 2,3 l,8 0,6 -1,4 0,5 
ll,7 3,0 2,5 2,0 l,4 -1,4 -l,2 l,3 
9,2 4,5 4,2 2,4 3,3 l,4 -0,3 l,5 
the deterioration of the trade balance may be regarded as 
acceptable or at least as not yet out of control. 
Present forecasts for the current account of the balance of 
payments in 1982 (see Table 13) indicate that the Com-
munity as a whole will achieve a sustainable balance close to 
zero, if oil prices and the dollar exchange rate remain fairly 
steady. However, there will still be considerable differences 
between the Member States. The improvement in the 
external balance should be maintained in Germany and the 
Netherlands, but achievements will be more modest in most 
of the other Member States. In France and Denmark, present 
current deficits may well increase slightly. A more marked 
improvement in external positions is essential, to allow for 
interest payments and the gradual redemption of external 
debt. 
To reinforce the competitiveness of the European economies 
while at the same time improving the employment situation, 
not only must internal absorption of resources be reduced, 
but there must be at the same time a reallocation of resources 
towards productive uses. 
The share of total consumption in Community GDP has 
increased considerably (almost 5 percentage points of GDP). 
The relative expansion of consumption expenditure was 
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Table 12 
Changes in the structure of GDP uses and current balance of payments position (as a % of GDP) 
(a) Average 1968-72 (b) 1982 
Consumption Gross capital Balance on goods GDP Change in 
formation and services balance on 
goods and 
Private Public Total Fixed Stocks Total Exports Imports Balance services at 
capita! constant prices 
B (a) 61,4 14,1 75,5 21,4 1,3 22,7 42,3 40,6 + 1,7 100 
(b) 64,9 19,6 84,5 19,5 0,3 19,8 64,0 68,4 -4,4 100 
(b) - (a) +3,5 +5,5 +9,0 -1,9 -1,0 -2,9 +21,7 +27,8 -6,1 0 0,0 
DK (a) 56,9 20,0 76,9 24,3 0,7 25,0 25,5 27,4 -1,9 100 
(b) 56,1 28,0 84,1 15,6 -0,3 15,3 36,8 36,3 +0,5 100 
(b) - (a) -0,8 +8,0 +7,2 -8,7 -1,0 -9,7 + 11,3 +8,9 +2,4 0 + 8,3 
D (a) 54,8 16,4 71,2 24,8 1,5 26,3 21,1 18,6 +2,5 100 
(b) 55,4 21,0 76,4 22,8 -0,1 22,7 29,5 28,7 +0,8 100 
(b) - (a) +0,6 +4,6 +5,2 -2,0 -1,6 -3,6 +8,4 + 10,1 -1,7 0 + 1,6 
GR (a) 70,1 12,6 82,7 24,9 2,5 27,4 8,1 18,2 -10,1 100 
(b) 70,9 17,2 88,1 20,8 2,8 23,6 14,7 26,4 -11,7 100 
(b) - (a) +0,8 +4,6 +5,4 -4,1 +0,3 -3,8 +6,6 +8,2 -1,6 0 +4,l 
F (a) 60,7 13,4 74,1 23,5 2,1 25,6 14,8 14,4 +0,4 100 
(b) 65,1 15,8 80,9 21,1 -0,1 21,0 22,2 24,0 -1,8 100 
(b) - (a) +4,4 +2,4 +6,8 -2,4 -2,2 -4,6 +7,4 +9,6 -2,2 0 + 1,5 
IRL (a) 70,7 14,4 85,1 22,9 1,4 24,3 32,1 41,5 -9,4 100 
(b) 63,4 21,5 84,9 30,1 -0,1 30,0 53,2 68,1 -14,9 100 
(b) - (a) -7,3 +7,1 -0,2 +7,2 -1,5 +5,7 +21,1 +26,6 -5,5 0 +4,9 
(a) 63,4 15,3 78,7 20,6 0,7 21,3 16,0 16,0 0,0 100 
(b) 64,2 18,1 82,3 20,3 0,9 21,2 24,7 28,2 -3,5 100 
(b) - (a) +0,8 +2,8 +3,6 -0,3 +0,2 -0,1 +8,7 + 12,2 -3,5 0 + 2,4 
NL (a) 56,8 16,3 73,1 25,3 1,5 26,8 46,1 46,0 0,1 100 
(b) 60,5 17,9 78,4 19,0 -1,3 17,7 58,9 54,9 4,0 100 
(b) - (a) +3,7 + 1,6 +5,3 -6,3 -2,8 -9,1 + 12,8 +8,9 +3,9 0 +7,9 
UK (a) 62,5 17,8 80,3 18,5 0,7 19,2 21,7 21,3 +0,4 100 
(b) 60,3 22,l 82,4 16,2 -1,8 14,4 . 27,1 23,9 + 3,8 100 
(b) - (a) -2,2 +4,3 +2,1 -2,3 -2,5 -4,8 +5,4 +2,6 +2,8 0 +2,4 
EC (a) 60,8 14,6 75,4 22,5 1,4 23,9 21,0 20,3 +0,7 100 
(b) 62,6 17,7 80,3 20,2 -0,3 19,9 29,9 30,1 -0,2 100 
(b) - (a) + 1,8 +3,1 +4,9 -2,3 -1,7 -4,0 +8,9 +9,8 -0,9 0 +2,8 
Suur('(•: 1968-72: Eurostat, except B, D, NL: National Accounts. 
!9Sl: Economic budgets, Commission departments, May-June f982. For EC: extrapolation of !980 data on the basis of rates of growth given in economic budgets. 
greatest in Belgium, Denmark and France. The rate of 
expansion is close to the Community average in Germany, 
Greece and the Netherlands. The impact of this trend on the 
external balance was attenuated by a considerable.decline in 
the rate of investment and stockbuilding, particularly in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, where the decline was so 
marked as to result in an improvement in the balance on 
goods and services. The degradation of the pattern of 
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Table 13 
Balance of payments on current account (as% of GDP) 
1959-1963 1964-1968 1969-1973 1974-1978 1979 1980 1981 19821 
B 0,0 2 0,4 2,3 -0,7 -2,9 -5,2 -6,3 -4,8 
DK -1,l -2,0 -2,2 -3,2 -4,5 -3,4 -3,1 -3,5 
D 0,9 0,7 0,8 1,3 -0,6 -1,8 -1,0 0,6 
GR 2,2 2 -3,6 -2,7 -3,0 -2,9 -0,9 -2,2 -2,1 
F 1, 1 0,0 0,0 -0,8 -0,1 -1,3 -1,5 -1,9 
lRL -2,2 -1,9 -3,6 -3,7 -10,1 -8,4 -12,8 -10,2 
I 0,7 2,7 1,1 -0,6 1,6 -2,5 -2,3 -1,6 
L 6,J2 6,4 13,9 25,2 28,1 22,2 20,3 18,4 
NL 2,1 -0,4 1,0 1,6 -1,2 -1,4 2,5 4,4 
UK 0,1 -0,6 0,4 -1,6 0,0 1,4 2,9 1,0 
EC 10 0,6 0,3 0,5 -0,2 -0,5 -1,3 -0,6 -0,5 
I Forecasts: Economic budgets, May 1982. 
2 1960-63. 
Sources: 1959 to 1980: Eurostat and OECD national accounts; 1981 and 1982: Economic budgets (May 1982). 
domestic uses of GDP was less marked in Italy, where 
investment declined little in relative terms, 1 and in the 
United Kingdom, where gross capital formation nevertheless 
fell further from an initial level which was already rather low. 
Ireland was an exception among the Member States in that 
the marked deterioration of its external position was mainly 
associated with rapidly expanding investment. The share of 
consumption in GDP has remained stable, although at a 
higher level than in the Community as a whole, and the 
substantial increase in public consumption has been entirely 
offset by the relative decline in private consumption. 
In the Community as a whole the decline in the rate of 
investment as a proportion of GDP is an imperfect indicator 
of the weakness of capital formation in the Community as a 
whole. The growth of GDP, the other term in the ratio, has 
itself declined considerably; and part of the flow of gross 
investment is destined simply to renew plant and equipment. 
In fact, at constant prices, net investment (i.e. after deduction 
of the consumption of fixed capital as estimated in national 
accounts) has contracted in the Community as a whole by 
almost 3 % a year on average since 1973. Between 1960 and 
1973, it had increased at an annual average rate of 5,6 %-
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The rate of investment observed in Italy during the reference period 1968· 
72 was already considerably lower than during the period prior to 1964. 
The inadequacy of investment is further aggravated by the 
fact that some proportion - difficult to quantify - of 
productive capacity has become obsolete as a result of cost 
changes and technical development. Since the stock of 
capital is expanding too slowly in relation to the growth of 
the labour force, an insufficient number of new jobs has 
appeared and cyclical unemployment has given way to 
structural unemployment. By holding back productivity 
gains, this process reduces the competitiveness of European 
products both in terms of price and in terms of technological 
content. 
Practically all the Member States face the dual requirement, 
more pressing in some than in others, of improving the 
external balance while shifting domestic demand from 
consumption to investment. At macroeconomic level, such 
adjustment requires the same type of measure as those which 
must be undertaken to moderate the trend of costs and 
prices. Lasting export growth must be based on the control of 
relative price changes. The reestablishment of surpluses 
which can be devoted to the internal financing of firms and 
the reinforcement of profitability, which are essential 
conditions for a recovery of business investment, requires a 
gradual adjustment in the functional distribution of incomes. 
It is moreover unlikely that easier credit would constitute an 
efficient incentive for this purpose, since the effects of any 
easing of interest rates that was not based on a parallel 
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decline in inflation rates would probably be rapidly annulled 
by the reinforcement of inflationary anticipations and a 
downward pressure on exchange rates. The stabilization of 
public finance should contribute to slowing down the 
expansion of public consumption, and, by attenuating 
pressures on interest rates, help to avoid such crowding out 
· on the capital markets as may result from budget deficits. 
Section 4 - A suitable mix between 
adjustment and external financing 
The rate at which the required adjustments can be made will 
depend mainly on the rate of growth of the European 
economies, and will vary widely from one Member State to 
another. In view of the limited availability ofofficial reserves 
and the economic cost of any brutal adjustment, external 
borrowing can help as a transitional device temporarily to 
prevent a serious current payments deficit from leading to a 
spiral of devaluation and inflation, the undesirable effects of 
which have already been stressed. Otherwise, there is a risk 
that protectionist measures aimed directly at reducing the 
flow of payments abroad will multiply. Apart from the fact 
that such measures are usually effective only partially and for 
a short period, they seriously disturb the working of the 
Community itself. External borrowing does not involve the 
same risk of market distortion and the accumulation of 
internal strains, at least in the short term. 
The Member States and the Community itself have some 
room for manoeuvre in their borrowing. Although the 
surpluses of the oil-producing countries are at present very 
small, the volume of funds available on the international 
markets is very large, and investors are more than ever in 
search of financial assets issued by borrowers with a good 
credit rating. Finally, in a broader context, adjustment in the 
industrialized countries must not be so rapid as to transfer 
current deficits to the developing countries, which have much 
more limited access to external financing. Nevertheless, as in 
any borrowing process, prolonged recourse to external 
financing brings increasing risks and costs, and a gradual loss 
of independence. Foreign borrowing cannot, therefore, be 
considered a permanent subsitute for policies aimed at 
adjustment. 
Thus, external financing of a large budget deficit makes it 
possible in the early stages to reconstitute the external 
reserves required to support exchange rates and to preVent 
crowding out on the national financial market. 
However, assuming that the proceeds of the borrowings are 
not sterilized by the central bank, the effects are identical to 
those of monetary financing of the government deficit. As 
debt grows, and with it the cost of servicing, lenders will tend 
to withdraw from the market, or to lend only on stricter 
conditions. To· restore the confidence of the markets, the 
borrowing country will have to accept a greater increase in 
interest rates than could be economically justified in relation 
to the domestic economy, or call on conditional official 
financing. Basically the need to adjust will merely have been 
evaded and when it can be avoided 'no longer the adjustment 
will be the more severe for having been so long delayed. 
If the flow of external financing is mainly channelled into 
productive uses which fit in with the general adjustment 
process, it will continually add to the productive capacity 
which will provide the means of repayment. Even in such 
cases, the volume of debt and, particularly, its rate of increase 
cannot exceed certain limits, imposed by the need to service 
the debt before the investments become fully productive, 
and, ultimately, to produce a current account surplus with 
which gradually to reduce the volume of debt. 
Recent changes in current deficits and their present size (see 
Table 13) give, for the various Member States; a summary 
indication of the external borrowing requirement and the 
available margins for manoeuvre. Apart from the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany, which have 
restored a current surplus, the Member States require foreign 
financing obtained either by encouraging capital to enter the 
country, or by foreign borrowing in the name of public 
departments and undertakings. External financing should 
remain fairly small in France and Italy. In Denmark and 
Greece, although there has been no marked deterioration in 
the current payments position over the past few years, 
repeated deficits have resulted in a level of outstanding debt 
such as to set a severe limit to the scope for future borrowing. 
The same is true in Belgium, where current deficits have 
increased considerably since 1976, leading to a very rapid 
build-up of foreign debt and eventually to devaluation and 
the introduction of a recovery programme. In relation to the 
size of its economy, Ireland is the country with the largest 
foreign debt in the Community. However, recourse to 
external financing is closely linked in Ireland with the 
necessary accumulation of capital. In view of the require-
ments of economic development, massive redemptions 
would probably not be in order, and the possibility of 
supporting the investment effort through a regular flow of 
external financing should be preserved. 
While implementing common policies and ensuring closer 
coordination of the economic policies of the Member States, 
the Community can make a specific contribution· to 
determining the right mix of adjustment and financing 
through its borrowing and lending instruments. 
First of all, the Community lending instruments with a 
structural purpose (European Investment Bank, ECSC, New 
Community Instrument, Euratom) enable the recipient 
countries to obtain the necessary supp\ementary financing 
for the development of priority sectors and regions on the 
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most advantageous market conditions without directly 
committing their own credit. This external financing, which 
is partly subsidized, must be accompanied by an effort to 
mobilize and channel· national savings so that they can 
gradually take over. The volume of Community loans 
granted to some countries has, in view of its relative size, 
reached macroeconomic dimensions (see Table 3). Further 
substantial development of these operations should perhaps 
be based on a global adjustment programme which the 
receipient countries would undertake to implement in 
addition to the microeconomic criteria specific to each 
project. 
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Secondly, the Member States have at their disposal balance 
of payments support mechanisms either with the other 
Member States (medium-term financial aid) or with the 
Community (Community loan mechanism). Because of their 
purpose, these mechanisms cannot be used directly to cover 
immediate and specific needs of the domestic economy, such 
as a budget deficit. It is nevertheless essential to use these 
mechanisms in good time, in order to ensure that adjustment 
is gradual, to maintain confidence on the capital markets and 
thus to prevent a balance of payments crisis which would be 
costly both for the country concerned and for its trading 
partners. 
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CHAPTER III 
The realignments of February and June 1982: 
the system undermined or consolidated? 
Since the beginning of the year, the monetary authorities of 
the member countries have twice realigned parities between 
the currencies participating in the EMS. These two 
operations give serious cause for concern, since the frequency 
and the size of the adjustments threaten a gradual erosion of 
the system's credibility. The conditions surrounding these 
realignments-both the decision-taking processes and the 
economic programmes adopted at national level-make it 
quite clear, however, that the participating countries wish the 
EMS to function well and that there is a common 
commitment to achieve a higher degree of convergence 
towards stability. 
Section 1 - Operations carried out 
consistently with the logic of the 
system 
The last realignments were separated by an interval of only 
four months. On 22 February I 982, the central rate of the 
Belgian and Luxembourg francs was devalued by 8,5% with 
respect to the other participating currencies, much the largest 
EMS adjustment up to that time. The Danish krone was 
readjusted downwards by 3% at the same time. The 
Table 14 
operation of 14 June resembled that of October of last year, 
although the widest bilateral change, that between the mark 
and the French franc, was slightly larger: the mark and the 
Dutch guilder were revalued by 4,25% in relation to the 
group of currencies whose bilateral rates remained un-
changed, while the French franc was devalued by 5,75% and 
the Italian lira by 2,75% in relation to the same group of 
currencies. The four earlier realignments since the EMS was 
set up in March 1979 were separated by longer intervals--
two of them, indeed, by a period of stability of almost 
16 months. An examination of Tables 14 and I 5 shows how 
t_he accumulated change in bilateral central rates resulting 
from the latest two readjustments compares with changes 
prior to 1982. In relation to the mark, the currency which has 
appreciated most within the system since its inception, the 
largest central rate change (12,2%) was that of the Belgian 
franc. The French franc depreciated over the same period by 
approximately the same amount in relation to the mark as it 
did between March 1979 and the end of 198 l, a little under 
10%. The other currencies participating in the EMS, 
particularly the Danish krone and the Italian lira, de-
preciated much less in relation to the mark as a result of the 
last two realignments than they had over the preceding two 
and a half years. 
Although changes in central rates have undoubtedly become 
larger and more frequent, the cohesion of the system and the 
discipline it requires have been preserved. As before, the two 
recent realignments were decided by mutual agreement at 
meetings of the Ministers of Finance and the Governors of 
the central banks, and the Community nature of these 
decisions was less than ever a matter of pure form. Indeed, 
the direction and the size of adjustments were the subject of 
Appreciation ( +) or depreciation (-) of ECU central rates and bilateral central rates from 13 March 1979 to 5 October 19811 
Bruxelles K0benhavn Frankfurt Paris Dublin Roma Amsterdam 
in in in io in io io 
BFR/LFR DKR DM FF IRL LJT. HFL 
BFR/LFR +8,1 -7,l + 3,1 +9,7 -5,2 
DKR -7,5 -14,0 -4,6 -7,5 +1,5 -12,3 
DM +7,6 + 16,3 +10,9 +7,6 + 18,0 +2,0 
FF -3,0 +4,8 -9,9 -3,0 +6,4 -8,1 
IRL +8,1 -7,1 +3,1 +9,7 -5,2 
LIT -88 -1,4 -15,3 -6,0 -8,8 -13,6 
HFL +s:s +14,0 -2,0 +8,8 +5,5 + 15,7 
ECU +3,3 + 11,7 -4,0 +6,5 +3,3 +13,3 -2,1. 
The table is to be read horizontally. For example, the central rate of the Belgian franc appreciated by 8,1% over the reference period against the Danish krone in Copenhagen and 
depreciated 7,1% in that period against the German mark in Frankfurt. 
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Table 15 
Appreciation ( +) or depreciation ( - ) of ECU central rates and bilateral central rates from 5 October 1981 _to 14 June 1982 I 
Hruxc!lcs Kobenhavn 
in in 
BFR/LFR DKR 
BFR/LFR -5,7 
DKR +6,0 
DM + 13,9 +7,5 
FF +3,0 -2,8 
IRL +9,3 +3,1 
LIT +6,3 +0,3 
HFL + 13,9 +7,5 
ECU + 10,3 +4,1 
Sec Note l to Table 14. 
discussions which became intense and at times difficult 
before unanimous consensus could be reached on a balanced 
rearrangement of the parity grid. At the same time, as we 
have already stressed (see Chapter II, Section l), the 
adjustments have preserved the stabilizing influence of the 
EMS, in the sense that the changes in central rates were 
smaller than the inflation rate differentials which had 
accumulated between the participating countries. 
Section 2 - Confirmation of the importance 
attached to greater convergence 
At each of the last two realignments, the countries most 
affected agreed to implement accompanying policies which 
would enhance the beneficial effects and neutralize the 
perverse effects of the changes in parity. In Belgium, the 
February devaluation was an integral part of a recovery plan 
designed to resolve the'structural problems in the economy. 
Apart from a temporary price freeze and specific measures in 
favour of employment, the measures taken by the Belgian 
Government were mainly intended to improve profitability 
in the productive sector by combining the mechanical effects 
of devaluation with a loosening of wage indexation, while 
contromng developments in PubJic finance. In this perspec-
tive, the devaluation should be seen as an important part of 
the measures taken and as making them easier to apply. The 
programme should progressively alleviate external imbal-
ance and the budget deficit, while improving the employment 
situation. 
The June realignment is also indicative of a concern tO 
establish greater convergence. In the countries whose 
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Frankfurt Paris Dublin Roma Amsterdam 
in in in io in 
DM FF IRL LIT HFL 
-12,2 -2,9 -8,5 -5,9 -12,2 
-7,0 +2,9 -3,0 -0,3 -7,0 
+10,6 +4,3 +7,2 
-9,6 -5,7 -3,1 -9,6 
-4,l +6,l +2,9 -4,1 
-6,7 +3,2 -2,8 -6,7 
+ 10,6 +4,3 +7,2 
-3,2 +7,1 + 1,0 +3,8 -3,2 
currencies were devalued, stabilization policies are now 
being applied. The French Government has introduced 
measures intended rapidly to reduce the rate of inflation, and 
to encourage the recovery of investment. The measures 
include a four-month prices and incomes freeze, at the end of 
which the rate of inflation should have declined con-
siderably, the control of public finances, with a budget deficit 
kept down to 3% of GDP, and a return to a balanced budget 
for the social security funds. The countries whose currencies 
were revalued have recognized that the readjustment could 
make it easier for them to apply policies. which would 
promote economic recovery. The Commission has for its 
part actively encouraged the process of convergence. It has 
not confined itself simply to following through as effectively 
as possible the coordination procedures for economic 
policies provided for in Community texts. It has tried to spell 
out what convergence should mean in practice. 
In the middle of 1981, the Commission was led to make its 
position clear on several occasions and in varying circum~ 
stances. On 22 July 1981, the Commission, as _authorized by 
the Council Decision of February 1974 on the attainment of 
a high degree of convergence of the economic policies of the 
Member States, took the initiative and addressed a 
recommendation to the Belgian Government. This recOm· 
mendation stressed the need to restore external and 
budgetary equilibrium while pursuing a rigorous monetary 
policy and holding back the expansion of real incomes. The 
summary given earlier of the recovery measures taken when 
the Belgian franc was devalued in February 1982 shows that 
the Belgian authorities have now stepped up the already 
substantial efforts devoted to achieving the objectives of this 
recommendation. On 22 July 1981 the Commission also sent 
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the Council a communication on the principles of indexation 
in the Community, warning against the risk that general and 
excessively rigid index-linking of prices and incomes would 
spread the inflationary process and block necessary adjust-
ments. The earlier decision taken in May 1981 by the Italian 
authorities to introduce a compulsory deposit for the 
purchase of foreign currency had led the Commission to 
examine the economic and financial situation in Italy. On 
I July 1981, it addressed to the Government of Italy a 
recommendation pursuant to Article 108(1) of the Treaty, in 
which it expressed its concern about the risk of protectionist 
chain reactions that could be provoked by such measures 
(which were in fact gradually relaxed, and finally dis-
continued in February 1982). The Commission, stressing 
that measures to hamper trade can only delay the correction 
of basic factors, also recommended an effort to reduce the 
government deficit and restrain the growth of nominal 
incomes, in particular through a less automatic application 
of the mechanism linking pay to prices. 
Finally, at the time when the Council was fixing its annual 
budget guidelines, the Commission adopted, on 1 July 1982, 
a communication on budget discipline and economic 
convergence which sought to bring the Member States into a 
discussion in depth of the fiscal and budgetary means to be 
adopted in order to correct developments considered to be 
extremely disquieting in a number of Member States. 
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PART TWO 
The development of the European Monetary System in its present 
institutional framework 
As a result of circumstances----eyclical and more structural in nature-the EMS could not be 
definitively consolidated in the two years originally planned, the Commission therefore 
took the initiative in proposing a non-institutional development of the system, after 
evaluating the results achieved from 1979 to 1981 (see Chapter IV). 
The areas in which progress can be envisaged are set out in Chapter V while Chapter VI 
presents and comments on the proposed resolution presented to the Council by the 
Commission on the transition from the system's initial stage to its second phase. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Evaluation of the functioning of the EMS at 
31 December 1981 
At the start of 1982, Commission departments, at the request 
of the Council (Economic and Financial Affairs) held on 
14 December 1981, prepared an initial evaluation of the 
functioning of the EMS, the successor to the agreement on 
the narrowing of margins which was in force from 1972 to 
1979 and which is briefly described in Annex A. 
The studies in question were chiefly intended to clarify the 
discussions of the European Council of March 1982, and 
were made with a view to proposing improvements to the 
system. 1 
The report which follows, adopted in February 1982 and 
already communicated to the Monetary Committee and the 
Committee of Governors by the Commission, 2 examines 
how the EMS has worked for almost three years, in the light 
of its objectives and the changes which have taken place in 
the economic environment since its establishment. 
• 
• • 
The objective of the system, clearly defined by the European 
Council at Bremen, is to devise 'a scheme for the creation of 
closer monetary cooperation leading to a zone of monetary 
stability in Europe'. Stability should be interpreted as 
extending over the whole range of prices, exchange rates, 
interest rates and other monetary variables. The degree of 
success should be measured with reference to various criteria, 
including the previous performance of the EMS economies, the 
comparalive performance of non-participating countries and 
the amount of economic and monetary cooperation induced by 
the system. 
Part One of this report first examines the main elements for an 
assessment of the performance of the participating economies. 
Part Two then goes on to discuss the operation of the system's 
mechanisms. 
See Annex B: Main features or the European Monetary System in its 
present phase. 
2 The texts already circulated by the Commission are printed in italics. 
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Section 1 - Elements for assessment 
1. Central rates 
Since the start of the EMS, the participating currencies have 
achieved among themselves a greater degree of exchange rate 
stability than during the previous period. This stability also 
contrasted with the volatility of non-Community currencies, 
the dollar and yen, and of the non-participating Community 
currencies, sterling and the drachma. 
Over the period, there have been four changes of central rates, 
only two of which have involved more than one currency. All 
have been made by mutual agreement in orderly market 
conditions, and a common procedure has been developed. 
Between the start of the system and the October realignment 
the maximum bilateral change, 18°/o, has been between the 
German mark and the lira. The German mark has revalued by 
nearly as much against the Danish krone, and by between about 
7 and IG°/o against the other currencies apart from the guilder 
against which it has revalued by only 2"1,. These amounts are 
almost exactly half its appreciation against the lira and French 
franc respectively over the previous three-year period. The 
changes have in all cases been in the direction suggested by 
price and cost movements, and no central rate change has 
subsequently been reversed . 
The central rate adjustments have not led to large movements 
in Community effective exchan'ge rates preserving trade 
between EMS countries. This stability contrasts with the 
strongly divergent exchange rate movements recorded within 
the Community in the period /973-78, and is an important 
positive factor for an area in which trade amongst member 
countries in 1980 amounted to over 500/o of their total trade. 
However, in view of the persistent inflation differentials (see 
below) between the participants, this development also means 
that currencies having relatively high inflation have imported 
stability through the mechanism of direct price interdepend-
ence, while countries having less inflation have gained in terms 
of export potential. 
The relative stability within the EMS contrasts strongly with 
the volatility of sterling, the drachma, the dollar and yen 
against the participating currencies. The dollar's movements 
have been dominated by the reversal of the US balance of 
payments position and by interest rate differentials. The 
policies of the US administration have not prevented saw-
toothed movements of interest rates, nor the resultant short-
term capital inflows and outflows. Until mid-1980 the ECU 
rate of the dollar fluctuated widely around a slight downward 
trend. There was then a steady rise to a peak in August 198/ 
about 45% above the level of July 1980. Since then the rate of 
the dollar declined somewhat, again fluctuating around its 
trend. Over the whole period these dollar fluctuations have 
considerably added to the uncertainties for international trade. 
Evaluation of the functioning of the EMS at 31 December 1981 
The two non-participating Community currencies, sterling and 
the drachma rose by 20% and fell by 18% against the ECU 
excluding sterling, respectively since March 1979. The 
depreciation of the drachma in 1979 and 1980 has partially 
followed the inflation differential. Sterling's evolution has been 
much more erratic and has reflected interest rate differentials 
of from 3,5 to 5 ,5 points against the average for participating 
currencies in 1979and 1980; and again in mid-November 1981, 
when sterling benefited from a favourable differential after the 
fall in US rates. Added to this was the current account surplus 
between 1978 and 1981, attributable to North Sea oil and the 
recession. 
2. Exchange rate management 
Between realignments full use has been made of the limited 
fluctuation margins. The maximum permissible spread 
between two currencies has repeatedly been taken up. In 1979, 
the Belgian franc was at its lower limit against the German 
mark in late May and early June and then against the Danish 
krone in October. At the start of 1980, it was again at its lower 
limit but against the French franc and guilder. The German 
mark was weak for a large part of 1980, several times falling to 
its lower limit against the French franc. Their positions were 
however reversed in early 1981,fo/lowing interest rate moves 
by the Bundesbank, implying a total bilateral movement of 
4 Y2% in a relatively short period. ' Such reversibility within 
the margins weakens the impact of short-term interest rate 
differentials on capital movements, thus when there are no 
expectations of central rate changes reducing the need for 
intervention. 
The divergence indicator has on the whole been a useful 
additional element to the arrangements. Given the underlying 
inflationary situation, it is consistent with the aims of the 
system that it has been systematically activated only by weak 
currencies although this was probably also influenced by the 
strength of the dollar. When the threshold has been reached or 
overstepped, the necessary measures have normally been taken 
to redress the situation, although there is still some difference 
of opinion over the interpretation of a 'presumption to act'. The 
currency most frequently divergent was the Belgian franc: it 
crossed its divergence threshold from May to July 1979, in 
February and March 1980.from February to April 1981 and 
again in December 1981. The Danish krone and French franc 
have also crossed their thresholds. The most frequent policy 
reaction has been to raise interest rates. There have, however, 
been a number of occasions on which bilateral limits have been 
reached before any currency has crossed its divergence 
threshold and the movement of sterling and of the lira beyond 
See the calendar of events on page 43 for a graph of maximum spot spreads 
between currencies participating in the narrow-band system and 
indicating which currencies crossed their upper or lower divergence 
threshold for more than five days. 
the 2,25% band has caused some inertia in the movement of the 
indicator, despite the corrections made. 
The amount of intervention necessary to maintain the 
fluctuation margins has at times been substantial but has not 
caused problems for monetary targets or depletion of reserves. 
The currencies supported by interventions were at different 
times the French and Belgian francs and the Danish krone. 
Speculative bouts have generally been contained, and in only 
one case was extensive intervention activity followed by a 
realignment of central rates. 
The basic texts of the EMS specify that 'in principle 
interventions will be in the currencies of the participating 
countries'. In practice, however, dollar interventions, which 
may be addressed either at curbing fluctuations against that 
currency or be primarily for currency management within the 
EMS, still predominate. In part, this is because a number of 
countries prefer to maintain their currency near the centre of 
the fluctuation band. This has been true particularly for Italy, 
whose currency has a wider band ( 6%). For intra-marginal 
intervention, agreement must be obtained to use another 
participant's currency, which is not the case for the dollar. 
3. Interest rates and monetary aggregates 
When the markets do not anticipate. a change in exchange 
rates, short-term capital movements are dominated by nominal 
interest rate differentials, which makes these, together with 
interventions, an important instrument of currency manage-
ment. There have been a few examples of policy conflict 
between domestic and external objectives in the area of interest 
rates. Shortly after the start of the system both Denmark and 
Italy had to lower their interest rates, because of capital 
inflows, when relative domestic conditions would have 
suggested the contrary. 
While in most Community countries there were domestically 
generated reasons for relatively high interest rates, peaks in 
US rates may have led, in a number of member countries, to 
higher interest rates than generally warranted by purely 
domestic considerations. But as with interventions, it is 
difficult to distinguish between measures inspired by the system 
and those in response to changing outside circum$tances. There 
has been a steady rise in interest rates between 1978 and 1981. 
For domestic reasons, European monetary authorities neither 
followed the fall of transatlantic rates after March 1980, nor 
their spectacular rise in the second half of 1980. But the high 
external deficit and persistent inflation, which was likely to be 
further aggravated by the strong rise in the US dollar, made 
further upward movement of interest rates inevitable in 1981 in 
Europe, despite the low level of activity and high unemploy-
ment. 
Since 1979, the stance of quantitative monetary policy has 
become more restrictive in practically all Community 
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countries. This change has been prompted by the need to 
combat inflation generally and in particular by the desire to 
prevent the emergence of secondary inflationary effects 
following the rise in the price of oil. Conflicts between 
maintaining central rates and adhering to quantitative 
monetary objectives have been avoided. Furthermore the very 
existence of the EMS has provided a strong incentive to 
improve de facto coordination of monetary policies. 
4. Costs and prices 
In 1978, the average of the Community GDP price deflators, 
which reflect the overall change in domestic costs, had fallen to 
8,5%, compared with an average over the previous three years 
of 11%. The dispersion between Member States had also 
declined. Following the second oil shock, however, both the 
average and the dispersion have again increased. In 1979, the 
Community average was nearly 10% and in 1980 over 11,5%, 
with a range from 4,3% in Germany to 20,3% in Italy. 
Exchange rate stability and satisfactory monetary manage-
ment have not therefore been matched by a greater conver-
gence of costs and prices. When expressed in natiorJa/ 
currencies, average annual divergences in cost and price trends 
between EMS partners were, in many cases, quite substantial. 
Over the period 1979-81, the average annual consumer price 
inflation rate has been 16,3% in Italy whereas that in Germany 
has been 5,6%. In contrast the lira/German mark bilateral 
central rate varied by only 18% over the whole period 
Furthermore aggregate variations in the relative levels of unit 
labour costs in national currency have ranged from -14,5% to 
+ 32.7%. Such a large change in competitive positions in a 
relatively short period, is the result both of previous 
movements, in the reverse direction, accumulated mainly 
through excessive nominal exchange rate movements during 
the pre-EMS period; and of the policies tailored to maintain-
ing nominal exchange rates. In the future, maintaining 
exchange rate stability requires decreasing the divergence of 
cost and price trends. 
The shift from a low to a high relative cost and price level in a 
country ,vith a stable exchange rate should serve to exert 
pressure to implement appropriate policies to ensure domestic 
stability. Maintaining exchange rate stability is often the only 
way in which the real problems of domestic adjustment are 
forced into the open. These problems would otherwise be 
obscured by the spiral of devaluation and i,iflation; with the 
devaluations doing nothing to resolve the basic problems. This 
was the experience of the United Kingdom and Italy between 
1973 and 1978. It is important that the EMS stabilization 
mechanism should work fully in those countries where inflation 
or the level of relative costs is still too high; this not only means 
that monetary policy must defend the exchange rate but also 
that domestic adjustment, notably in the areas of incomes and 
public finances, must be encouraged and speeded up through 
other appropriate measures. Quite independently from the 
existence of the EMS, such internal adjustment is necessary in 
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order to increase possibilities of economic growth in conditions 
of stability and higher employment. The EMS highlights the 
need for adjustment and provides one of the necessary 
ingredients to help its realization. 
Section 2 - Functioning of the system's 
mechanisms 
In summary, in its first three years of life, the European 
Monetary System has been remarkably successful in assuring 
exchange rate stability through a period of great world 
monetary turbulence. It has provided a monetary environment 
favourable to the orderly development of intra-Community 
trade; and has succeeded in avoiding the excessive exchange 
rigidities that eventually led to the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods parity system. The system has been managed in a 
realistic way, avoiding on the one side full or over-
accommodation of cost and price trends and on the other 
stubborn defence of unrealistic exchange rates. Although the 
situation would have been worse without it, the EMS has 
however failed to produce the desirable degree of convergence 
towards price stability. Since 1978 i,iflation rates have become 
higher and more divergent because of the second oil shock, the 
extraordinary appreciation of the dollar, and insufficient 
domestic discipline in the areas of costs and public finance. The 
political commitment underlying the EMS, and the mechan-
isms created by the system itself, have been an essential, albeit 
insufficient.factor pushing for stability-orientated policies in 
member countries in which monetary stability was most 
needed. A stronger impulse in this direction can only come from 
a strengthened EMS. The critical appraisal of the functioning 
of the system's mechanisms, which is made in the following 
paragraphs, can show the appropriate ways to achieve such a 
strengthening. 
I. ECU creation 
There has been a dramatic increase in the total quantity of 
ECU created from about 27 OOO million, resulting from the 
initial swap operations at the start of the system, to nearly 
50 OOO million in April 1981. 1 This amount subsequently has 
declined to 42 OOO million ECU. 
Taking the swap operations of July 1979 and January 1981 as 
an example, it can be seen that against almost exactly the same 
amount of gold, 15 800 and 38 300 million ECU were 
respectively created, because of an increase in the price of gold 
used in the swap operations of over 140% between the two 
periods. ECU created against dollars fell only from I I 600 
million to JO 900 million because the decline of 6% in the 
amount of dollars transferred was not entirely offset by the 
appreciation of the dollar in terms of ECU. 
Annex B shows the ECU creation resulting from the swap operations. 
Table 16 
EMS calendar from 1978 to 1981 
Events concerning the EMS 
1978 6-7 July: European Council, Bremen Annex 
4-5 December: European Council. Brussels 
Resolution 
1979 
1980 
1981 
13 March: the EMS enters into operation 
6 Ju.ly: the Bank of England swaps 20",, of 
its gold <1nd dollar reserves against ECU 
with the EMCF 
l 7 September: the EMS reviewed after six 
months: the Council considers that it is 
operating satisfactorily 
24 September: first realignment (DM + 
2° 0 : DKR - 3'.' 0 ) 
30 November: second realignment 
(DKR - 4,76",,) 
1-2 December: The European Council 
decides to extend the renewable swap 
mechanism for a further two~year 
period 
23 March: third realignment (LIT -
6",,) 
5 October: fourth realignment (OM and 
HFL + 5.5''.,: FF and LIT - 3'.' 0 ) 
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Events concerning relations 
between the EMS and the doUar 
November: the US authorities announce 1978 
that they will actively intervene on the 
exchange markets 
Dollar fluctuations around a downward 
trend: its rate against the ECU rises 
from 1,35 in March to 1,32 in May, 
falling again to 1,40 in September and 
J,43 in December 
6 Oc!Ober: the Federal Reserve Board 
decides to pursue a strictly quantitative 
monetary policy and to allow interest 
rates to fluctuate 
Continuing dollar fluctuations in the first 
half of the year: its rate against the ECU 
rose from 1,44 in January to 1,35 in 
April, falling again in July to 1,44; from 
July onwards, steady rise in the dollar 
rate, reaching 1,30 against the ECU in 
December 
Further upsurge in the dollar until August 
(when its rate against the ECU was I); 
subsequent fall until November when 
the rate of the dollar against the ECU 
was around I, I 0 
4 May: the US authorities announce that 
they will no longer intervene on the 
exchange millets, save in exceptional 
circumstances. 
1979 
1980 
1981 
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The key to the growth in ECU has therefore been the rule 
determining the price of gold used for the swap operations. The 
automatic link between the price of gold and the quantity of 
ECU de/ermines, oulside Jhe control of Jhe sys1em, the degree 
to which gold is mobilized. The gold price rule used in the swap 
arrangements ( whichever is lower between the six month 
average and the latest market price) did moderate the increase 
in supply of ECU somewhat over the period when gold prices 
were rising rapidly. The swap price reached a maximum of 
447 ECU per ounce whereas the market price went above 
670 ECU per ounce. 
As the participants transfer gold and dollars in very different 
proportions the number of ECU that they have each received at 
successive swap renewals, and hence the distribution of the 
quantity of ECU between them, has been highly affected by the 
changes in the prices of these two assets. 1 
In contrast, the use of ECU or the effect on ECU creation of 
the loss or gain of dollar reserves has had little effect on the 
distribution of ECU. For example, the amount of ECU 
received through the swap operations by the Netherlands and 
Denmark, which have both seen a similar reduction in the 
amount of dollars that they transfer, has respectively increased 
by nearly 90% and decreased by 11% between July 1979 and 
October 1981 because the increase in the price of gold has 
affected in very different proportions the a/location of ECU to 
these two countries. 
ECU creation is determined by a rule in which the three key 
variables ( the price of gold, the dollar exchange rate and the 
respective proportions of these two assets) are outside the 
control of the system. [Inder these circumstances, the quantity 
of ECU created cannot be expected necessarily to be consistent 
with the aims of the system, and hence a wider use of the ECU 
as a means of settlement and as a reserve asset could not 
contribute towards achieving greater monetary stability. 
2. The use of ECU 
Participants have a right to use ECU for settlement at the 
maturity of a very short-term financing operation 'with the 
proviso that a creditor central bank shall not be obliged to 
accept settlement by means of ECU of an amount more than 
50% of its claim which is being settled'. 2 With the agreement of 
the creditor, ECU may however be used for any settlement 
between participating central banks. 
In practice, ECU use has been limited. Italy, Ireland and the 
Netherlands have practically never had a net ECU position; 
and when they have it has been a very low percentage of the 
ECU that they received through the swap operations. 
Germany's net position has changed from being positive to 
negative and then positive again, but at the maximum reached 
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See Table 17, page 45 
Paragraph 16. l of the Agreement of 13 March 1979 between the central 
banks. 
4% of its ECU holdings. Denmark and Belgium have 
consistently had substantial net negative positions, and France 
has had a net positive position. The total of the negative or 
positive positions has reached 8% of -the quantity of ECU 
created through the swap arrangements ( see Table 18, 
page 46). 
Interest on these net ECU positions is calculated as the 
weighted average of the official discount rates of the currencies 
of which the ECU is composed. There is therefore no scope for 
discretionary decisions that would affect the attractiveness of 
the ECU relative to the dollar. Both its value and its yield are 
given. Furthermore market interest rates can at times deviate 
considerably from official discount rates which can result in an 
even greater variation in its relative attractiveness than in its 
price relationship vis-a-vis the dollar. 
Debtors have been reluctant to build up large negative net ECU 
positions because of the uncertainty over what will happen at 
the end of the transitional phase, when, unless there is a 
decision to the contrary, they would be required to clear their 
ECU positions by acquiring ECU from other participants. 
Creditors have not encouraged the use of ECU both because 
the interest rate rules have generally not been favourable to 
them and because the creation method is unlikely to limit the 
volume of ECU thereby being an element of restraint on 
potential debtors. 
With the limited use reflecting both inadequate inducements 
and provisions within the system as well as the reticence of the 
participants, it would be inadvisable simply to increase the use 
of the ECU by abolishing the acceptance limit or by enlarging 
the categories of transactions over which one of the parties had 
the right to use ECU without amending other parts of the 
system in such a way as to make the quantity and the yield of 
the ECU the result of stability-orientated decisions. Only a 
scarce currency can induce discipline. 
Moreover. and for reasons indicated below, ii is unlikely that 
the ECU can become an element inducing stability when its use 
is in addition to, rather than as an alternative to, other reserve 
assets and settlement instruments. It is for thes.e reasons that 
the Commission in its report of 20 March 1980 to the 
European Council suggested that the possibility of adopting the 
ECU as an exclusive instrument of settlement between the 
Community's central banks should be considered. 
3. Credit mechanisms 
Substantial use has been made at times of the very short-term 
financing. For marginal intervention in Community currencies, 
the facility is automatically available at the demand of the 
intervening central bank. With agreement from the creditor, it 
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Table 17 
Distribution of ECU between participants 
Share of total ECU issued Proportion of ECU 
received against gold 2 
Change in dollar 
reserves between 
initial swap period 
Initial 1 October 1981 Initial I October 1981 and October 1981 
Banque Nationale de Belgique 6,9 8,9 78,3 85,8 + 17,8 
Danmarks Nationalbank 2,l 1,0 12,1 36,1 -49,8 
Deutsche Bundesbank 36,9 32,7 40,8 65,0 -25,7 
Banque de France 17,6 21,0 73,3 87,1 -19,7 
Central Bank of Ireland 0,7 0,3 9,1 28,6 -53,5 
Banca d'ltalia 16,3 18,2 64,9 81,7 -18,3 
Nederlandsche Bank 9,3 10,7 75,1 91,9 -47,4 
Bank of England . 10,3 7,1 31,7 59,4 -43,2 
100,0 100,0 
The initial positions were established over the period March to April 1979 (July 1979 for the Bank of England). 
The proportion of each national central bank's ECU which it receives in return for swapping 20% of its gold varies because of changes in its dollar holdings. Gold holdings have remained 
virtually unchanged over the period. 
may also be used to finance intra-marginal interventions. In 
both 1979 and 1980, about 2 OOO million ECU of financing was 
obtained by activation of the mechanism. In 1981 use has 
amounted to about 7 OOO million. The overwhelming majority 
of these operations have been repaid in the creditor's currency, 
and the balance has resulted in transfers of ECU and other 
reserves. 
Both the short-term and medium-term credit mechanisms were 
increased substantially at the start of the EMS. The granting 
of medium-term financial assistance is discretionary: it is 
subject to a Council decision, which lays down economic policy 
conditions. In the case of the short-term monetary support, 
credit can be granted to a central bank automatically on the 
demand of a debtor up to its limited quota, beyond which it 
becomes discretionary. Neither of these mechanisms nor the 
Community loan facility for balance of payments needs has 
been used since the start of the EMS, but in contrast there has 
been considerable use of unconditional credit from the 
international capital markets to finance external imbalances. 
Following the second oil price shock, the Community as a 
whole went into substantial deficit, for which financing was 
necessary while domestic adjustments and an increase in 
OPEC absorption took place. The deficits have differed 
considerably between Member States as a percentage of GDP, 
as have the amount and changes in amount of official external 
debt. 
The imbalances have been financed with little change in overall 
reserve positions. In 1980, the Community's 31 OOO million 
ECU current account deficit was.financed by capital inflows of 
28 OOO million and a reserve fall of only 3 OOO million. 
In these circumstances the EMS credit mechanisms cannot on 
their own contribute towards imposing a tighter monetary 
discipline in the Community, without general provisions 
regarding the official recourse to external financing. 
4. Exterior aspects of the system 
The EMS has an important role to play in the existing 
international monetary relationships. Since the late 1960s and 
again even more obviously throughout 1981, the dialogue with 
the American authorities has been hampered by the lack of a 
strong Community monetary organization comparable to that 
existing in the areas of trade and agriculture. This dialogue 
becomes increasingly important both with the development of a 
multi-currency reserve system and since the US monetary 
authorities have changed their method of monetary manage-
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Table 18 
Net use ( - ) or accrual ( +) of ECU as a percentage of ECU received through the swap operations 
End of month Belgium Denmark FR of France 
Germany 
1979 April -8,2 +27,4 
May -14,7 +33,2 +0,8 +0,2 
June -15,0 -1,8 +2,8 +0,2 
July -13,9 -1,9 +2,8 +0,2 
August -14,0 -1,9 +2,9 +0,2 
September -14,2 -1,9 +2,9 +0,2 
October -12,9 -2,3 +2,7 +0,2 
November -13,5 -26,9 +3,8 +0,2 
December -25,2 -5,6 +4,2 +2,5 
1980 January -27,9 -9,8 +2,8 +4,8 
February -39,7 -21,1 +3,9 +9,6 
March -54,I -29,1 +0,8 + 15,4 
April -43,3 -45,7 -1,4 +17,2 
May -37,6 -46,1 -1,5 +17,4 
June -31,2 -46,5 -1,5 + 15,8 
July -24,8 -38,8 -1,5 + 13,6 
August -25,0 -39,1 -1,5 + 13,7 
September -24,8 -39,5 -1,5 + 13,6 
October" -24,4 -33,6 -3,0 +15,6 
November -25,7 -33,8 -3,0 +16,0 
December -30,8 -34,1 -3,I +17,4 
1981 January -31,6 -30,1 -3,1 +17,6 
February -50,0 -30,4 -3,1 +25,0 
March -69,9 -30,6 +0,6 +27,0 
April -67,0 -30,6 + 1,1 +27,3 
May -67,2 -30,9 + 1,1 +27,5 
June -68,1 -31,2 + 1,1 +27,7 
July -71,7 -31,5 + 1,6 +29,2 
August -72,3 -31,8 +2,2 +28,6 
September -72,9 -36,4 +2,3 +28,9 
October -78,0 -41,7 +3,1 +30,2 
November -78,7 -42,1 +3,2 +30,5 
December -79,4 -42,5 +3,2 +30,8 
ment and have concentrated heavily on domestic policy 
objectives. 
A multi-currency reserve system needs more, not less, 
management than an international monetary system based on 
only one currency, and as Europe will inevitably, in one form or 
another, be one of the reserve issuing centres, it should be able 
to discuss monetary matters productively with the United 
States. 
Over the/ast 20 years, the relative position of the United States 
in the world economy has profoundly changed and a tripolar 
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system has emerged. Not only in terms of industry, agriculture 
and per capita income, but also as a trade partner and as a 
holder of international reserves, the Community has become 
one of the three great areas of the industrial world. 
An appropriately developed EMS could be a useful way of 
organizing the European pole of the international monetary 
system. Through the creation of a common and stable 
monetary identity for the Community, it would help the orderly 
evolution of the multi-currency reserve system, both through 
helping to limit the number of currencies that play a reserve 
role and through putting greater economic weight and depth of 
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financial markets behind the ECU. Internally, it would help 
cohesion within the EMS spreading over several European 
shoulders the responsibilities of an international currency role 
that have proved quite heavy even for politically and 
economically great powers. 
A fundamental part of the exterior aspects of the system is the 
exchange rate relationships vis-:i-vis third currencies. The 
internal exchange rate arrangements of the EMS are 
somewhat facilitated when the dollar is strong relative to the 
EMS currencies. When the opposite is true, short-term funds 
tend to flow into the German mark in preference to other 
Community currencies thereby accentuating any tensions 
already existing in the system. Just such a movement was the 
catalyst for the September 1979 realignment. 
In theory, in a system with one dominant currency, the exterior 
position could be determined as two-step procedure in which 
the dominant currency manages its exchange rate vis-:i-vis the 
outside and the others manage theirs against it. In practice, this 
procedure is not suitable to any of the EMS partners. Nor can 
the problem be ignored. Even when the US monetary 
authorities are pursuing a policy of allowing the dollar to find 
its own level in the exchange markets, that level is a matter 
about which the Community is neither indifferent nor 
completely impotent. On the other hand, it is not a question on 
which any rigid guidelines can be pre-specified. As stipulated in 
the Bremen Annex and the Brussels Resolution, any actions on 
the dollar should therefore be subject to a common procedure 
which would result in some compromise between the different 
national positions an{i the aims of the system. 
5. Wider use of the ECU 
All ECU created by the EMCF, whatever their creation 
method, have the same characteristics of being 'official' sight 
liabilities usable only between participants in the system. On 
the other hand, as the ECU becomes the expression of the 
Communities' emerging monetary identity, deeper and broader 
financial markets operating in ECU will develop and a broader 
category of holders will have access to it. Both these facts pose 
the problem of a wider use of the ECU. 
The basic EMS texts mention that European economies with 
especially close ties to the Community could participate in the 
system in some way. Some countries already maintain very 
close exchange rate links with one of the EMS currencies, but 
nothing has been done to integrate these relationships within 
the EMS or to extend the use of the ECU to this wider zone. 
The Community has been in deficit to the OPEC cowitries, 
who in turn are looking for ways of diversifying their reserves. 
A move towards allowing them to hold ECU together with 
invoicing of their exports to Europe in ECU has been 
advocated by some as beneficial to both sides and could again 
extend the use of the ECU. 
The expr.ession of a monetary identity cannot however be 
confined to official holders; private use of, and markets for, the 
ECU will have to develop. The international financial 
community has started to use ECU for a number of credit 
operations including opening of deposit accounts, issuing of 
deposit certificates, granting of loans and issuing bonds. The 
last of these took off in 1981. There have been six bond issues 
totalling nearly 250 million ECU, which may be a small figure 
compared with the total in all denominations over the same 
period (USD 18000 million), but it nevertheless amounts to 
about 5% of the total of public issues in currencies other than 
the dollar: a remarkable percentage for a start. Three of the 
issues have been made by Community institutions, two by the 
EIB and one by Euratom. Other Community institutions use 
the ECU for accounting purposes and have opened ECU 
accounts for the relevant transactions with a number of banks. 
Today, there are still a number of obstacles, as well as 
unfamiliarity, to this development of the private use of the 
ECU. The syndicate leaders of the ECU denominated bonds 
are banks from those Member States whose authorities have 
allowed the use of the ECU through giving it the same status as 
a foreign currency. Jn other Member States, the ECU is still 
disadvantaged by its hybrid nature. As seen from any individual 
country, it is composed partly of national currency and partly 
of foreign currencies. The national currency part naturally falls 
under any regulations directed at domestic monetary policy 
and the foreign currency part is subject to any exchange control 
type regulations. The result is that the ECU is disadvantaged as 
compared to either domestic or foreign currency. 
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CHAPTER V 
Analysis of the possible areas in which the EMS 
can be developed 
The evaluation of the way in which the EMS has functioned 
demonstrates that there are a number of areas in which the 
system could be improved. 
The possible areas for the development proposed by the 
Commission,' which tend to respect the present balance 
between strictness arid solidarity, derive from an analysis of 
the areas in which progress could be made within the present 
legal framework, and consequently without recourse to 
Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome. 
The analysis made in Chapter IV has shown that despite the 
undeniable successes of the EMS, further developments are 
necessary; and they are likely to become more necessary as the 
external environment worsens: its achievements have been the 
result of a combination of favourable external circumstances 
and its own ii1ternal strengths. Similarly its disappointments, in 
terms of convergence towards stability, stem from hostile 
external factors and from certain shortcomings in the system 
itself. Its mechanisms, relying excessively on prespecified 
rules, have not always worked cohesively towards the 
underlying objectives, and have not been broad-ranging enough 
to induce a satisfactory level of price stability. 
The aims therefore should be to develop the system: to make 
the mechanisms more responsive to changes in environment, 
endow them with a greater disciplinary effect; to encourage 
public and private economic agents to model their behaviour 
more closely on necessity of monetary stability; and to 
organize in a more orderly and effective manner the 
Community's role in the multiple reserve currency system. 
Possible developments, based 011 technical analysis and on 
extensive discussions both within the Commission departments 
and in the competent Committees as well as on the above 
assessment, are briefly described in thefo/loWing paragraphs. 
They can be grouped around four main areas for action: 
( i) coherence of the mechanisms; 
(ii) opening the system; 
(iii) use of the ECU on the markets; 
(iv) policy convergence. 
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Annex C-2 presents a technical study by the Alternates of the Monetary 
Committee on some of the problems which could be posed by non-
institutional development of the EMS. 
Section 1- Assuring greater coherence of the 
mechanisms 
Three years' experience suggests that when the system was 
designed and put into effect, excessive confidence was placed in 
the virtues of the automatic mechanisms which did not prove 
justified. The effect of discipline, inducing rigour and stability, 
which was expected to be induced by the operation of the 
mechanisms, has not been sufficiently marked. Adjustments 
could therefore be made by improving the control over and 
coherence of the main constituent parts of the system. 
I.I. The ECU 
The ECU used within the system has two defects: its creation is 
unmanaged, and it is little used. 
Within the swap system, the creation of ECU can only be fully 
controlled by introducing more discretionary decisions. It is 
possible to moderate the effects of erratic movements of the 
price of gold or the dollar exchange rate on the quantity of 
ECU created,' by increasing the duration of each swap or 
lengthening the reference period over which averages are 
taken. The consequence of these methods however is that the 
internal valuation of the assets and the market valuation will 
diverge, with adverse consequences for the use of the ECU. A 
more efficient method is to keep the quantity of ECU fixed and 
make the necessary quarterly adjustments to the amounts of 
reserve assets transferred according to variation in their ECU 
price. This has been called the 'closed pool' and would mean 
determining, (i) the initial pool of ECU, and (ii) the procedure 
for any subsequent alterations to the pool. It should not be 
possible for such a decision to be taken except solemnly and at 
fairly long intervals. One possibility would be for the central 
banks or the Board of Governors of the EMCF to agree each 
year on the volume of ECU to be created. Another would to be 
to set an annual rate of growth for the volume of ECU (linked, 
for example, to the growth of the Community's external trade 
or of intra-Community trade), a rule from which the central 
banks could not depart except by unanimous decision. 
With the inflationary danger involved in the present method of 
ECU creation eliminated, the use of the ECU should be 
encouraged. The abolition of the ECU's present acceptance 
limit in the settlement of operations covered by the very short-
termfinancing would enable the debtor to clear his debt in full 
by surrendering ECU. In return, the creditor would receive a 
higher remuneration on his net ECU position ( the rate of 
interest could be set each month by the Board of Governors of 
the EM CF at a level derived from the market level) 3 and could 
See Annex C-2: Severing the link between the volume of ECU issued and 
the price of gold or the exchange rate of the dollar. 
E.g. the average of three-month interbank rates on the internal market of 
various EMS currencies, or the three-month Euro-ECU rate. 
Analysis of the possible areas in which the EMS can be developed 
be authorized to mobilize his net ECU credit position on the 
basis of formulae to be agreed. I 
Adopting all the above provisions would appreciably enhance 
the ECU's properties, by reaffirming its role both as a 
settlement instrument and as an instrument based on stability. 
At the same time the balance of rights and obligations between 
creditors and debtors would be respected. 
1.2. The mechanisms 
In the same way as the ECU's properties can be improved and 
with the same object in view, certain gaps in the existing 
mechanism could be .filled. 
First, organization of the use of Community currencies in intra-
marginal interventions.2 At present, a central bank's use of a 
Community currency for intervention inside the margins is 
subject to the goodwill of the central bank whose currency is 
requested. Although interventions of this kind might prevent a 
currency's movement towards its margin, interventions are 
instead made in dollars and this often has the effect of 
undermining the coherence of the participating central banks' 
attitudes towards that currency. Alternatively, if no interven-
tion is made inside the margins, the currency under threat slides 
until it reaches its bilateral margin, at which point the 
intervention amounts may be far greater than those that would 
have been necessary to reverse the trend earlier. Both so as to 
prevent the latter situation from occurring-in order to 
economize as much as possible on intervention funds-and to 
reduce the predominance of dollar interventions, which tends to 
place that currency at the centre of the system, the use of 
Community currencies in intra-marginal interventions must be 
organized by defining guidelines within the spirit and the letter 
of the system. One possibility would be to authorize the central 
bank whose currency had crossed the divergence threshold or 
had gone beyond a given bilateral limit to intervene, at its 
discretion, in Community currencies.3 These interventions, 
which could benefit from the very short-term financing facility, 
would nevertheless be subject to a ceiling. 
Another possibility would be to limit solely the availability of 
Community currencies for the purpose of intra-marginal 
intervention, without making provisions as above.for specific 
cases where they would be allowed. In this case, provision could 
be made/or the central bank, whose currency is used, to have 
the right to request suspension of interventions in its currency. 
Second, relations with the dollar. The organization of intra-
marginal intervention in Community currencies will reduce the 
See Annex C-3: Mobilization of net ECU creditor positions. 
See Annex C-2: Intra-marginal interventions·- eligibility for the VSTF 
facility. 
The choice of intervention currencies would then relate to the currencies 
whose premium or discount over the divergent currency was the greater. 
amount of undesirable dollar interventions, but without 
eliminating the problem which the dollar represents for the 
system as a whole. The sharp fluctuations of the dollar 
exchange rate over the last three years and the large fund 
movements which they produced, represent so great a threat to 
the cohesion of the EMS that they call for active efforts for the 
definition of a common altitude towards the dollar on the part 
of the EMS currencies. This common attitude would be defined 
by the central banks at short and regular intervals, as part of an 
assessment exercise resulting in a quantitative formulation of a 
'zone ofprobabi/ity'for the ECU/dol/ar exchange rate. At a 
later stage, the same exercise might moreover be contemplated 
for the ECU/yen exchange rate. Such a zone, which would have 
to be fairly wide ( ± 10-15% around an ECU/dollar exchange 
rate), would serve as a point of reference for the Community 
central banks, which would be expected to act on their interest 
rates or to intervene in order to stop the dollar/ ECU rate from 
leaving the zone. The markets could be ieformed of it in order 
to benefit from an announcement effect. 
The Community monetary authorities represented by the 
EMCF should also use their influence to persuade the US 
authorities to reconsider their laissez-aller exchange rate and 
interest rate policy: the moves made by the Community would 
gain in credibility if they were supported by the same methods 
on the American side. In this connection, the start of talks with 
the US authorities with a view to replacing the existing 
network of swaps between certain Community central banks 
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York by a single credit 
line between the latter and the EMCF would provide tangible 
evidence of the European determination to close ranks vis-cl-vis 
the United States. 
Third, a step would be taken towards the consolidation of credit 
mechanisms-planned for a later stage-if it was decided to 
make the EMCF responsible for the short-term monetary 
support mechanism. This would strengthen the EMCF's 
functions and act as a signal of the determination to organize 
the t!;Xisting institutions in/unction of the needs of the workings 
of the EMS. No legal difficulty would be involved, since the 
provision is contained in the Council Regulation of 3 April 
1973 establishing the EMCF and was subsequently confirmed 
by the Bremen and Brussels European Councils. 
Section 2 - Opening the system 
The EMS isat present a closed system in which only the central 
banks of certain Member States participate, whereas the 
Community is open to the outside world.4 If the EMS were 
opened up to the central banks of certain third countries, by 
authorizing them to acquire and hold ECU, the Community 
could strengthen the system (by extending its geographical 
See Annex C-2: The external role of the ECU. 
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area and increasing the possibilities for mobilizing the ECU), 
and could protect it from international monetary instability 
( by channelling at least part of the tendencies of reserve 
diversification towards the ECU): at the same time it could 
help with the financing of an overall external payments deficit. 
Hence the importance of planning and organizing this kind of 
internationalization of the ECU. 
A general principle should govern the opening of the system: 
third holders should be subject to substantially the same rights 
and obligations concerning use of and remuneration in ECU as 
the participants. Extending its role beyond the Community 
should not destroy the single nature of the ECU. The conditions 
for acquiring ECU will accordingly have to reflect its 
precarious existence, so long as the swap system is used/or its 
creation. · 
2.1. A first possibility would be to extend the ECU's 
negotiability by permitting designated third holders to acquire 
existing ECU assets from participating central banks. A third 
holder arrangement setting out in detail the terms and 
conditions for acquiring, mobilizing and restituting ECU would 
be necessary. Participating central banks could thus mobilize 
their ECU against dollars, offer ECU as a settlement of a debt 
or satisfy a demand for temporary reserve diversification, 
without affecting the total volume of ECU in circulation. 
2.2. A second possibility would be to permit the EMCF to 
issue ECU to third countries under the same conditions as those 
applying to existing participants, i.e. against a swap of 
reserves. This formula, which would imply the creation of 
additional ECU, would seem most suitable for those European 
countries 'with particularly close economic and financial ties 
with the Community' wishing to be associated in the exchange 
rate mechanism. The association agreement would have to set 
out the conditions for acquiring and using ECU on terms 
analogous to those applied to member central banks. 
2.3. In a broader perspective another possibility would be for 
the EMCF to issue ECU for reserve diversification by non-
Community institutions. The purpose of this kind of suggestion 
is as a contribution to shelter the EMS from strains possible as 
a result of the trend towards diversification when it is directed 
overwhelmingly towards one or other Community currency. In 
view of both the problems which would be posed if the EMCF 
were to shoulder an exchange risk and of the ECU's 
characteristics, notably the absence of institutional convert-
ibility, it would seem that the possibilities, in the present State 
of affairs, are limited. However, certain 'substitution account' 
formulae might be envisaged, based either on increasing the 
ECU's negotiability ( e.g. by designation formulae), or on the 
EMS members directly shouldering the exchange risk. This 
would be the case if the EMCF, having issued ECU against 
reserve assets, re-lent the latter to those of its members which 
had an external deficit to finance. Seen from this angle, the 
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Community loans mechanism could thus be handed over to the 
EMCF. 
Since the EMCF has little room for manoeuvre in the field of 
diversification, the Community would have an interest in 
promoting the private market of the ECU, thus making 
available to third country monetary authorities, wishing to 
diversify their reserves, a wide range of instruments in ECU. 
Section 3 - Encouraging the private use of the 
ECU 
Alongside the official ECU circuit and unconnected with it, a 
genuine private ECU circuit is now developing. It is natural/or 
operators and markets to be interested in the monetary 
expression of a vast economic area in the process of 
integration. The Community can nevertheless, not be in-
different to this use of its monetary 'image', and it should not 
only promote, but also monitor, and even guide this expanding 
private use of the ECU so as to turn it to the greatest 
advantage. Whence the importance of proposals designed to 
supplement the existing provisions and to encourage and 
control the use of the ECU on the markets. 
3.1. It is important to define a sort of ECU 'trademark' so that 
the term and the instrument 'ECU' is used correctly by the 
markets. For example, contracts referring to an 'ECU' defined 
as a closed basket should be avoided because the ECU is by 
construction open to the currencies of future Community 
members. The necessary Community legislation should be 
adopted to ensure that the ECU is not deflected. Thus, for 
example, prohibiting the insertion of an indexation clause in an 
ECU contract would ensure that it remains an instrument of 
stability which is its purpose. The overall purpose would be that 
the wider private use of the ECU would be solidly based. 
3.2. The E/B and the other Community institutions, which use 
the capital markets for raising funds, should set an example by 
launching ECU issues and systematically expanding their 
ECU borrowings. Greater use of the ECU by various 
Community institutions would strengthen the ECU's role on 
the markets and at the same time reaffirm its role as the 
Community monetary identity. 
3.3. Other steps should be taken to promote the wider use of 
the ECU by the financial markets. First the discriminations 
currently applying to the ECU in national regulations should 
be removed (being neither a national nor a foreign currency, it 
is subject to any regulation applying to either). The ECU 
should be given the status of a foreign currency---a privileged 
one--as it is an infant future common currency. The principle 
of free movement within the Community of £CU-denominated 
capital should also be established, and finally the EMCF 
Analysis of the possible areas in which the EMS can be developed 
should be empowered to monitor ECU operations and issues 
( calendar, endorsement or joint authorization by the EMCF 
and the national authorities, etc.). 
The adoption of a regulation containing the above proposals 
would provide a stable foundation for the expansion of the 
private use of the ECU, and would make it an instrument 
capable of developing the Community's ultimate objectives. 
Section 4 - Strengthening policy convergence 
The development of the EMS will not be a real success without 
greater convergence of economic and monetary policies. Three 
years' experience have shown that monetary policies were 
conducted largely on the basis of the system's requirements, 
which helped to make it a success, but that price and cost trends 
continued to diverge. The persistence of these divergences 
imperils the very nature of the EMS, which is in danger of 
gradually being transformed into a crawling peg system. Even 
the measures to strengthen the system discussed above could 
prove useless or ineffective if not backed by real progress 
towards con'vergence. New efforts to improve policy coordi-
nation and convergence must therefore be made. 
All dimensions of economic policy should be considered, and 
approached anew from a single view-point, that of their 
contribution to convergence towards stability. It is clearly a 
long and difficult exercise. This problem should always be 
borne in mind when economic policies are formulated. Some 
concrete decisions should be taken at the Community level and 
be rapidly implemented, indicating a unerring determination to 
move towards convergence. These could be: 
4.1. phasing-out or modifying restrictions on capital move-
ments at present authorized under safeguard clauses; 
4.2. discussion, guided by the operating requirements of the 
EMS, of the intermediate objectives of national monetary and 
interest rate policy; 
4.3. regular examination of the instruments of national 
monetary policy and their use, and laying down a list of internal 
and external monetary policy measures and instruments which 
are incompatible with participation in the EMS and the 
customs union; 
4.4. establishing a system of mutual information and a 
monitoring procedure I on balances of payments and external 
indebtedness ( with a view to encouraging early recourse to 
conditional Community financing). 
As agreed by the Monetary Committee in its October 1980 report on 
recycling(§ 3.4). -
Most of the necessary decisions relate to a more active 
concertatian of monetary policies. It cannot be claimed that by 
themselves they could remedy the inadequate degree of 
convergence, but only that they could help to do so: they 
therefore only represent a number of small steps forward. 
Section 5 - Conclusions 
The possibilities far developing, strengthening and consolidat-
ing the EMS, presented above.farm a balanced whole. They 
maintain the system's existing degree of solidarity and 
strictness while extending its scope; and, as has been shown in 
the report of the Alternates of the Monetary Committee of 3 
February 1982, putting them into effect would not generally 
give rise to any insurmountable technical problems. They are 
addressed primarily at the technical and pa/icy management 
domains; and are within the limits of the existing institutional 
framework. They represent a necessary step forward. The 
analysis of nearly three years of operation has shown that the 
successes are fragile. The system must be strengthened from 
within and its ability to resist outside shocks must be increased. 
In summary the possibilities for development discussed above 
amount to: 
(l} Making the system more coherent: 
- by reinforcing the ECU role as the centre afthe system 
through establishing some degree of contra/ over the 
process of creating ECU which, together with removing 
its acceptance limit modifying the interest rate formula 
and increasing its negotiability, will encourage an 
increased use within the system; 
- by removing certain imperfections andfilling same gaps 
in the system mechanisms through: 
- organizing the use of Community currencies for intra-
marginal interventions and extending the very short-
term financing to these interv~ntions; 
- coordinating relations vis-3.-vis the dollar by defining 
a catnmon attitude, with a quantitatively expressed 
'zone of probability', and by cooperating over interest 
rates; 
- taking a step towards consolidating the credit 
mechanisms by making the EMCFresponsiblefar the 
short-term monetary support. 
(2) Opening the system towards the outside by permitting third 
country monetary authorities to hold and use the ECU. 
(3) Encouraging the use afthe ECU on the financial markets 
by protecting its image of stability, by increasing the ECU 
borrowing and lending activity of Community institutions, 
by minimizing restrictions on the use of the ECU by 
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progressively liberalizing the movement of ECU de-
nominated capital. 
( 4) Reinforcing policy convergence by fully uti/izin{ the 
existing framework and by improving the follow-up to 
measures taken. 
As well as these technical improvements, there are others, with 
more political content. These are, in particular, the full 
participation of sterling and the lira, and the issue of an ECU 
coin which would circulate freely throughout the Community. 
The European Monetary System will not assume its full 
significance and will not achieve its full potential until it 
organizes, on an equal footing, the exchange rate relationships 
of all the Community currencies: sterling's, and later the 
drachma's, participation in the exchange rate mechanism ( and 
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the narrowing to 2,25% of the Italian lira's present margins) 
would bring the system to full fruition and would act as a signal 
to the markets and to public opinion of the determination to 
pursue in common the attempt-accepted and recognized by 
all-to establish a zone of monetary stability in Europe. 
From another point of view, the issue of an ECU coin I would 
strike public opinion just as hard, though in a different way: by 
bringing the ECU out of the specialists' circle (central banks, 
exchange dealers, capital market operators) to which it is now 
confined, and pulling it in the pocket of the man in the street, 
the ECU's destiny as the monetary symbol of the Community 
would be fully affirmed. 
See Annex C-2: Minting an ECU coin. 
Commission proposals for a non-institutional development of the EMS 
CHAPTER VI 
Commission proposals for a non-institutional 
development of the EMS 
In the spring of 1982, as a result of the postponement of the 
institutional phase and the Council's manifest intention 
nevertheless to develop the EMS to some extent, the 
Commission presented the Council (Economic and Financial 
Affairs) of 15 March 1982 with proposals for action that 
could be implemented without it being necessary to amend 
the Treaties. · 
Section I below reproduces the text of the Draft Resolution 
submitted to the Council ' by the Commission, while 
Section II reviews the principal arguments put forward when 
the text was examined by the Community bodies concerned. 
It will be remembered that the Council, meeting in informal 
session on 15 May 1982, was unable to agree on the draft, but 
that it instructed the Monetary Committee and the 
Committee of Governors to keep these questions under 
review. 
Section 1 - Draft Resolution on the 
development of the European 
Monetary System 
J. Introduction 
I.I. At the Council meeting of 15 March 1982, the Ministers 
of Economics and Financial Affairs of the Member States 
examined the Commission's communication on strengthening 
of the European Monetary System and listened to reports on 
this subject from the chairmen of the Monetary Committee and 
Committee of Central Bank Governors. 
1 .2. The Council confirms its determination to continue 
strengthening the system until its transition to the institutional 
stage at the appropriate time. It agreed to keep under review 
the work on the transition to the final stage of the system and 
the creation of the European Monetary Fund already 
undertaken by the Commission and the competent committees. 
1.3. The Council is determined to move forward towards 
establishing the final phase of the system by adopting the 
following provisions and measures. 
The draft was preceded by a communication to the Council (see Annex D). 
2. The ECU 
2.1.1. At the next quarterly swap, the base volume of ECU will 
be set at 40 OOO million 2. This base volume will remain until 
the end of the present period of swaps. 
During this period, quarterly value adjustments will relate to 
the quantities of gold and dollars transferred to the EMCF by 
the central banks. Volume adjustments will continue to be 
made according to the existing system. 
A new base volume will be fixed when the decision is to be taken 
on the renewal of the swap system ( 15 March 1983). 
Alternatively, the reference period to be used for gold valuation 
will be extended to two years. 
2.1.2. The acceptance limit on ECU is raised to 100%. 
2.1.3. The remuneration of ECU net credit positions will be 
fixed by the Central Bank Governors on the basis of market 
exchange rates. 
2.1.4. Any participant whose net posttzve posztwn has 
exceeded 50% of its ECU allocatiM may, on demand, mobilize 
these ECU against dollars for t: ' duration of the existing 
period of swaps. Mobilization should not be done for the sole 
purpose of changing the composition of reserves. 
2.2. Private use of the ECU 
2.2.1. The ECU will be the subject of a basic Community text 
which will lay down its characteristics and the way in which it is 
used. 
2.2.2. The ECU will have the status of a foreign currency in all 
Member States. National monetary authorities will permit the 
financial institutions under their control to open accounts and 
carry out operations in ECU. ECU bond issues will be the 
subject of a Community mutual information procedure. 
2.2.3. Indexation clauses will not be permitted to apply, apart 
from by exception, to claims, values or prices expressed in 
ECU. 
2.2.4. The various Community institutions, and the EIB will 
be invited to do the same, shall, with the active collaboration of 
the Member States, undertake to promote the widest possible 
use of the ECU in the areas for which they are responsible; in 
particular: 
- the ECU will be progressively used for borrowing and 
lending operations as far as is compatible with its sound 
2 This number corresponds approximately to the amount of ECU which 
would be created if the existing rules were applied at the start of the next 
swap period (April 1982). 
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establishment on the financial markets, the object in view 
being for it to account for a similar proportion of such 
operations as do those national currencies which are most 
used; 
Community institutions' accounts in national currencies 
will, in principle, be replaced by accounts in ECU; 
- the financial rights and obligations of these institutions will, 
as far as possible, be denominated and settled in ECU. 
3. Measures to develop ~onvergence 
3.1. The actual conduct of the economic policies of Member 
States must be assessed, as regards its results and its methods, 
by reference to the objectives laid down by common agreement. 
The Commission is invited, in this context, to make full use of 
the existing consultation and recommendation procedure. 
3.2. The Council of Ministers ECO/FlN will regularly 
discuss, on the basis of a report by the Monetary Committee 
and the Committee of Governors, the intermediate monetary 
targets and the level of interest rates in the Community 
countries in the light of their compatibility with the objectives 
of economic policies. Where the intermediate monetary targets 
are concerned, the discussion will take place at least once a 
year during the fourth quarter. 
3.3. Measures which are incompatible with the proper 
functioning of the EMS must be avoided. The Council will, on a 
proposal of the Commission, draw up a list of measures which 
impede current transactions; implementation of such measures 
will be prohibited, in the absence of a decision made at the 
Community level and for a limited period. 
3.4. Except for derogations granted under the Treaty, there 
will be free movement of £CU-denominated capital. Liberaliz- . 
ation of other capital movements currently subject to 
restrictions will be sought through an examination of the 
restrictions in force. 
3.5. A mutual information and monitoring procedure will be 
established on the balance of payments situation and the 
external indebtedness of the Member States, in line with the 
suggestions of the Monetary Committee of October 1980. 
Early use of Community credit will be encouraged when it is 
complementary to a policy airried at external balance. 
4. Organization of the exterior aspects of the system 
4.1. The competent Community institutions will propose to the 
US and Japanese authorities that their regular discussions on 
monetary pfoblems of common interest should be reinforced. 
These consultations should also take place when the foreign 
exchange market appears to be unrelated to the underlying 
economic data-i.e. · where rates are obviously outside the 
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limits that economic likelihood would suggest~or when 
interest rate differentials cause excessive and undesirable 
strains on the Community's money and financial markets. 
4.2. The European authorities will continue to request the 
United States to abandon the principle of not intervening on the 
foreign exchange markets. Cooperation with Community 
central banks will be facilitated by the establishment of a single 
credit line between the FED and the EMCF. 
4.3. Coordination of Community central banks' interventions 
in third currencies will be increased. Interventions will be based 
on a common assessment of the ECU's exchange relationships 
and bearing in mind the average level of interest rates desirable 
in the Community. 
4.4. When a currency crosses its divergence threshold 
(lowered to 50% for wider band currencies) or when the 
difference of its bilateral rate is more than .85% of the 
maximum permitted fluctuation margin against another 
participating currency, the central bank of the currency in 
question is presumed to be able to intervene in Community 
currency and to have access to the very short-term financing. 
The issuing central banks of currencies used for interventions 
have the possibility of refusing the continued use of their 
currency if this causes problems for their internal monetary 
policy. Nevertheless, the dollar will continue to be used for 
intra-marginal interventions in cases where, by use of this 
currency, the cohesion of the EMS can be maintained and, at 
the same time, an undesirable moveml!nt of the dollar in 
relation to the EMS can be acted upon. 
4.5. The central banks of countries which seek to have special 
economic and financial ties with the European Communities 
will be able to obtain ECU, either by acquiring them from the 
participating central banks, or against transfers of reserves, in 
the form of swaps, from the EMCF. 
5. Further procedure 
5.1. So as to implement the provisions of point 2.2. above, the 
Council notes the Commission's intention to submit, to the 
extent this is necessary, the appropriate modifications to 
Regulation (EEC) No3180/78. · 
5.2. The Council invites the central banks to modify their 
agreement of 13 March 1979 laying down the operaiing 
procedures/or the European Monetary System to take account 
of points 2.1.1., 4.4. and 4.5. above. 
5.3. The Council invites the Commission, in close cooperation 
with the Monetary Committee and the Committee of 
Governors, to report in time for its July meeting on the 
implementation of the measures and procedures set out in 
paragraphs 3 and 4 above. 
Commission proposals for a non-institutional development of the EMS 
Section 2 - Discussion of some of the 
proposals 
The Commission's suggestions formally presented in the 
above draft Resolution were discussed in detail, first by the 
specialist committees (the Monetary Committee and the 
Committee of Governors: see Annex E and Annex F), and 
then by the Council (Economic and Financial Affairs) 
meeting in February and April 1982. 
This section summarizes the discussions and deals with the 
main objections to the Commission's proposals. 
I. Must greater convergence precede any development of the 
system? · 
Some governments believe that the lack of convergence 
between the Community economies poses the main threat to 
the EMS. The most pressing requirement is therefore for 
policies that will increase convergence rather than for 
technical improvements that would-however desirable in 
themselves-<iistract attention from the real problem. 
The Commission, too, thinks that the achievement of a 
satisfactory·degree of convergence is essential to prevent an 
undesirable change in the character of the EMS. Indeed, its 
proposals are largely concerned with this matter. But the 
Commission feels that convergence and the development of 
the system must be pursued simultaneously because each 
reinforces the other. The EMS has undeniably helped to 
stabilize exchange rates and has supported the anti-
inflationary policies implemented in several countries. There 
is little doubt that, without the EMS, divergence would have 
been even greater. Consequently, it is desirable to strengthen 
all aspects of the EMS; this would provide the markets with 
tangible proof of the monetary authorities' commitment to 
the system, and by this very fact would exert a stabilizing 
influence. 
2. Link between the acceptability and convertibility of the 
ECU 
Some Member States link unlimited acceptability with 
institutional convertibility of the ECU. Their main argument 
is that the ECU is only a regional instrument of settlement, 
while the international role of certain Community currencies 
means that the authorities issuing these currencies need to 
have a stock of reserve assets that will be accepted by all 
countries. If acceptability is increased, there is a greater risk 
that quantities of ECU will be accumulated. These Member 
States do not therefore think that any increase in accept-
ability can be considered unless the ECU is fully convertible 
into other assets. 
This argument calls for two remarks: 
First, the requirement for a convertible ECU cannot be taken 
into consideration in the present transitional stage, where 
ECU are created precariously through a system of swaps 
under which the EMCF does not have unrestricted freedom 
to use the reserves against which the ECU are created. In 
these circumstances, it is both legally and technically 
impossible for the EMCF to guarantee the convertibility of 
the ECU. 
Secondly, there is little evidence from past experience to 
support the fear of an excessive accumulation of ECU. Such 
accumulation could only derive from settlement operations 
in ECU at the settlement date for drawings on the very short-
term financing facility, as this is the only instance in which 
central banks are entitled to use ECU (up to a limit of 50%) to 
discharge their debt All other transfers of ECU must be 
made by mutual agreement In the three years of existence of 
the EMS, total repayments of very short-term financing 
amounted to the equivalent of? 300 million ECU, only 9% of 
which (660 million ECU) was actually settled in ECU. This 
was because debtors preferred, and still prefer, to discharge 
as much as possible of their debt by purchasing the creditor's 
currency (80 % in this instance) on the market, rather than to 
lose reserves, whether ECU or dollars. 
Nevertheless, the Commission is aware that future develop-
ments are not necessarily a continuation of past experience, 
and it has attached several other suggestions to its proposal 
that the ECU be made fully acceptable: control of ECU 
creation so as to reduce the risk of an inflationary expansion 
of the volume; increase in the remuneration on the ECU in 
order to enhance its attractiveness to creditors; and the right 
to mobilize ECU when the outstanding amount ofECU held 
by a participant exceeds a certain ceiling (exercise of this right 
being perhaps subject to some monitoring of the need for 
convertible reserves). 
All in all, the proposed system seems all the more balanced 
since in the present system the 50% acceptance limit applies 
to each claim and not to the total amount of ECU held by 
each participant Assuming that, in order to defend their 
currencies, several Commllnity counttjes became debtors of 
the same Community central bank under the very short-term 
financing facility, that bank would, according to present 
rules, have to accept settlement in ECU for 50% of each of its 
claims. Contrary to what one might think, the acceptance 
limit therefore offers no real guarantee against the accumu-
lation by a central bank of a relatively large amount of ECU 
relative to the initial stock of ECU acquired against the 
transfer of reserves. 
The Commission's proposal would change the present 
situation by offering potential creditor countries an 
assurance that the net ECU credit positions which they might 
build up could be mobilized beyond a certain threshold; at 
present, the system's creditors can trade in their ECU for 
other exchange assets only through mutually agreed 
transactions. 
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In the debate, some countries moreover considered the 
amendment proposed by the Commission too favourable to 
the system's potential creditors. 
3. Reservations about extending the private use of the ECU 
In principle, the Member States are in favour of extending 
the private use of the ECU, but not all are prepared to follow 
the Commission's proposals: these aim at promoting and 
giving a framework to such use by the means of a single basic 
text giving an official basis to the private use and prescribing 
methods of use. 
The basic text would stipulate, among other things, that the 
ECU should have the status of a foreign currency. This status 
is in fact already largely granted to it by the monetary 
authorities in most of the Member States which, de Jure or de 
facto, treat transactions in ECU as foreign currency 
transactions for the purposes of their exchange regulations. 
These regulations authorize resident banks to use ECU for a 
wide range of transactions, comparable with those usually 
carried out in foreign currency. 
The absence of a genuine European capital market ( one of 
the objectives of economic and monetary union), has been 
partly compensated by the development of the Euromarket. 
However, this is not enough. So, in order to facilitate the 
emergence of a European capital market, the Commission 
has proposed establishing the principle of the free movement, 
within the Community, of ECU-denominated capital. 
The Member States with exchange controls find it difficult to 
accept this principle, which could breach their systems of 
protection; for it would be easy to get round the rules 
forbidding certain exports of capital by denominating 
transactions in ECU. However, it seems that agreement 
might be possible on progressive liberalization, starting with 
the financial operations of the Community institutions, 
which are already exempt from exchange controls in most of 
the Member States. It would also be conceivable to free ECU 
issues for Community residents within an annual ceiling that 
could be raised periodically. 
The Commission's proposals on developing the use of the 
ECU for the Community institutions' borrowing and 
lending activities have been well received. However, its 
suggestions for the ECU to be used, first for keeping the 
Commission's accounts with the financial institutions of the 
Member States and second for denominating the rights.and 
obligations which the Commission contracts met with some 
misgiving. 
Modelling itself on the rules in force in some countries (e.g. 
Germany) for claims and prices expressed in national 
currencies, the Commission has proposed that claims, values 
and prices expressed in ECU may not, except by way of 
derogation, carry indexation clauses; it feels that such 
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clauses could damage the good reputation of the ECU, which 
is intended to be an instrument of stability and should 
therefore be based on solid foundations. Discussion has 
shown that formulation of such a principle applying 
specifically to the ECU did not seem essential to a number of 
Member States which felt that the treatment of the ECU in 
this respect should conform to the general rules applicable in 
those countries. 
4. Objections to the organization of intra•marginal interven. 
tions 
In the present system, intra.marginal interventions in an 
EMS currency, like the acquisition of an EMS currency 
through the very short-term financing facility, requires the 
prior agreement of the issuing bank. For some of the central 
banks, the Commission's proposals for improving the 
organization of these transactions are unacceptable, as they 
could interfere with national autonomy as regards monetary 
policy. The strong-currency countries, i.e. those likely to be 
supplying the intervention currencies, point out· that the use 
of the VSTF facility for intra-marginal interventions would 
be inflationary in that it wouJd increase the volume of money 
supply during the facility's period of activation. 
The same central banks also feel it undesirable to embark on 
the de facto reduction of the 2,25% fluctuation margins since 
this would mean a systemization of procedures relating to 
intra·marginal interventions. 
The Commission supports its position by pointing to two 
facts. First, since the EMS was introduced central banks 
have intervened within margins, mainly in order to keep the 
overall cost of intervention down; second, the present prior 
agreement procedure has frequently turned out in practice to 
be too lengthy in view of the requirements of rapidly 
changing markets, so that monetary authorities have tended 
to save time by intervening in dollars rather than in the 
Community currencies. 
Consequently, the Commission thinks the intervention 
procedure should be improved by giving the central banks a 
limited power of initiative, while ensuring that there is no 
adverse effect on the conduct of internal monetary policy in 
the country whose currency is used. The implementation of 
the Commission's proposals could lead to better balance 
between interventions· in Community currencies and inter· 
ventions in dollars, allowing the choice to depend on the 
respective movements of the currencies in question. This 
would prevent dollar interventions being used to maintain 
the cohesion of the EMS, when such intervention would 
move the dollar in an undesired direction. Conversely, the 
dollar, and not Community currencies, would be used when 
use of the dollar would help both the cohesion of the EMS 
and the stabilization of its exchange rate. In concrete terms, 
this would mean that weakening Community currencies 
would be supported by the sale of other Community 
currencies rather than dollars when it was obvious that the 
exchange rate of the dollar ought not to fall further. 
Commission proposals for a non-institutional development of the EMS 
However, if the dollar exchange rate was too high, weak 
Community currencies would have to be supported, 
primarily by sales of dollars. This improvement in the 
coordination of interventions as a whole would not interfere 
with the requirements of national monetary policies since the 
amounts of national currency automatically available would 
be small, and since the central banks involved would be able 
to suspend recourse to their currencies. 
5. External aspects: acquisition of ECU by third countries 
Most of the Community countries think that, in the non-
institutional stage, the use of the ECU can be extended 
beyond the Community frontiers only with great caution. It 
would be advisable, in particular, to authorize only the 
transfer to third countries of pre-existing ECU by the 
Community central banks. For so long as the system for 
creating the ECU makes it a precarious asset which cannot 
be converted through the EMCF, any creation of new ECU 
for non-Community countries is out of the question. 
Although its own proposal goes further, the Commission is 
prepared to accept this argument, which would enable the 
area of use of the ECU to be extended and would therefore 
constitute some progress. 
6. Legal problems raised by the non-institutional development 
of the EMS 
The Commission considers that the changes to the present 
system could be made on the basis of Article 235 of the 
Treaty of Rome, ' and by amending the Agreement of 
13 March 1979 between the central banks: numerous 
Council statements have clearly established that the 
development of the EMS is necessary to achieve the 
Community's objectives of promoting continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increase in stability and closer 
relations between the Member States (see Article 2 of the 
EEC Treaty). Furthermore the substance of the Commission 
proposals is in keeping with the logic of the Resolutions of 
the Bremen and Brussels European Councils which are 
themselves the basis of the present system. 
Although most of the Community Member States take the 
same view as the Commission, there is not unanimity. 
Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome: 
'If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the 
course of the operation oft he common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the 
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.' 
The need to resort to Article 236 2 (i.e. to amend the Treaty) 
is upheld by the countries in which domestic monetary order 
is based on the Constitution and the central bank's 
independence from government. In these circumstances, and 
given the effects of the Commission's proposals on the 
domestic monetary policies in Member States, they feel that 
successive changes to the EMS based on Article 235 would 
gradually undermine the sovereignty Member States have 
over monetary matters without there having been a debate 
beforehand in national parliaments. Such a debate-and 
with it recourse to Article 236-is thought to be essential, as 
is detailed consideration of the development of the EMS by 
the legislative authorities would provide the system with a 
clear legal basis and place it firmly on democratic found-
ations. 
Although aware of the validity of the arguments put forward 
by the supporters of recourse to Article 236, the Commission 
feels that a revision of the Treaty would not be essential for 
the development of the EMS in the way in which'it proposes. 
Recourse to Article 235, can, at this stage of the discussion, 
provide an adequate legal basis for making technical 
improvements to a system itself based on that Article. 
Conclusion 
After a series of discussions during the first four months of 
1982, the Monetary Committee, which concentrated initially 
on the system's mechanisms, tried to devise a compromise 
which might be based on the following points: 
(i) raising the acceptance limit of the ECU from 50% to 
60% or 70% (instead of I 00%, as suggested by the 
Commission); 
(ii) allowing the VSTF facility to be used to finance intra-
marginal interventions, while maintaining, under 
certain conditions, the right of veto of the creditor 
central bank; (the Commission had proposed automatic 
access to the VSTF facility for intra-marginal interven-
tion, unless the central banks issuing the intervention 
currencies proved that the use of their currencies 
impeded the conduct of domestic monetary policy); 
Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome: 
'The government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to 
the Council proposals for the amendment of this Treaty. 
If the Council, after consulting the Assembly and, where appropriate, the 
Commission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a conference of 
representatives of the governments of the Member States, the conference 
shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of 
determining by common accord the amendments to be made to this 
Treaty. 
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.' 
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(iii) lengthening the reference period to be used for the 
valuation of gold from six months to one year; (the 
Commission had proposed an extension to two years); 
(iv) opening up the System to the outside world by 
authorizing the central banks of European countries 
having particularly close links with the Community to 
acquire ECU from EEC issuing institutions; (the 
Commission had proposed that third countries would 
also be able to acquire ECU against transfers of reserves 
in the form of swaps with the EMCF). 
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However, a consensus could not be reached on these 
proposals, chiefly because it was impossible to overcome the 
objections to the proposals concerning the acceptability of 
the ECU and intra-marginal interventions. 
The difficulties in reaching a technical consensus were 
compounded by the prevailing feeling, expressed in the oral 
statements of the Chairmen of the Monetary Committee and 
of the Committee of Governors on 17 May 1982 (see 
Annexes E and F), that given the economic and monetary 
situation in the Community, absolute priority should be 
given to improving the convergence of economic policies. 
PART THREE 
Preliminary synthesis of ideas on the institutional stage of the European 
Monetary System 
See Annex H. 
Transition to the final stage of the EMS, which will be a decisive step in the progress towards 
economic and monetary union in the Community, will be achieved only if sustained efforts 
are made to promote economic convergence (cf. Part One) and if a genuine political resolve 
is forthcoming. By definition, final consolidation of the EMS means that Member States 
must relinquish at least some of their national policy-making powers and that there must be 
an active search for common solutions to the main problems with which the Community is 
generally confronted. 
Consequently, this European construction would have to have a tangible effect at the day-
to-day operational level, and have to make its impact felt as a means of creating at the 
Community level broader and more effective potential for action than in each individual 
Member State. The interdependence of Member States, which is already a fact of life, 
should be positively exploited as a source of strength and so as to enable the Community to 
become a pole of monetary attraction in its own right in international relations. 
If there were a real desire to make headway, the legal problems would not be an 
insurmountable obstacle, and a start could be made in the process of monetary integration 
involving the transfer to the Community of prerogatives hitherto exercised by each 
individual country's monetary authorities. 
In March 1980 the Commission sent to the European Council a report concerning the 
European Monetary Fund. 1 All the subsequent work up until now has been inspired by the 
ideas in that document. During 1980 and 1981, the Commission prepared for the Monetary 
Committee a number of working papers which examined direct transition from the initial 
stage to the institutional stage of the EMS, and did not envisage any intermediate stage for 
developing the system (cf. Part Two). Although these papers no longer necessarily reflect, in 
all their points, the arguments that could currently be developed, nevertheless, it was felt 
useful to attach them as an annex. 
The crucial feature of the institutional phase is the establishment of a decision-making 
body, the European Monetary Fund, which is entrusted and empowered to pursue the 
objective of creating a stable European monetary standard. As the way in which this 
objective is achieved will depend upon the Fund's decisions in response to prevailing 
conditions, it is neither necessary nor possible to lay down in detail a specification for the 
institutional phase of the EMS. It is, however, necessary and possible to specify a number of 
preconditions and likely features. This is done below through some brief considerations on: 
(i) the ECU; 
(ii) the Fund; 
(iii) the exterior aspects of the EMS; 
(iv) institutional questions. 
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Section 1 - The ECU 
The ECU will be the sight liability of the Fund and as such 
will be used by the participating central banks. It will also be 
used progressively by the private sector to denominate the 
whole range of financial transactions. The conditions 
surrounding the use of the Fund's sight liability within the 
system is a matter between the participants; they may have 
conventions, rules and ad hoe agreements as discussed below. 
The use of the ECU to denominate private financial 
transactions cannot be forced upon parties to contracts but it 
can be permitted and encouraged by legislation and more 
importantly by ensuring that the ECU is attractive. For both 
the official and the private roles, it is essential that the ECU's 
fundamental characteristics allow the Fund to develop it in 
such a way that it is associated with stability. 
The present definition of the ECU as a basket ties it to the 
national currencies. It can be neither more nor less stable 
than the best or worst of them. This is a prudent formula and 
gives support to the ECU in its formative stage. It uses the 
joint identity of the component currencies while it is 
acquiring its own. The purpose of the EMS is to ensure that 
the component currencies are stable; and as it succeeds, the 
ECU, defined in terms of them, will also become more stable. 
It might also however be desirable at some stage that it is 
more stable than their average, in which case the existing 
basket definition would have to be modified. Eventually 
when a single stable monetary standard is achieved the 
definition becomes irrelevant as there will then be no 
fundamental difference between the national currencies or 
between them and the ECU. 
Within the system the supply and demand conditions for the 
ECU should be developed in such a way as to be conducive to 
stability. The method chosen for ECU creation must reflect 
the fact that any money can only exert a disciplinary effect 
through scarcity. The present method of ECU creation 
against a swap of gold and dollars suffers from the overriding 
disadvantage that the decision on the quantity of ECU in the 
system has been abandoned to a formula based on the 
market price of two assets which are not in the control of the 
participants. In the institutional phase, the Fund should have 
the power to control the quantity ofECU and should do so in 
the interests of the aims of the system. This has clear 
implications for the way in which gold and dollars are 
transferred to the system as will be discussed below. The 
transfers must allow the creation of a permanent ECU and 
full control over the quantity. 
All settlements between participating central banks would 
normally be made fully and exclusively in ECU. Changes in 
the amount of other reserve assets held by the participants 
and the Fund would occur only in relation to exterior 
imbalances which will be discussed below. Moving to this 
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position of ECU use will only gradually be achieved, but an 
obvious first step is the removal of the 50% acceptance limit. 
The purpose is to ensure that there is a demand for the asset 
which is under the control of the system and which can 
therefore exert a disciplinary effect. The more it is used, the 
more other instruments are effectively demonetized within 
the system. At present the relatively easy availability of 
settlement instruments, especially the dollar, through the 
international markets allow countries to delay necessary 
adjustments to external imbalances. In the institutional 
phase of the EMS, the ECU will play an important role in 
ensuring that timely adjustments are m_ade. For cases where 
additional financing is needed the credit mechanisms will be 
consolidated in the Fund. Decisions on credit will therefore 
be made as a complement to the decisions on ECU creation 
and in the light of its use by the participants. 
As well as being the system's settlement instrument, the 
ECU's qualities as a reserve asset must be ensured. It must be 
as attractive as other assets held as reserves, i.e. as dollars, 
gold, SOR etc. Given the very different qualities of each of 
these, the implications for the ECU are not immediately 
clear, but it is true that special measures for the ECU may be 
necessary because its use is confined to a regional block. The 
participants will continue to need and hold other reserve 
assets and it is important to consider how one asset can be 
transformed into another, and especially how dollars may be 
acquired with ECU. Two complementary procedures are 
necessary. The ECU should be both negotiable and 
convertible. 
Negotiability is the regulated possibility to exchange ECU 
for dollars with other participants of the system. The 
possibility already exists in the present phase of the EMS and 
has been used to a limited extent. Although the transactions 
may be recorded by the Fund they essentially involve a 
voluntary agreement of two central banks. There is now a 
provision that such transactions shall not be done for the sole 
purpose of reserve diversification. Potential net ECU 
accumulators may fear that even if this provision was 
removed their access to dollars would be too limited given the 
small number of ECU holders. It would be possible to 
supplement the voluntary negotiability with a designation 
scheme. This would involve some participants being 
designated to supply dollars to another participant in given 
circumstances determined by the Fund. They would then 
have to supply dollars either according to a pre-arranged key 
or according to their ability as judged by the Fund. Such a 
scheme has great similarities with the short-term monetary 
support and is a form of credit arrangement. 
Convertibility is also necessary. Institutional convertibility 
means that under certain circumstances the Fund would be 
obliged to provide dollars to members in return for ECU 
which should thus be destroyed. The main questions posed 
by convertibility are associated with the circumstances in 
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which, and the price at which these operations would be done 
and the possible effect on the Fund's liquidity. The degree to 
which institutional convertibility is necessary depends upon 
the size of the potential imbalances within the system and the 
resultant net ECU positions as well as on the extent to which 
participants need other reserve assets. The Fund must be 
given powers to influence these factors as well as being in a 
position to use the dollars that have been transferred, or 
other assets, to acquire dollars, to the extent necessary to 
ensure the required degree of institutional convertibility. 
The major difference between convertibility and negoti-
ability is that the former involves the destruction of ECU 
whereas the latter only involves a redistribution between 
participants. It is therefore natural that whereas the Fund 
must be directly involved in convertibi1ity it need not 
necessarily be involved in negotiability, although there 
would be cases in which it was desirable that it should be 
because the distribution of ECU could be an important 
element in overall control. 
When reserve assets are being held in considerable amounts 
and for long periods of time, a supplementary factor to their 
characteristics as a store of value is any income that can be 
earned. The growth of dollar holdings during the Bretton 
Woods System was certainly associated with the fact that it 
was better than gold in that it could be converted into gold 
and held in a form which carried an interest payment. Given 
the very different proportions in which its central banks hold 
gold and dollars it is clear either that they do not decide 
reserve composition using portfolio optimizing techniques or 
that they have very different views about the future. 
Considering this and the fact that interest payments have 
often been swamped by capital movements, the importance 
of interest-type payments on ECU should not be exag-
gerated. A return is available on dollars because central 
banks hold their dollars in the form of bonds and obligations 
mainly of the US Government. The same procedure is not 
available for official ECU as long as no official authority 
issues ECU-denominated securities, but the Fund will have 
some income from its assets which could be used to 
remunerate ECU. The remuneration per ECU will depend 
upon the quantity of ECU created on the income available to 
the Fund. This latter is based on the actual income on dollars, 
any income available on gold, and any income from credit. 
Section 2 - The Fund 
To ensure the development of a common and stable 
monetary standard for the Community, the Fund will 
eventually have to make decisions over the whole range of 
monetary policy dimensions: exchange rates, external 
financing, domestic monetary developments. The instru-
ments which it can use will depend upon its power to 
influence the monetary policy in Member States. Initially, 
the Fund will concentrate on the exchange rate and financing 
dimensions of monetary policy while the adjustment 
dimensions will remain primarily the responsibility of 
national authorities. 
Exchange rates 
The exchange rate mechanism includes both day-to-day 
interventions and changes in central rates. The exterior 
aspects of the system are examined below and so here only 
interventions in Community currencies are considered. 
Without large quantities of national currencies the Fund 
could not itself undertake interventions. Member central 
banks have both the market size and the skills to be the active 
operators in this area for their own currencies. There is no 
need to change this situation in the institutional phase. 
The very short-term financing facility has proved a useful 
addition to the intervention mechanisms, and the Fund 
would continue to play its accounting role for these 
operations. However, the mechanisms would also be made 
less rigid by making: (i) the financing period variable below 
a maximum rather than fixed; (ii) the interest rate set 
discretionally, and (iii) credit available also for intra-
marginal interventions under circumstances and conditions 
to be determined. The Fund would have to make decisions 
on these questions in the light of the prevailing circum-
stances. 
Parity changes are already decided by mutual agreement 
through a common procedure. In the institutional phase, it 
would be natural to incorporate realignments into the 
Fund's decision-making structure. No rules about the 
appropriate size or time of parity changes can be prespeci-
fied, but guidelines may help both technical judgment and 
policy decisions. In this sense, the divergence indicator can 
continue to be used as a method of monitoring developments 
on the exchange markets, but other monetary markets 
should also be followed, as well as the underlying economic 
developments. The Fund will have to develop extensive 
technical capacities in these fields so that it can provide a 
major input into the overall decision-making process. 
Although they are the necessary final point of a process of 
monetary integration, irreversibly fixed parities should not 
be rigidly planned in advance. As long as central rates are the 
result of a common decision through the Fund they could 
continue to be adjustable after the establishment of the 
institutional phase without undermining the objective of 
stability. 
The Fund's balance sheet 
The Fund's decisions will be reflected in its balance sheet, 
and to a considerable extent its powers are determined by its 
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asset transformation ability within the balance sheet. The 
liability side of the ECU was discussed above; it is now 
necessary to consider the asset side. 
(a) Initial transfer 
The present swap system has various defects: the number of 
ECU created is mechanically determined by the transfer; this 
number is unstable, depending upon the price of gold and the 
dollar exchange rate; and it is unrelated to the needs of either 
the system as a whole or of individual participants. 
Furthermore, as the participants have the right to the return 
of exactly the gold and dollars which they transfer, the ECU 
created are nothing more than a transient denomination of 
the particular gold and dollars transferred by each individual 
participant. The transfer of assets in the institutional phase 
should avoid these problems. 
Along with delicate political questions, the definitive transfer 
of reserves poses economic problems because gold and 
dollars have very different characteristics and a highly 
volatile price relationship, which makes the decision on the 
initial price or valuation method difficult. It would be wise to 
separate the problem of transfer of assets as much as possible 
from that of the initial volume of ECU and its distribution 
between participants. Through their transfer of gold and 
dollars, the members of the system would participate in the 
Fund. As a separate action the Fund would then issue an 
initial quantity ofECU without specifying an ECU price for 
the two assets. The total amount of gold and dollars 
transferred would then take into account the need for the 
Fund to be a credible financial institution and its potential 
operational role inside and outside the system. The gold 
proportion of this total amount would depend upon the 
extent to which it is thought desirable to mobilize gold. 
(b) Subsequent operations 
Once the Fund is established with an initial quantity ofassets 
and a set of decision-making procedures, its main task, apart 
from exchange rate policy, will be to control the total 
quantity of ECU consistently with its policy objectives. It will 
do so by exchanging assets against ECU, such assets being 
'external' (gold and dollars) or 'internal' ones (credit). 
ECU creation ( or destruction) against other reserve assets 
will occur through the obligation of participants to hold in 
ECU not less than a given percentage of their reserves and/or 
through conversion permitted under certain circumstarices. 
For the latter case possibilities will depend not only on the 
extent of institutional convertibility as discussed above but 
also on dispositions enabling members to obtain ECU 
against dollars. 
As to credit, the present mechanisms have been largely taken 
over from pre-EMS arrangements and do not necessarily 
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give rise to ECU creation or assets in ECU except in the case 
of the very short-term financing facility. Instead, ECU 
(created from gold or dollars) are partly used for reimburse-
ment. At present, although the short-term mechanism is 
meant to be a mechanism of 'first resort' it has hardly been 
used, simply because access to international capital markets 
has been so free. In the next stage, private access would 
remain unchanged but official access would be less as ECU 
rather than dollars would be needed for Community 
settlements. Credit could then become a significant policy 
instrument in the hands of the Fund. 
The establishment of the institutional stage would un-
doubtedly imply consolidation within the EMS of the 
existing Community credit mechanisms: the very short-term 
financing, the short-term monetary support and the 
medium-term financial mechanism. 
Consolidation of the VSTF facility raises two issues: 
provision of the currency requested and the settlement and 
financing procedures. As for the first point, there is room for 
improvement on two fronts: intra-marginal interventions 
could, if not already eligible, qualify for the VSTF facility, 
and the foreign exchange needed for intervention purposes 
could be supplied by the European Monetary Fund and not, 
as at present, on a bilateral basis by the banks participating in 
the exchange-rate mechanism. An innovation could also be 
introduced in the settlement procedures under the VSTF 
facility whereby the creditor central bank could have its 
debts settled immediately in ECU created by the Fund. In 
return, the latter would acquire a claim, also in ECU, on the 
debtor bank. As concerns the consolidation of the STMS and 
MTFA it would have to be accompanied by a revision of the 
amount of credit available and of the conditionality both in 
the light of the Fund's responsibilities in the adjustment 
process. 
The credit instruments available in the Fund would probably 
not be the same as those now in existence which are largely 
automatic and which are separated by duration. It is 
necessary to consider erect.it generally from a functional point 
of view and ask what overall limitations on amount and 
duration are necessary. Within any such limits, the Fund 
should make discretionary decisions about whether credit 
should be granted in a particular instance or not, and if so on 
what conditions as to duration, interest rate, etc. A decision 
to grant credit would thus be parallel to one on exchange 
rates. It would be natural in both cases that general policies 
of the member countries are reviewed and recommendations 
made. 
Situations may arise when there are too many ECU, with the 
result that credit becomes an irrelevant policy instrument. In 
these circumstances, the Fund would be incapable of 
pursuing its objectives if it could not take measures to 
decrease the amount ofliquid ECU. This could be done by a 
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ratio type method which would require members (a member) 
under certain circumstances to hold a given percentage of its 
total ECU in a term deposit rather than as sight ECU. 
Alternatively the Fund could vary the attractiveness of term 
deposits relative to sight ECU through the interest rate. 
Normally only a low interest rate at most would be payable 
on sight ECU and participants could be encouraged to hold 
less sight ECU and more term deposits through an increase in 
the interest rate on the latter. 
Section 3 - Exterior aspects of the EMS 
In its institutional stage, the EMS will have to develop in a 
way consistent with the main features of the post-Bretton 
Woods era. International monetary relationships are no 
longer organized by one dominant currency. Various new 
reserve centres have emerged. Managed floating has become 
the prevailing exchange rate regime. Private financial 
institutions have largely outgrown official ones in the role of 
creating international liquidity and of intermediating 
between surplus and deficit countries. Domestic monetary 
targets have to a large extent replaced gold as the anchor of 
the money creation process. 
The institutional phase must satisfy three requirements. 
First, it must help the effective conduct of external monetary 
policy by the Community. Second, it must promote 
cooperation with outside monetary authorities. Third, it 
must contribute to the evolution towards a new world 
monetary order. 
Regardless of the attitude of the American authorities vis-a-
vis their exchange rates and intervention, member countries 
of the Community have since 1971 always individually 
followed a policy of managed floating vis-a-vis the dollar but 
have never accepted common management. This is inef-
ficient because it allows internal policy differences to be 
concealed; it lets the dollar/German mark relationship 
magnify the EMS/dollar relationship, with the result of 
sometimes reducing and sometimes amplifying the intra-
EMS tensions generated by internal factors; and it may lead 
to contradictory actions on the exchanges such as simul-
taneous buying and selling of dollars by different particip-
ants. For the institutional phase, a truly 'common dollar 
policy' should consist in handling dollar interventions by 
common decision through the Fund. Collective decisions on 
the necessary amount of intervention would, like individual 
decisions taken today, be based on a judgment about the 
desirable combination of exchange rate and reserve object-
ives. There is no technical difficulty in stating such objectives 
in terms ofan ECU /dollar exchange rate and of the desirable 
change of dollar reserves for the system as a whole. 
The difficulty is much more the political one of defining an 
appropriate decision-making procedure and a key for the 
repartition of the change in reserves among the member 
central banks. From an operational point of view there 
would be no need for the Fund itself to undertake the task of 
intervening on the exchange markets. This could continue to 
be done by member central banks, once they act in execution 
of a commonly defined policy line. Such a common dollar 
policy would be consistent with the idea outlined above that 
settlements within the system would be made exclusively in 
ECU, and hence that dollars would have a purely external 
role. 
In contrast to intervention policy, monetary cooperation 
with other authorities outside the EMS requires agreement 
and participation by other parties. Such parties are not only 
the US authorities, but also the authorities of other 
important monetary centres, such as Japan and the oil-
producing countries. Monetary cooperation may take 
several forms in the areas of exchange rate management and 
of financing payments imbalances. The common definition 
of some kind of exchange rate target among key world 
currencies seems unlikely today, but could be considered 
again in the future. Actions are possible in the field of 
financing, such as activation of swap lines between monetary 
authorities or official borrowing or lending like the 'Carter 
Bonds' as in l 978. A well developed EMS could have 
considered an equivalent action in 1981, when exchange rates 
clearly moved out ofline but when market pressures were too 
strong for interventions alone to be effective. Similarly, the 
Community could finance protracted oil deficits with its own 
liability, thus also meeting the desire of OPEC countries to 
hold non-dollar denominated assets. A full development of 
both common intervention policy and of a common policy of 
financing payments imbalances by the EMS would require 
that ECU-denominated assets of different maturities be 
issued to non•members of the system. 
Finally, the European Monetary System will have a role in 
promoting the evolution of the international monetary 
system. If the ECU and the EMS were fully developed, the 
natural consequence would be for them to replace the 
existing currencies and their authorities in international 
monetary relationships. The ECU would have a larger role to 
play than the sum of national currencies would have in its 
absence. The ECU would thus be one of the few currencies of 
which the multi-reserve currency system was composed. 
Such a system would be simpler and less difficult to manage 
than one in which the European pole had failed to give itself 
the necessary organization. 
Section 4 - Institutional questions 
The problem of the institutional phase has three facets: the 
functional, the institutional, and the legal. The functional 
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facet, to which most of the above has been devoted, is the 
basis for identifying institutional and legal arrangements. 
The institutional aspect essentially consists of defining the 
appropriate charter of the Fund. The legal aspect is the 
problem of approving the charter by a satisfactory pro-
cedure. These three facets are different but related, and the 
system will be able to achieve its objectives only if efficient 
and mutually consistent solutions are found for all of them. 
The heart of the institutional problem is giving the Fund the 
instrument and organization that are necessary to assure that 
it not only can but also that it is obliged to pursue the 
necessary policies to reach the objective of'creating a zone of 
monetary stability in Europe' in the sense of both prices and 
exchange rates. In a world in which floating is managed and 
conditions are Continuously and unpredictably changing, 
this requires the possibility to take decisions that are both 
discretionary and rapid. In the monetary field there can be no 
'stopping the clock' or 'delaying the campaign year'. 
An important question is the interdependence between the 
Fund and other national and Community institutions. It is 
generally agreed that a money-creating institution must 
benefit from a certain degree of independence ifitis to be able 
to resist pressures for excessive liquidity creation that would 
inevitably lead to inflation. Independence has its basis not 
only on legal provisions, but also on prestige and tradition. 
In member countries institutional arrangements vary widely 
from great to very limited independence of the central bank, 
although in no country is independence pushed to the point 
of permitting the central bank to overtly oppose the general 
policy orientation of the elected government. At the 
Community level it is of the greatest importance to properly 
formulate the terms of the problem. 
Independence means that the power to create money should 
be sufficiently separated from the power to spend so as to 
ensure that decisions satisfy the general objective of 
monetary stability rather than the particular needs of 
individual spenders. In today's national contexts, this 
essentially means the autonomy of the central bank from the 
budgetary authority, which is at the same time the largest 
spender and the interpreter of popular will. In a Community 
context, the budgetary authority (the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament) is unlikely to be the 
major source of inflationary pressures, as the budget is small 
and balanced by law. 
The 'money spenders' are not only the budgetary authority 
but also, and perhaps more, deficit countries. Seen in this 
light, the issue of independence is not so much one of 
determining which authorities will sit in the organs of the 
Fund, as one of defining the decision-making rules, such as 
majority rules, within such organs. In an institution like the 
EMF, which will have to take decisions, and often to take 
them very quickly, it is hard to imagine anything different 
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from majority· decisions which are in fact the rule in all 
multilateral monetary and financial institutions, whether at 
world or at Community level. In designing the details of 
voting procedures careful consideration should be given to 
possible formulae such as: the number of board members 
determined by the importance of the country; voting powers 
proportional to the capital-quota position; voting powers 
dependent to some extent on credit positions. Some of these 
formulae are used in existing institutions e.g. EIB and !MF. 
A further category of problems concerns the structure of the 
Fund. Different types of institutions have been outlined in 
the studies discussed by the Alternates of the Monetary 
Committee: an accounting type, a central bank type, a 
regional !MF type and a sui generis institution. This typology 
results from different hypotheses about the attribution to the 
Fund of functions that in the present arrangements belong 
alternatively to central banks, ministers, etc. This distinction 
is useful but it should not be carried too far. It is clear from 
the discussion of the functional aspects that the Fund would 
be incapable of pursuing its objectives if its responsibilities 
did not envelop the three dimensions of monetary policy: 
exchange rates, financing and adjustment. These three 
dimensions are part of a whole and yet, in the existing 
national arrangements, they are split between different 
authorities (central banks, treasury, other organs and 
agencies) and split in a way that differs from country to 
country. 
A last aspect of the institutional problem is related to the 
evolutionary character of the institutional phase. Although 
the full potential of the EMS will be realized in a gradual way, 
the fundamental characteristics of the final form of the 
system should be defined from the outset. In other words, the 
direction of the movement should be stated without 
ambiguity from the beginning, but the movement would then 
be gradual. If this is so, provisions will be needed to assure 
that the dynamic process will actually occur. The Com-
munity knows this kind of problem being itself a dynamic 
institutional system. Indeed it has always needed 'a motor', 
although through the years this function has been success-
ively performed in very different ways. 
To sum up, an appropriate institutional setting will have to 
satisfy different requirements: the need for discretionary and 
rapid decisions; autonomy from actual and potential money-
spenders; competence over the full range of dimensions of 
monetary policy; clearly defined position in the constellation 
of national and Community institutions; provisions to 
assure the evolution of the system. In practice, if the political 
will develops for a transition to the institutional phase, all 
these problems may prove less difficult to solve than might at 
first sight appear. Existing Community and non-Community 
institutions offer a wealth of suggestions to the ingenuity of 
legislators. 
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The system narrowing the margins of fluctuation 
between the currencies of the European Economic Community 
from April 1971 to March 1979 
The system for narrowing the fluctuation margins between 
the currencies of the European Economic Community from 
April 1972 to March 1979 (the 'snake') was the precursor to 
the European Monetary System, which retains some of its 
features. 
The history of the snake can be split into two periods: April 
1972 to February 1973 and March 1973 to March 1979. 
I. April 1972 to February 1973: the narrowing 
of margins between the European currencies 
in a system of fixed parities (the snake in the 
tunnel) 
I. Origin: the Basle Agreement 
The main achievement of the Community's first ten years 
was the establishment of a customs union; at the start of its 
second decade the Werner Plan was the first step in an 
attempt to achieve economic and monetary union by stages. 
In compliance with this plan, the Council, on 22 March 1971, 
invited the central banks of the Member States 'from the 
beginning of the first stage, and on an experimental basis, to 
hold exchange rate fluctuations between the currencies of 
Member States within margins narrower than those resulting 
from the application of the margins in force for the US 
dollar, by means of concerted action with respect to that 
currency'. 
Nevertheless, speculation against the US dollar in May 1971 
and the deepening crisis culminating in the suspension of the 
dollar's convertibility into gold on 15 August 1971 1 meant 
that the European monetary authorities were unable to 
implement these provisions. 
After the Washington Agreement of 18 December 1971,' the 
maximum spot spread of the EEC currencies around their 
parities, expressed in dollars, were in fact widened to 
± 2,25% (as against ± 0,75% previously). Over time, the 
maximum fluctuation margins of these currencies were thus 
increased to 4,50% vis-ii-vis the dollar and to 9% vis-il-vis any 
other currency. 
The suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold transfonned the 
international monetary system from an exchange rate system pegg'ed to 
gold (nevertheless a somewhat hybrid system since only the dollar was 
convertible into gold) into an exchange rate system pegged to the US 
dollar. 
2 The main points of the Agreement were: 
(i) a general realignment of parities and notably a 7,89% devaluation of 
the US dollar against gold, the official gold price rising from USO 35 
to USD 38 per ounce; 
(ii) a widening of the fluctuation margins from 1% (0,75% for the EEC 
currencies) to 2,25%. 
Such possible vanat10ns (9%) between the Community 
currencies were incompatible with the Werner Plan object-
ives. So, after a Council resolution of 21 March 1972, the 
Community central banks agreed, in the Basle Agreement 
signed on I O April 1972 which entered into force on 24 April 
1972, to reduce the margins of fluctuation of Community 
currencies around their reciprocal parities to + 2,25%, i.e. to 
the same level as the margins applicable to the US dollar.3 
So that these new margins could be respected (they 
denoted-and still do-the points for interventions in 
Community currencies), the Community's issuing insti-
tutions agreed (the agreement is still in force) to grant each 
other an unlimited amount of very short-term financing 
facilities (VSTF) in their currencies; these facilities are 
administered by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
(EMCF). 
2. Participating countries and functioning of the snake in the 
tunnel 
At the end of May 1972, ten countries implemented the 
Agreement to reduce margins: the six founder members of 
the EEC (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands), the three 
countries which were to accede on 1 January 1973 (Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom) and Norway (see below: 
Chronology of the 'snake'). 
The Basle Agreement, as it functioned.from April 1972 to 
February 1973, is generally known from the way it looks on a 
graph, as the 'snake in the tunnel' (see Graph I). 
The axis of the tunnel was represented by the parity of the 
Community currencies against the US dollar and its two 
outer extremes were formed by the fluctuation limits (i.e. a 
ceiling of + 2,25% and a floor of - 2,25%) against the dollar 
parity. 
Within the tunnel-which therefore had a diameter of 
4,50%-the European currencies participating in the Basle 
Agreement moved within a Community band-usually 
called the 'Community snake'-which was necessarily 
narrower than the tunnel since the maximum spread of rates 
which two European currencies could show in relation to 
their reciprocal parity was limited to 2,25%. 
Up to the start of 1973, the 'snake in the tunnel' worked 
relatively well apart from three exceptions. Three Com-
munity currencies had to withdraw from the snake and allow 
their exchange rates to float: the pound sterling and the Irish 
pound, on 23 June 1972, and the Italian lira at the beginning 
of 1973. 
3 The 1972 Basle Agreement remained in force until the implementation of 
the European Monetary System on 13 March 1979. 
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II. March 1973 to March 1979: the joint 
floating of the European currencies (the 
'snake outside the tunnel') 
1. The abolition of the tunnel and the start ofjoint floating of 
the European currencies 
At the beginning of 1973, developments on the foreign 
exchange market showed that the general parity realignment 
decided in December 1971 had not ushered in a new period of 
stability for the international monetary system. 
In fact, February 1973 saw an increase in speculation against 
the US dollar to the benefit of the German mark and the yen. 
On 12 February 1973 the dollar was devalued for the second 
time (10% against the official price of gold which rose from 
USO 38 to USO 42,22 per ounce). But despite the dollar's 
devaluation, the foreign exchange markets remained unset-
tled and had to be closed at the beginning of March 1973. 
In this crisis situation, the Community Finance Ministers 
met in Brussels on 11 and 12 March 1973 and decided among 
other thingS to keep the maximum spread between six 
Community currencies at 2,25% (see below) and to cease 
their systematic intervention at the maximum fluctuation 
margins of the United States dollar. 
For the European currencies these arrangements marked the 
end of the system affixed parities and the birth of the system 
of the joint float, which has been in existence ever since 
(though in a modified form since the establishment of the 
European Monetary System on 13 March 1979). 
To use a metaphor, it can be said that the decision of 
12 March did away with the 'tunnel'-since the maximum 
margins of fluctuation against the dollar were no longer 
defended-but retained the snake since the maximum spread 
between Community currencies remained fixed at 2,25%. 
• 
• • 
2. The functioning of the joint float 
Eight currencies were originally involved in the joint float: 
six EEC currencies (the Danish krone, the Dutch guilder, the 
French franc, the Belgian and Luxembourg francs, and the 
German mark) and two other currencies (the Norwegian 
krone which had been associated since 23 May 1972 and the 
Swedish krona which had entered the joint float on 
19 March 1973). 
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The six years from March 1973 to March 1979 saw a fall in 
the number of currencies participating in the joint float 
mainly because of tensions due to the oil price shocks, the 
variety of responses to the energy crisis and the lack of 
success of Community policies to reduce economic and 
monetary divergences. 
Apart from numerous adjustments of central rates (see 
chronology), the following were the main events: 
(i) the French franc, which had withdrawn from the snake 
on 19 January 1974, re-entered the joint float system on 
10 July 1975 only to leave it again on 15 March 1976; 
(ii) the Swedish krona ceased to be associated with the 
snake on 28 August 1977; 
(iii) shortly after the conclusion of negotiations on the 
European Monetary System which provided for the 
implementation of a new exchange rate mechanism, 
Norway, on 12 December 1978, announced its 
withdrawal from the snake. 
Thus by the beginning of 1979, only a mini-snake was left, 
containing five Community currencies: the Danish krone, 
which had maintained its participation in the joint float at 
the cost of several devaluations, and four 'stronger' 
currencies (the Dutch guilder, the Belgian and Luxembourg 
francs and the German mark). 
The other European currencies (French franc, Italian lira, 
pound sterling and Irish pound) practised a 'dirty' float. 
• 
• • 
The European Councils in 1978 (Copenhagen on 7 and 8 
April, Bremen on 6 and 7 July and Brussels on 4 and 
5 December) were to reintroduce into the EEC a unified joint 
float system vis-a-vis other countries, grouping together eight 
of the EEC countries within the framework of the European 
Monetary System (see Annex B) . 
The effective implementation of the EMS, on 13 March 
1979, was accompanied by the abrogation of the Basle 
Agreement signed in 1972 and by the implementation of new 
provisions. 1 
Basle Agreement of 13 March 1979 between the central banks of the 
Member States of the EEC laying down the operating procedures for the 
European Monetary System. 
Chronology of the 'snake' 
(April 1972 to March 1979) 
1972 
24 April 
1 May 
23 May 
23 June 
Entry into force of the Baste Agreement of 10 
April 1972 establishing a fluctuation system 
limited to 2,25% between Community cur-
rencies (the snake in the tunnel). The countries 
taking part were Belgium, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg 
and The Netherlands 
The pound sterling, the Irish pound and the 
Danish krone join the snake 
The Norwegian krone is associated with the 
snake 
The pound sterling and the Irish pound leave 
the snake 
27 June The Danish krone leaves the snake 
JO October The Danish krone rejoins the snake 
1973 
13 February The Italian lira leaves the snake 
12 March 
14 March 
29 June 
3% revaluation of the German mark against 
the EMUA' and announcement by the 
Council of a joint float of EEC currencies 
within margins of fluctuation of 2,25% 
against one another, with the exception of the 
pound sterling, the Irish pound and the Italian 
lira, which continue to float independently 
The Swedish krona is associated with the 
snake 
5,5% revaluation of the German mark against 
the EMUA 
17 September 5% revaluation of the Dutch guilder against 
the EMUA . 
16 November 5% revaluation of the Norwegian krone 
against the EMUA 
EMUA; European monetary unit of account created on 3 April 1973 and 
defined by a weight of fine gold (I EMUA = 0,88867088 grams of fine 
gold, i.e. the gold parity of the dollar from 1934 to 1971). The EMUA was 
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund's unit of account from 3 April 
1973 (the date on which this body was established) to 31 December 1978. 
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19 January The French franc leaves the snake 
1975 
JO July The French franc rejoins the snake 
1976 
15 March The French franc again leaves the snake 
17 October 'Frankfurt realignment' of exchange rates 
against the EMUA, with the German mark 
being revalued by 2%, the Danish krone being 
devalued by 4% and the Norwegian krone and 
Swedish krona being devalued by l % 
1 April 
28 August 
1977 
6% devaluation of the Swedish krona and 3% 
devaluation of both the Danish and the 
Norwegian kroner against the EMUA 
The Swedish krona leaves the snake, 5% 
devaluation of both the Danish and the 
Norwegian kroner against the EMUA 
1978 
13 February 8% devaluation of the Norwegian krone 
against the EMU A 
17 October 4% revaluation of the German mark and 2% 
revaluation of both the Dutch guilder and the 
Belgian franc against the EMU A 
4-5 December European Council in Brussels: adoption of a 
resolution on the establishment of the Eu-
ropean Monetary System 
12 December The Norwegian krone leaves the snake 
13 March 
1979 
Signing by the Governors of the central banks 
and by the members of the Board of Gover-
nors of the EMCF of instruments relating to 
the implementation of the EMS 
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ANNEXB 
Main features of the European Monetary System 
in its present phase 
The European Monetary System (EMS) was established by 
the Resolution of the Brussels European Council of 
5 December 1978 and implemented on 13 March 1979 after 
the conclusion of an arrangement on the progressive 
reduction of the monetary compensatory amounts. 
The Brussels Resolution provided for an initial phase, which 
originally was to have lasted two years, but which was 
prolonged. In due course, on transition to the definitive 
phase, all the elements of the system will be consolidated, and 
the European Monetary Fund (EMF) will be set up. 
All the EEC countries, at the different levels of responsibility 
concerned, are signa.tories of the instruments constituting the 
EMS. However, the United Kingdom and Greece do not 
participate in the system's exchange rate mechanism and 
Italy's currency benefits from special arrangements which 
will be described below. 
Since its creation, numerous commentaries have been 
devoted to the EMS, including one in particular in European 
Economy. 1 The system will therefore not be described again 
here; instead a simple reminder of its main features at the 
present tim~ is given below in two sections- one relating to 
the ECU and the other to the exchange rate and credit 
mechanisms. 
I. The ECU 
The ECU is at the centre of the EMS. 
Its definition, the way in which it is issued and its use are 
described below. 
A. Definition 
The ECU is defined as a 'currency basket' type of numeraire. 
A procedure exists for periodically re-examining its com-
position and for revising the latter, if necessary. 
l. Present situation 
The composition of the ECU and the way in which its value is 
determined are identical to those of the European unit of 
account (EUA) created in March 1975. 
The ECU is therefore equal to the sum of fixed amounts of 
nine Community currencies (see Table I). The tenth EEC 
currency- the Greek drachma - is, according to the Greek 
Treaty of Accession, due to be introduced into the ECU by 
31 December 1985 at the latest. 
See European Economy. No 3. July 1979. 
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Table l 
Composition of the ECU 
The ECU is at present equal to the sum of the following amounts 
of the currencies of the EEC Member States 
0,828 
0,0885 
1,15 
109 
0,286 
3,66 
0,14 
0,217 
0,00759 
(except Greece): 
German mark 
pound sterling 
French francs 
Italian lire 
Dutch guilder . 
Belgian francs 
Luxembourg franc 
Danish krone 
Irish pound 
Because each currency accounts for a fixed amount in the 
composition of the ECU, the relationship between these 
amounts and the value of the ECU or, in other words, the 
respective weight of each of the currencies in the ECU, varies 
in line with exchange rate movements between the Com-
munity currencies. These weights have changed appreciably 
since 1975 (see Table 2). 
2. Revision of the ECU's composition 
The Brussels Resolution laid down that the weights of the 
currencies in the ECU would be re-examined and if necessary 
revised 'every five years or, on request, if the weight of any 
currency has changed by 25%'. 
'Revisions have to be mutually accepted; they will, by 
themselves, not modify the external value of the ECU. They 
will"be made in line with underlying economic criteria.' 
The circumstances in which the ECU's composition can be 
altered must be laid down by the Council, acting unani-
mously on a proposal from the Commission and after an 
opinion from the Monetary Committee and the EMCF's 
Board of Governors. 
B. Issue of ECU reserves 
ECU reserves are created by the EMCF for the EEC central 
banks against the transfer, by these banks, in the form of 
three-month revolving swaps, of 20% of their gold assets and 
20% of their dollar reserves; under the present provisions, 
the swaps are to be unwound in Marc4 1983, save in the event 
of a unanimous decision to the contrary by the Governors of 
the central banks. 
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Table 2 
Weighting of the vario~ currencies in the ECU 
Reminder of Weightings on the basis of the ECU central rates 
the initial in force on 
weightings of 
the currencies 13 24 30 23 5 22 14 
in the EUA March September November March October February June 
(March 1975) 1979 1979 1979 1981 1981 1982 1982 
Belgian and Luxembourg francs 8,2 9,63 9,54 9,55 9,31 9,32 8,50 8,45 
Danish krone 3,- 3,06 2,95 2,81 2,74 2,74 2,65 2,63 
German mark 27,3 32,98 33,31 33,36 32,54 34,36 34,24 35,48 
French franc 19,5 19,83 19,64 19,67 19,18 18,63 18,56 17,39 
Irish pound 1,5 1,15 1,13 1,14 1, 11 1, 11 1,11 1,10 
Italian lira 14,- 9,50 9,40 9,41 8,63 8,38 8,35 8,07 
Dutch guilder 9,- 10,51 10,41 10,42 10,17 10,74 10,70 11,09 
Pound sterling 17,5 13,34 13,62 13,64 16,32 14,72 15,89 15,79 
Total 100,- 100,- 100,- 100,- 100,- 100,- 100,- 100,-
Entry into force of the EMS on 13 March 1979. 
On 24 September 1979, the German mark was revalued by 5% against the Danish krone and by 2% against the other EEC currencies participating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. 
On 30 November 1979, the Danish krone was devalued by 5% against the other EEC currencies participating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. 
On 22 March 1981 (with effect from 23 March), the Italian lira was devalued by 6 % against the other EEC currencies participating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. 
On 4 October 1981 {with effect from 5 October), the Gennan mark and the Dutch guilder were revalued by 5,5% against the Danish krone, the Belgian franc, the Luxembourg franc and 
1he Irish pound; the French franc and the Italian lira were devalued by 3% against these same currencies. 
On 21 February 1982 (with effect from 22 February), the Belgian franc and the Luxembourg franc were each devalued by 8,5% and the Danish krone by 3% against the other currencies 
participatinf in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. 
On 12 June 982 (with effect from 14 June), the German mark and the Dutch guilder were revalued by 4,25% against the Belgian franc, the Luxembourg franc, the Danish krone and the 
Irish pound; the French franc and the Italian lira were devalued by 5,75% and 2,75% respectively against the same currencies. 
Table 3 
The creation of ECU by swap operations 
Swap operations Gold US dollar Gold USD 1 = Counterpart in ECU 
starting in transfers transfers price ... ECU ('OOO million) 
(million ('OOO· (ECU per 
ounces) million) ounce) Gold US dollars Total 
April 1979 80,7 13,4 165 0,75 13,3 10,0 23,3 
July 19791 85,3 15,9 185 0,73 15,8 11,6 27,4 
October 1979 85,3 16,0 211 0,70 18,0 11,3 29,3 
January 1980 85,5 15,5 259 0,69 22,2 10,7 32,9 
April 1980 85,6 14,4 370 0,77 31,7 11, 1 42,8 
July 1980 85,6 13,7 419 0,70 35,9 9,6 45,5 
October 1980 85,6 13,9 425 0,71 36,4 9,9 46,3 
January 1981 85,6 14,5 447 0,75 38,3 10,9 49,2 
April 1981 85,7 14,2 440 0,84 37,7 12,0 49,7 
July 1981 85,7 12,7 406 0,97 34,8 12,3 47,1 
October 1981 85,7 11,5 402 0,91 34,5 10,5 45,0 
January 1982 85,7 11,7 368 0,92 31,6 10,7 42,3 
April 1982 85,7 I0,5 327 1,- 28,1 10,5 38,6 
The Bank of England transferred 20"/o of its gold and dollar reserves from July 1979. The Bank of Greece has made no transfer. 
Source: Monthly reports of ~e agent of the EMCF. 
71 
Documents relating to the European Monetary System 
As a result, at present, the creation of ECUs is not definitive. 
Furthermore, the amount of ECUs issued - at present 
38 600 million (see Table 3)- varies every three months for 
two reasons: 
(i) first, the swap system itself means that the volume of gold 
and dollar transfers made by the issuing institutions 
fluctuates in line with the volume of official gold and 
dollar reserves held by these institutions; 
(ii) second, the rates at which the transfers are valued are 
themselves fluctuating. The conversion rate for gold is 
equal to the average of the prices recorded daily at the two 
London fixings during the previous six calendar months 
but not exceeding the average price of the two fixings on 
the penultimate working day of the period; the rate used 
for the dollar is the market rate two working days prior to 
the value date of the swap operation. 
C. Use of the ECU 
The use of the ECU by the official authorities-national or 
Community-and by the private sector, is now examined. 
I. The 'official' use of the ECU 
(a) The use of ECU reserves is specified in one case only: a 
debtor is entitled to use the ECU in order to repay at the 
settlement date a debt under the very short-term financing 
arrangement. However, the creditor central bank is not 
obliged to accept settlement by means ofECUs ofan amount 
more than 50% of its claim. In other cases, the use of the ECU 
between central banks takes place by mutual agreement. 
(b) Apart from its role as a reserve asset, the ECU is also 
used as a numtraire for the exchange rate mechanism, as the 
basis for establishing the divergence indicator, and as the 
denominator for operations in both the intervention and the 
credit mechanisms. 
(c) Lastly, as a unit of account, the ECU has been 
progressively introduced into all the Community's areas of 
activity. 
From 1975 to 1978, it was used first of all - in the initial 
EUA form - by various institutions (the EIB since 
18 March 1975; the EDF- under the Lame Convention-
since 21 April 1975; the ECSC since 24 April 1975) and fora 
variety of purposes (the general budget since 21 April 1978; 
in customs matters since 23 November 1978). With effect 
72 
from April 1979, the ECU was introduced into the common 
agricultural policy, but with specific conversion rates ('green 
rates'). Lastly, since January 1981, the ECU has replaced the 
EUA in all the sectors in which the latter had been used and 
has thus become the sole unit of account used by the 
Community authorities. 
As a general rule, two principles, whose degree of application 
depends on the sectors concerned, govern the use of the ECU 
for the administrative needs of the Community: the first 
concerns the recording in ECU of operations in national 
currencies; the second aims at the denomination, wherever 
possible, of claims and debts of the Community authorities in 
ECUs. 
2. The private use of the ECU 
Before examining the expansion in the use of the ECU by the 
private sector, it must be pointed out that there is no 
connection (except for the ECU's definition and the use of 
identical exchange rates -the latter being determined by the 
foreign exchange market) between the use of the ECU within 
the official framework of the EMS and its use by the private 
sector; in the former case, we are referring to an agreement 
between the authorities of the Member States and to 
Community decisions; in the latter, each operation gives rise 
to a contract under private _law. 
This said, the use of the ECU by the private sector, after 
getting off to a fairly slow start, is now expanding. 
(a) The first operations in EUA, the initial form of the 
Community's currency unit, were chiefly concerned with the 
keeping of current accounts opened mainly on behalf of the 
Community authorities. However, the ECU really started to 
be introduced into private contracts as a monetary 
instrument only from 1979 onwards, when it became a 
currency of settlement for operations within the EMS, and 
operations did not really start until April 1981 with the 
launching of the first public ECU issue. Since then several 
issues have followed and, at the end of June 1982, they 
totalled some 1 OOO million ECU. 
(b) At present, the private use of the ECU is expanding 
significantly for two main reasons. First, the majority of the 
Community's issuing institutions now grant the ECU, de 
facto or de Jure, the status of a currency, and second, since the 
start of their ECU operations, the banks themselves have 
used the ECU not only as a simple unit of account, the use of 
which would have required a currency of settlement, but also 
as an instrument of settlement, at least between final 
operators. This approach has led the banks to extend all the 
services normally available on convertible currencies to the 
ECU. 
At present, the ECU is thus dealt-in in on-the-spot and 
forward foreign markets ( up to one year); it can also be kept 
in an interest-earning current account or be placed on a time 
deposit. There are also short-term overdrafts and syndicated 
bank loans for up to seven years. 
In future, the establishment of a clearing house should 
facilitate operations for small and medium-sized banks 
which will thus operate directly on an ECU market without 
any longer having to break down their operations into the 
different component currencies. 
II. The exchange rate and credit mechanisms 
A. The exchange rate mechanism 
The EMS exchange rate mechanism organizes exchange rate 
relationships between the Community currencies according 
to a system of stable, but adjustable when necessary, parities. 
I. The stability of exchange rates 
With the exception of the United Kingdom and Greece, the 
other EEC countries have joined or rejoined a system of 
stable parities, consisting of limited margins of fluctuation 
based on a common numeraire - the ECU - and on 
intervention rules. 
All the currencies participating in the EMS have an ECU-
related central rate. The central rates as a whole serve to 
determine the grid of bilateral central rates (see Table 4). 
Fluctuation margins of ± 2,25% are established around the 
bilateral central rates, except for the Italian lira which 
temporarily observes ± 6% margins. 
Once a currency reaches its lower or upper bilateral 
intervention point vis-ii-vis another currency, the central 
banks of the countries concerned are required to intervene. 
Interventions at the margins must be made in the currency at 
the opposite bilateral limit. 
These intervention rules, which are similar to those used in 
the snake, have been supplemented in the EMS by an original 
mechanism: the 'divergence indicator'. As its name indicates, 
the divergence indicator, which is based on the ECU, 
identifies the currencies whose exchange rate performance 
diverges from the 'Community average'. A 'threshold of 
divergence' is fixed at 75% of the maximum spread of 
divergence for each currency and when a currency crosses the 
threshold, this results in a presumption that the country 
concerned will act. 
The indicator in fact works as an early warning system and is 
designed to encourage the monetary authorities to take 
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adequate measures even before the compulsory intervention 
points are reached. These measures may be diversified 
intervention, measures of economic or monetary policy, or 
changes in central rates. 
2. The adjustments 
The inadequacy of economic policy convergence means that 
adjustments of central rates are inevitable with varying 
frequency. Adjustments were made even under the Bretton 
Woods system which is sometimes called - not quite 
accurately- a system of fixed parities. 
The originality of the EMS is that it organizes the 
adjustments to take place in the best possible conditions. 
Thus the Brussels Resolution states: 'Adjustments of central 
rates will be subject to mutual agreement by a common 
procedure which will comprise all countries participating in 
the exchange rate mechanism and the Commission. There 
will be reciprocal consultation in the Community framework 
about important decisions concerning exchange rate policy 
between countries participating and any country not 
participating in the system.' 
Since the entry into force of the EMS, six adjustments of 
central rates have taken place (see Table 2, notes 2 to 7); the 
changes in bilateral central rates, resulting from these 
realignments, are indicated in Table 5. 
B. The credit mechanisms 
The existing credit mechanisms - which are to be con-
solidated into a single fund, in the final phase of the EMS -
have been reinforced and supplemented by measures to assist 
the less prosperous countries of the Community. 
1. The reinforcement of the credit mechanisms 
We shall consider in turn very short-term financing, short-
term monetary support and medium-term financial assist-
ance. 
(a) Very short-term financing (VSTF) is designed to 
facilitate respect of the maximum margins of fluctuation. All 
the central banks of the countries belonging to the EMS 
exchange rate mechanism are eligible for it. 
Under the VSTF arrangement, the participating central 
banks open for each other unlimited credit facilities through 
the EMCF in their respective currencies for a very short 
period. 
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With the establishment of the EMS, the VSTF arrangement 
was changed in two important respects: the initial credit 
period was extended from 30 to 45 days from the end of the 
month in which the debt was incurred, and the debtor central 
bank was enabled to make settlement by transferring ECUs, 
with the proviso that the creditor central bank is not obliged 
to accept a settlement by means ofECUs of an amount more 
than 50% of its claim. The balance of the debt is settled by the 
transfer of other reserve components. 
Table 4 
(b) Like the VSTF, the short-term monetary support system 
(STMS) is an agreement between central banks. Unlike the 
VSTF, reserved solely for participants in the exchange rate 
mechanism of the EMS, all EEC countries may request 
short-term monetary support. 
The granting of short-term monetary support is linked to the 
need for short-term financing caused by a temporary 
balance-of-payments deficit. 
Bilateral central rates and intervention margins for currencies participating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism 
(rates in force as from 14 June /982) 
Amsterdam Brussels Frankfurt Copenhagen London Dublin Paris Rome 
in HFL in BFR/LFR in OM in DKR in UKL in IRL in FF in LIT 
+2,25% I 782,85 92,525 326,45 27,3975 262,21 55 577,0 
HFL 100 central rate lOO I 743,23 90,4673 319,183 26,7864 256,380 52341,9 
-2,25 % I 704,45 88,455 312,08 26,1915 250,67 42 296,0 
+2,25 % 5,8670 5,308 18,726 1,57155 15,042 3 188,0 
BFR/LFR 100 central rate 5,73646 lOO 5,18961 18,3098 1,53659 14,7072 3 002,58 
-2,25 % 5,6090 5,074 17,903 1,50241 14,380 2 828,0 
+2,25 % 113,05 I 970,85 360,83 30,2845 289,85 61 433,0 
DM 100 central rate I l0,537 I 926,93 100 352,817 29,6090 283,396 57 857,4 
-2,25% 108,0775 I 884,00 344,97 28,9520 277,09 54 490,0 
+2,25 % 32,0425 558,60 28,990 8,58300 82,150 17 412,0 
DKR 100 central rate 31,33 546,154 28,3433 100 8,39216 80,3239 16 398,7 
-2,25 % 30,6325 534,00 27,715 8,20550 78,535 15 444,0 
UKLI central rate 
+2,25 % 3,8180 66,56 3,454 12,187 9,7890 2 074,80 
lRL 1 central rate 3,73324 65,0792 3,37736 11,9159 9,57129 I 954,05 
-2,25 % 3,6500 63,6315 3,302 11,6509 9,3585 I 840,32 
+ 2,25 ;{, 39,8925 695,40 36,090 127,33 10,6855 21 677,0 
FF JOO central rate 39,0045 679,941 35,2863 124,496 l0,4479 100 20415,7 
-2,25 % 38,1375 664,80 34,500 121,73 l0,2155 19 227,0 
+6% 2.02850 35,360 1,835 6,475 0,54338 5,20!0 
LIT I OOO central rate 1,91051 33,3047 1,72839 6,09804 0,511758 4,89818 1 OOO 
-6% 1,79925 31,365 1,628 5,743 0,48197 4,6130 
I ECU central rate 2,57971 44,9704 2,33379 8,234 (0,560453) 0,69!011 6,61387 1 350,27 
Doc~ not participate in the ci:;ch:mgc mechanism. 
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Table 5 
Appreciation or depreciation of the bilateral central rates of EMS participant currencies from 13 March 1979 to 14 June 19821 
Belgian and Danish German French Irish Italian Dutch 
Luxembourg 
franc 
krone mark franc pound lira guilder 
Belgian and Luxembourg francs +2,- -18,4 +0,1 -8,5 +3,2 -16,8 
Danish krone -1,9 -20,- -1,8 -10,3 + 1,2 -18,4 
German mark +22,6 +25,-1 +22,7 + 12,2 +26,5 +2,-
French franc -0,1 + 1,9 -18,5 -8,6 +3,1 -16,9 
Irish pound +9,3 +11,4 -10,9 +9,4 + 12,8 -9,1 
Italian lira -3,1 -1,2 -21,- -3,- -11,3 -19,4 
Dutch guilder +20,2 +22,6 -2,- +20,3 + 10,- +24,-
The table reads horizontally (for example, the Belgian franc has appreciated 2 % against the Danish krone and the Danish krone has depreciated 1,9% against the Belgian franc). 
The amount actually available for short-term monetary 
support has been more than doubled and increased to 14 OOO 
million ECU. In addition, the duration of the facility, 
previously fixed at six months (three months, renewable 
once) was extended to nine months (three months, renewable 
twice). 
(c) Medium-term financial assistance (MTFA) is granted by 
the Member States of the EEC, for a period of between two 
and five years, where a Member State is in serious balance-
of-payments difficulties. 
The credit amount actually available was more than doubled 
at the start of the EMS and at present stands at 11 OOO million 
ECU. 
2. · Transfers of resources to less prosperous countries 
The less prosperous countries of the Community which do in 
fact participate in the exchange rate and intervention 
mechanism - at present, Italy and Ireland - are eligible for 
loans on special terms. 
The Community institutions and the European Investment 
Bank are empowered to make available to them, for a period 
of five years with effect from the establishment of the EMS, 
loans of up to I OOO million ECU per year; these loans are 
eligible for an interest rate subsidy of 3%, limited to an 
annual cost of 200 million ECU. 
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Examination by the Monetary Committee 
of some aspects of the non-institutional development 
of the European Monetary System 
At the end of 1981, it was clear that the introduction of the 
institutional phase would take some time, and a relatively 
long time at that. 
The Monetary Committee therefore felt it useful to pin-point 
the areas in which progress could be made in the less distant 
future. 
In this connection, the Chairman of the Monetary Commit-
tee, at the Council (Economic and Financial Affairs) held on 
14 December 1981, suggested a number of points for 
consideration (see Annex C-1). 
In addition, the Alternates of the Monetary Committee 
- on a mandate from the Committee and in the reports 
which follow - studied some of the problems posed by the 
non-institutional development of the EMS. 
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The first report (Annex C-2) examines four questions: 
(i) how to break the link between the volume of ECUs 
issued and the price of gold and the exchange rate for the 
dollar; 
(ii) the eligibility of intra-marginal interventions for the 
very short-term financing facility; 
(iii) the external role of the ECU; 
(iv) the minting of an ECU coin. 
The supplementary report (Annex C-3) examines the 
problem of the mobilization of net ECU credit positions. 
ANNEX C-1 
Statement by Mr Jean-Yves Haberer, Chairman of the Monetary Committee, 
to the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 14 December 1981, 
on the European Monetary System 
I. Progress report on the work assigned to the 
experts 
On 13 March 1982 the European Monetary System will 
celebrate three years of official existence. 
The Monetary Committee has complied with the wish 
expressed on several occasions by the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
and in 1980 and 1981 devoted numerous studies to the 
reinforcement of the EMS until its transition, at the 
appropriate time, to the institutional phase. With the 
invaluable assistance of its alternates, a report was produced 
containing six documents prepared by Commission depart-
ments and revised after discussions with the experts of the 
Monetary Committee. The report was submitted to the 
Monetary Committee which took it into consideration in 
presenting the broad options which I am about to mention. 
In accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Luxem-
bourg European Council of 2 December 1980, the technical 
work centred on the gradual development of the use of the 
ECU, the renewal and reinforcement of the credit arrange-
ments, and the coordination of monetary policies and exchange 
rate policies pursued in relation to third countries. In the course 
of their work on these subjects, the experts, in the six 
documents I have mentioned, brought out the importance of the 
problems and options connected with: 
( i) the status of the ECU and its acceptability as a means of 
settlement; 
(ii) the liquidity of the central monetary institution; 
(iii) the arrangements for transferring reserves to the 
European Monetary Fund; 
(iv) the consolidation of Community credits in the EMF; 
(v) the external role of the ECU; 
(vi) and lastly, the institutional aspects of the EMF. 
It is certainly true that, when the time comes, certain points will 
have to be examined in even greater detail. These include,for 
example, the questions of the return paid on the ECU and the 
legal status which the period of transition to the institutional 
phase of the EM Swill have by reference to the Treaty of Rome 
and the member countries' constitutional rules. Nevertheless, it 
seems to me that the detailed and comprehensive technical 
studies already made provide, as from now, a sufficient basis 
for exploring the directions in which the EMS can go forward, 
and in particular for responding to the call of the recent London 
European Council. I therefore have the honour of asking the 
Council to recognize that we have acquitted ourselves of the 
preliminary work carried out at its request. 
II. The successes of the EMS 
As the European Council has several times noted, the EMS has 
worked remarkably successfully for three years. 
1. First, it has provided a satisfactory response to the central 
problem of a common market, i.e. of a zone the purpose of 
which is to promote the interdependence of its economies by 
trade, the movement of capital and individuals, and free 
competition; this problem is the stabilization of exchange rates 
without which it becomes far too hazardous to calculate 
profitability and to devise marketing strategies. 
Despite the existence of a wide fluctuation margin and the four 
- albeit moderate - realignments which have taken place 
within the EMS, trade between the countries participating in 
the exchange rate and intervention mechanism has benefited 
greatly from the security of transactions created by the 
foreseeable nature of exchange rates. By reducing the 
uncertainties involved in intra-Community trading operations, 
the EMS has thus made it possible to cut their cost and speed 
their development. 
2. This success has been coefirmed despite the turmoil in the 
international environment: the three years of the European 
Monetary System's existence have seen a very serious oil price 
shock succeeded by a monetary shock which was no less 
disruptive because of the sudden and erratic variations in the 
dollar interest rate and exchange rate. During this period, the 
interest rate on the major international currency doubled and 
its exchange rate appreciated by over 4rP/o against the major 
European currencies, but without any lasting effect on the 
internal cohesiveness of the EMS. 
3. The four currency realignments which occurred during the 
period, among which the only real general realignment was that 
of October 1981, were carried out calmly and remained within 
reas.onable limits, They showed the ability of the countries 
participating in the EMS to anticipate market movements and 
to regulate them without allowing undue disruption of the 
foreign exchange markets to develop. In this respect, 
interventions were clearly consistent with their natural purpose 
since they were for the most part reversible. Net transfers of 
reserves between participants remained limited. 
4. Contrary to the fears expressed by some at the moment of 
the establishment of the system, the mechanisms providing for 
a very large amount of credit ( a total of 25 OOO million ECU 
for medium-term financial assistance and short-term monetary 
support) did not have to be activated. The corrective measures 
which were needed were taken early enough/or any momentary 
divergences on the foreign exchange markets to be amply 
covered by very short-term financing between central banks. 
But the credibility of the EMS was greatly enhanced by the 
existence of a generously endowed credit system. 
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5. Even if the economic policies of the Member States are 
often very diverse, the constraint of having to respect the 
central rates established within the EMS has been important 
and has favoured the· convergence of monetary policies, and 
through them, of economic policies: the general rejection of a 
permissive interpretation of the European monetary rules has 
been an active element in bringing economic policies closer 
together, and a number of Member States are a we/I-known 
demonstration of this development. 
6. The success of the EMS has been assisted by the prospects it 
offers for Europe's progress towards genuine economic and 
monetary union, and by the technical and political rendez~vous 
which it has set itself from the outset. The existence of the 
European Economic Community's monetary ambition has, in 
its way, been crucial for the credibility of the EMS and has 
aroused manifest interest from the banks and the international 
markets. 
III. Scope for a non-institutional development of 
the EMS 
In line with the conclusions of the recent European Council in 
London, I believe it is essential to mark the third anniversary of 
the EMS by real and meaningful progress. In this area, as in 
any other, but perhaps even more so in view of the momentum 
created and the expectations inherent in the system, we cannot 
afford to stand still, for fear of losing what we have already 
achieved. Nevertheless, we must not be unrealistic. My 
colleagues and I myself feel that it would be inappropriate, in 
the present circumstances, to embark on the final phase, which, 
because of its scale, would require ratification by the national 
parliaments in long and complex procedures. It therefore seems 
that at this stage we must set on one side the question of the 
institutional framework of the EMS, together with other 
fundamental questions which also involve parliamentary 
procedures, e.g. the definitive transfer of foreign exchange 
reserves to a European Monetary Fund. 
That said, I have made use of the opportunities for personal 
diplomacy enjoyed by the Chairman of the Monetary 
Committee to form a personal opinion, which reflects many 
others, on the points which could permit, with a satisfactory 
degree of coherence, a non-institutional development of the 
EMS, if this were to find favour with the political authorities of 
the Community. These points are the following, in increasing 
order of importance: 
I. A signal to public opinion: each of the member countries, 
following its customary national procedure, should mint an 
£CU-denominated metal coin of standard design, which would 
circulate freely in the Community. 
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2. Improved technical cooperation between the central banks 
participating in the exchange rate and intervention mechanism. 
Thus, very short-term financing could be activated not only for 
obligatory interventions at the bilateral limits, but also for 
preventive intra-marginal i!Jterventions designed to promote 
the stability of the system; the divergence indicator mechanism 
could be improved; and acceptance of the ECU as a means of 
settlement between the participating central banks could be 
increased from 50% to JOO"!.,. 
3. Greater credibility for the ECU. The ECU's success must 
first be ensured in the Community itself; the Community 
institutions should set an example by using it/or their accounts 
and for their market borrowings. The central banks of the 
European countries with an exchange rate policy linked to the 
EMS could be authorized to hold ECUs obtained either by 
deposits of reserves with the EMCF or by settlements with 
EMS central banks. The central banks of oil exporting 
countries which had agreed to financial cooperation with the 
borrowing Community institutions could also be allowed to 
hold ECUs on the same terms. 
4. The regrouping of the credit mechanisms. The present short 
or medium-term mechanisms would be i'ncorporated into the 
EMCF itself where they would become credit lines, and this 
would confirm the Community's ultimate intention of setting 
up a genuine European Monetary Fund. 
5. Stabi/;zation of the volume of ECUs issued. A re-
examination might concentrate on the relationship between the 
volume of EC Us, which deserves to be under control, and the 
gold and dollar prices, which have the disadvantage of 
continually fluctuating. 
6. Closer convergence of monetary policies. Interest rate 
policies in particular could be concerted more frequently. 
7. The determination of a 'zone of probability 'for the dollar. 
There is a clear need for a common approach to third currencies 
and to the dollar in particular. An attempt should be made to 
determine a zone of probability for European exchange rates 
vis-a-vis the dollar, in consultation with the US authorities. 
I have ventured on a list which is in no way restrictive: in taking 
advantage of the opportunity provided by my presentation to 
the Council of the Monetary Committee's work on the EMS, 
my purpose is none other than to express the feeling that 
progress is possible in certain areas which are consistent with 
each other, and hence necessarily interconnected. 
The Council of Ministers may call on the Monetary Commillee 
at any time to translate the guidelines of the London European 
Council into concrete proposals. 
ANNEX C-2 
Report on some aspects of the non-institutional development 
of the· European Monetary System presented .on 3 February 1982 
by the Alternates of the Monetary Committee 
At its meeting of 13 January 1982, the Monetary Committee 
discussed various proposals for the non-institutional develop-
ment of the European Monetary System ( EMS) and requested 
the Alternates to examine and report on the following 
questions: 
(i) Hmv can the volume of EC Us issued be divorced from the 
two widely.fluctuating variables, the market price of gold , 
and the exchange rate for the US dollar? 
( ii) How is the extension of the very-short term.facility to the 
financing of intra-marginal interventions to be circum-
scribed ( either by attaching conditions, imposing a 
ceiling, or limiting its duration) ? 
/iii) How can the option open to non-Community institutions 
to hold ECUs be organized? 
(iv) How would the problems of legal tender arise in relation 
to the free circulation of an ECU coin minted according 
to national procedures? 
The Alternates accordingly met on 25-26 January and on 3 
February 1982 and herewith submit their report to the 
Committee. In conformity with the mandate received, the 
Alternates confined their examination to the feasibility, 
technical implementation and implications of the four courses 
of action mentioned above, without taking a position on their 
overall merits or otherwise; nor did they examine the links with 
other proposals affecting related aspects of the system ( e.g. 
ECU acceptability, remuneration, etc.). Finally, their exami-
nation remained withi'n the confines of a non-institutional 
development of the EMS, although views as to the precise 
limits of such a development differed. 
I. How can the volume of ECUs issued be 
divorced from the two widely fluctuating 
variables, the market price of gold and the 
exchange rate for the dollar? 
/. Since the inception of the EMS, the rules governing ECU 
creation against swaps of gold and dollars have led to marked 
.fluctuations in the total volume of ECUs issued. The amount 
rose from an initial 27 OOO million ECU in July 1979 1 to a 
July 1979 is taken as 1he point of departure for comparisons as it is the date 
al which the United Kingdom joined other members in transferring 20% of 
its gold and US dollaT holdings to the EMCF. 
peak of almost 50 OOO million ECU in April 1981, with a 
subsequent fall to 42 OOO million ECU at present. The key to 
these developments lies almost exclusively in changes in the 
price of gold. The volume of ECUs created against gold 
transfers rose from 16 OOO million ECU at the start of the 
system to 32 OOO million ECU at present (i.e.Jrom 58% to 75% 
of total ECU creation). The amount of EC Us issued against 
the transfer of dollars has, on the contrary, remained generally 
stable, ranging between 10 OOO ond 12 OOO million ECU since 
the start of the system, because of volume declines which 
almost totally offset the rise caused by the dollar's appreci-
ation. 
2. Before examining automatic formulae acting either on the 
valuation rules or on the volume of reserves transferred, the 
Alternates considered an alternative approach: endowing the 
Board of Governors of the EMCF with some discretionary 
powers over the adjustments to be made on the occasion of the 
swap renewals. These powers could be limited to the possibility 
of overriding the agreed rule under well-defined circumstances 
and on specific items ( e.g. valuation rules, which already in 
1979 were left to an agreement between central banks). Such a 
step could be justified by the consideration that, in the existing 
system, there is an over-reliance on automatisms, which always 
risk producing unforeseen results, and an insufficient scope/or 
stability-oriented discretionary decisions. Under these circum-
stances, the growth in ECU volume and its distribution between 
participants cannot be expected to always reflect the overall 
objectives of the system. Such a step is, however, generally seen 
as moving into institutional ground; one should furthermore 
not underestimate the contribution that automatic and clear 
rules have made to the overall credibility of the system, 
avoiding potentially difficult discussions at periodic intervals. 
3. The Alternates examined the possibility of reducing the 
volatility of ECU creation by acting through the valuation 
rules. Central banks would still swap 20% of their gold and 
dollar reserves, but the valuation method would be changed 
and/or, in the same line of thinking, the duration of each swap 
would be extended. In this respect, the Alternates agreed that 
any solution which would lead to disregarding the market price 
of the reserve assets for any extended period of time would be 
undesirable. Renewing swaps at unchanged prices would mean 
that over time the value of the ECU issued could diverge 
markedly from the current value of the underlying assets, with 
the ECU assets thus becoming much more (or less) valuable 
than their backing, which could in either case adversely affect 
the use of the ECU. ft could furthermore give the impression of 
an attempt to peg the price for gold, in contrast to 
commitments under the !MF Articles of Agreement. 
On the above grounds, the Alternates would tend to reject 
proposals aimed at stabilizing ECU creation through a freeze' 
on the gold and dollar price for future swap renewals. 
3 .1. The Alternates did, however, consider three possibilities 
for moderating the effects of erratic price movements: 
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(i} a lengthening of the duration of the swaps from the 
present 3 months lo say 6 or 12 months. This would 
reduce the frequency of the adjustments and therefore 
somewhat dampen the short-term volatility in ECU 
creation, but would not avoid large movements when the 
adjustments eventually took place, and would also 
encounter legal difficulties in certain member countries; 
(ii} a lengthening of the reference period for the valuation of 
gold, with the existing caveat of using whichever is lower 
between the average price and the latest market price. 
This would of course moderate the growth of EC Us in a 
period of rapid gold price increases, albeit to a limited 
extent ( see attached graph}; the effect could be more 
significant only if the reference period were much longer 
than 12 months; 
(iii} an alternative proposal is to value gold conservatively by 
comparison with present market rates, for example by 
applying a discount of 10 or 20% in the current price. This 
would have a once-and-for-all effect in reducing the 
volume of ECUs created, but would not eliminate 
subsequent volatility, unless the discount varied pro-
portionately to price movements. 
3.2. The above methods are not mutually exclusive and could 
perhaps be combined. In all cases, to the extent to which they 
succeed in dampening the effects of unstable market variables 
on ECU supply, they necessarily lead to a divergence between 
the internal and the market's valuation of the underlying 
reserve assets. These methods would thus all require a 
compromise between the objective of moderating the volatility 
in ECU creation and the principle, stated in point 3 above, that 
any prolonged or marked departure from market rates should 
be avoided. 
4. The Alternates finally examined various 'closed pool' 
systems for controlling the volume of ECUs issued. In such 
systems the quantity of ECUs would in principle be fixed and 
the volume of reserves transferred by each participant at a 
swap renewal would be adjusted in accordance with the price 
evolution of the assets. The percentage of reserves transferred 
would accordingly change at each swap, i.e. the 20% rule would 
no longer be applicable. 
4.1. The first issue arising in this context relates to the 
decision-making process for fixing the initial volume of ECUs 
to be created and for subsequent periodic reviews ( annual or 
biennial). The Alternates did not discuss this point as it falls 
beyond their mandate. 
4.2. The second point relates to the technical functioning of a 
'closed pool' mechanism. Various possibilities were con-
sidered: 
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(i} a 'uniform shares' rule: central banks would transfer 
gold and dollars according to a uniform proportion, say 
20"1, of their holdings of each asset. At subsequent swap 
renewals, the adjustments to take account of price 
changes ( while maintaining constant the total volume of 
ECUs created) would be made in such a way as to ensure 
that each central bank continued to transfer an equal 
proportion of its holdings of the two reserve assets, e.g. 
18% of each if the price of the reserve assets had risen or 
22% of each if it had fallen. The current proportion under 
this system ( if ECU creation had been kept at its original 
level} would be 12% of central banks' gold holdings and 
12"/, of their dollar reserves, instead of the initial 20% 
(see Table 1). This system would, however, have the 
drawback of making the amount of dollar transfers vary 
also in relation to the gold price; 
(ii} an alternative system would be one where gold transfers 
would vary inversely to movements in the gold price and 
dollar transfers inversely to movements in the dollar 
exchange rate. This system could work as follows: to 
establish the initial quantity of ECUs, a given proportion 
of gold and dollars would be transferred. At subsequent 
swap renewals, gold or dollars would be returned to or 
required from each participant in proportion to price rises 
or falls of these assets in terms of the ECU. With this 
system, the total amount of ECUs created remains 
constant, as does the share of this total allocated to each 
participant, whereas under the present arrangements 
these/actors vary in relation both to market prices and to 
volume changes. The system would in fact function as 
though a constant ECU a/location had been made to each 
participant until a new decision was taken. Its operation 
could possibly have adverse effects on liquidity for dollar 
holders. Had such a system been applied during the 
period since July 1979, the subsequent price movements 
in gold and dollars would have resulted in sizeable 
reductions in the share of gold deposited and increases, 
. for most members, in the share of dollars deposited ( as a 
proportion of their holdings of these assets- see Table 
~.. . 
(iii) given that the main cause of the fluctuations in ECU 
creation has been changes in the price of gold, another 
possibility would be to maintain the 20"/, rule for dollar 
transfers but to adjust the volume of gold tranifers 
inversely to movements in the price of gold and in the 
ECU creation against dollars, so as to keep the total 
volume of ECU supply constant ( see Table 3}. This 
would, however, mean that the two assets were treated 
very differently in the process of ECU creation; 
(iv} the two latter systems could be modified to take account 
also of volume changes in participants' reserves, with a 
country which had used some of its dollar reserves 
decreasing proportionately the dollars transferred. 
Table 1 
Share of assets transferred to the EMCF in % of gold and dollar holdings 
under a 'uniform shares' rule 
Belgium 
Denmark 
FR or Gennany 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
The Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Amount of ECUs created 
(thousand millions) 
against gold 
against dollars 
Conversion rates 
ECU/ounce of gold 
USD/ECU 
Table 2 
III-1979 
Gold Dotlars Total 
20 
20 
20 
20 
27,3 
15,8 
11,6 
185,064 
1,37653 
20 
20 
II-1980 
Gold Dollars Total 
128 128 128 
12,8 12,8 12,8 
27,3 
20,3 
7,1 
370,546 
1,29517 
Share of assets transferred to the EMCF in % of gold and dollar holdings 
under the 'rule of proportionate volume adjustments for gold and dollars' 
Belgium 
Denmark 
FR of Gennany 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
The Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Amount of ECU s created 
(thousand millions) 
against gold 
against dollars 
Conversion rates 
ECU/ounce of gold 
USD/ECU 
111-1979 
Gold Dollars Total 
20 
20 
20 
20 
27,3 
15,8 
11,6 
185,064 
1,37653 
20 
20 
II-1980 
Gold Dollars Total 
10,0 28,1 11,4 
9,7 54,2 32,8 
10,0 19,7 13,6 
10,0 18,2 11,3 
10,6 19,7 17,7 
10,0 23,7 12,7 
10,0 22,4 11,3 
9,8 19,2 14,7 
27,3 
15,8 
11,6 
370,546 
1,29517 
I-1981 
Gold Do!lars Total 
111 11,1 11,1 
11,I 11,I 11,1 
27,3 
21,3 
6,1 
446,958 
1,33166 
1-1981 
Gold Dollars Total 
8,3 15,3 9,1 
8, I 26,6 20,0 
8,3 21,5 12,4 
8,3 16,8 9,5 
8,8 12,5 11,8 
8,3 26,9 11,2 
8,3 21,3 9,5 
8,1 21,2 14,0 
27,3 
15,8 
11,6 
446,958 
1,33166 
Annex C-2 
1-1982 
Gold Dollars Total 
129 129 129 
12,9 12,9 12,9 
27,3 
20,4 
6,9 
368,025 
1,08806 
I-1982 
Gold Dollars Total 
10,0 12,5 10,4 
9,8 29,8 23,0 
10,0 20,5 13,8 
10,0 20,2 11,5 
10,6 15,5 14,6 
10,0 22,6 12,7 
10,0 21,1 11,3 
9,7 29,0 17,7 
27,3 
15,8 
11,6 
368,025 
1,08806 
Unlike the adjustments made in relation to price changes, 
these adjustments would change the total quantity of 
EC Us created ( except in the unlikely case of precisely 
offsetting volume movements in the participants' re-
serves). The system would thus reduce volatility in ECU 
creation hut would not operate as a pure 'closed pool'. 
4.3. A third issue is whether in all the above systems there 
should be a fixed rule regarding the proportion of reserves to be 
swapped or whether, given that each country may differ in its 
appreciation of what constitutes the most appropriately 
balanced portfolio of gold and dollar reserves, countries could 
be given some latitude (e.g. ±5%) in the distribution as 
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Table 3 
Share o( assets transferred to the EMCF in % of gold and dollar holdings 
under the 'role of folume adjustments of gold only' 
III-1979 11-1980 r-i9s1 
Gold Dollars Total Gold Dollars Total Gold Doll= Total Gold 
Belgium 20 20 20 
l 
20 II,0 86 20 9,9 
l Denmark I 15,3 15,9 FR of Germany 13,9 12,1 France 11,8 10,2 Ireland 17,9 18,0 Italy 12,2 10,4 The Netherlands 11,3 9,6 
United Kingdom 20 20 20 10,2 20 15,3 8,6 20 13,7 10,5 
Amount of ECUs created 
(thousand millions) 27,3 27,3 27,3 
against gold 15,8 16,2 16,4 
against dollars 11,6 II,! 10,9 
Conversion rates 
ECU/ounce of gold 185,064 370,546 446,958 
USD{ECU 1,37653 1,29517 1,33166 
!:CU/GOLD RATES (ECU per tine ounce) 
520 
480 
440 
400 
360 
320 
280 
240 
200 
160 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I , _,,,. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Rate used for swap 
operations with the EMCF 
Price on penultimate working 
- day of previous month 
A vcrage price over 
six previous months 
A wragc price over 
twelve previous months 
1-1982 
Dollars 
20 
I 
20 
27,3 
16,6 
10,7 
368,025 
1,08806 
M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M l J A S O N D l F M A M l l A S O N D 
1979 1980 1981 
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Total 
12,0 
16,8 
14,0 
11,9 
18,3 
12,5 
11,6 
14,5 
between gold and dollars, which would help to overcome some 
technical difficulties for the monetary authorities. This would 
introduce an element of flexibility, but also of arbitrariness, in 
the system. 
4.4. In conclusion, a 'closed pool' system would allow ECU 
creation to be controlled and divorced from market variables. 
It would, however, mean departing from the 20% rule set out in 
the European Council Resolution of 5 December 1978, and 
though market variables would no longer influence the volume 
of ECUs created, they would affect the volume of reserves 
transferred. In some cases, the different treatment of gold and 
dollar assets would be accentuated. 
II. How is the extension of the very short-term 
facility to the financing of intra-marginal 
interventions to be circumscribed ( either by 
attaching conditions, imposing a ceiling, or 
limiting its duration)? 
5. The Brussels Resolution states that in principle interven-
tions in the EMS will be made in participating currencies and 
provides for diversified interventions when a currency crosses 
its divergence threshold. The Agreement of I 3 March 1979 
between the central banks, however, makes no specific 
arrangements for intra-marginal interventions or their 
financing; such interventions are carried out on an ad hoe basis 
within the framework of concertation among EEC central 
banks. Currency availability then depends on bilateral 
agreements on either credit lines or using working balances 
(limited in principle by Article 15 of the central banks' 
Agreement). Intra-marginal interventions in Community 
currencies have nevertheless been considerable, amounting to 
over 20 OOO million dollars or some 55% of total interventions 
in Community currencies since the inception of the system. 1 
No intra-marginal intervention sales in EMS currencies were 
covered by very short-term financing through the EMCF. 
The Alternates have confined their examination to the general 
orientations which might govern the possible extension of the 
VSTF to intra-marginal interventions; it would be the task of 
central bank experts to eventually define the technical details 
of its implementation. 
6. It is the general vieu.1 that, if access to the VSTF for intra-
marginal interventions were to be made automatic or semi-
automatic as discussed below, such access could be made 
subject to a trigger related to the situation on the exchange 
markets ( a presomption de declenchement). Without fixing 
The :,ignificance of thi:, figure :,hou\d, however, be qualified: it includes 
repurchases of the currency previously sold as well as the sale of proceeds 
of official borrowing. 
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rigid rules, there should be a presumption that the financing of 
intra-marginal interventions through the VSTF would be 
Justified.for example, when a given bilateral spread ( say 2"/,,) 
is reached or when the divergence threshold is crossed. 
7. The Alternates felt that the extension of very short-term 
financing to intra-marginal interventions should in any event, if 
they were to be automatic, be circumscribed by imposing a 
ceiling/or each participating currency. It would be necessary to 
fix rules determining the amount of this ceiling ( e.g. related to 
quotas in the short-term monetary support mechanism), on 
how it would apply to debtor and creditor central banks, on how 
a ceiling would be reopened, etc. Within such a ceiling, cover of 
intra-marginal interventions by means of the VSTF could be 
either completely automatic or semi-automatic, in the sense 
that the central bank issuing the currency of intervention could 
object only in the case of special and concrete circumstances 
( such as conditions on the exchange markets or on domestic 
monetary markets) which it would be required to illustrate to 
the other authorities in the framework of concertation or in the 
appropriate Community bodies. The making available of 
amounts in excess of the ceiling to finance intra-marginal 
intervention would continue to be a matter for concertation 
between central banks on an ad hoe basis. 
8. Apart from fixing a ceiling, one could envisage altering the 
other elements of the VSTF ( duration, interest rate, means of 
settlement, etc.) when extending the facility to intra-marginal 
interventions. This would, however, be tantamount to creating 
a new facility and could not be described as an 'extension' of the 
existing VSTF. 
9. In this context the question arises whether the conditions 
under which intra-marginal interventions can take place should 
be altered. The Alternates agree that it is of fundamental 
importance for the proper functioning of the exchange rate 
mechanism that intra-marginal interventions should continue 
to be the subject of close concertation among central banks. 
This being said, it has been suggested that central banks should 
be given more leeway in their on._the-spot decisions for 
interventions in participating currencies, by making available a 
limited amount of individual Community currencies for intra-
marginal interventions. This amount could be used automati-
cally, in case of emergencies, on the intervening central bank's 
own initiative and on the understanding that the issuing central 
bank and the other central banks should be informed without 
delay. This proposal relates to the availability of currencies/or 
interventions and does not touch upon the question of financing. 
JO. Some Alternates consider that if automatic facilities for 
limited amounts were accepted, the central bank whose 
currency was being used might be expected to discourage intra-
marginal interventions beyond those limits; thus the present 
flexibility would be reduced rather than increased. These 
Alternates are furthermore of the opinion that the use of the 
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VSTF for intra-morginol interventions is justifiable only if 
there is a sufficient probability that these interventions will 
reduce the total of interventions otherwise needed. Thus, the 
presumption should not relate to a currency becoming 
divergent but rather to the causes of the imbalance and the 
measures being taken to remedy it. 
In the view of the other Alternates however, the application of 
such principles would not represent a significant departure 
from present practices. 
III. How can the option open to non-Community 
institutions to hold ECUs be organized? 
11. The Alternates examined the above question in relation to 
the external use of ECUs.issued by the EMCF. i.e. not in 
relation to £CU-denominated paper which might be issued by 
other Community entities or by private financial institutions. 
The possible interest of third parties in holding EC Us has also 
not been examined. 
12. A general principle governing the external role of the ECU 
should be that third holders of ECUs should be subject to 
substantially the same rights and obligations concerning the 
ECU (use, remuneration, etc.) as those of participant central 
banks: the single nature of the ECU should not be 
compromised in extending its role beyond the Community. The 
conditions for acquiring ECUs will accordingly also have to 
reflect the ECU's present precarious existence. 
I 3. A first possibility would be to permit designated third 
holders to freely acquire existing ECU assets from EMS 
members. 1 For example, a member central bank could swap 
ECUsfor dollars with a third country central bank in order to 
mobilize its ECU holdings. This swap could not be allowed to 
overlap the underlying swap of the member central bank with 
the EMCF. Such transactions would not imply an increase in 
the total volume of EC Us in circulation; there would merely be 
a transfer, in the EMCFs books. of ECUs held by members to 
official third holders. Such a transfer could also take the form 
of a sale rather than a swap, provided a prior 'third holder 
arrangement' had been concluded between the EMCF and the 
third party concerned, setting out in detail the terms and 
conditions for acquiring. mobilizing and restituting ECU 
assets. The third holder would in particular be required to 
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Allowing third parties to acquire ECUs in this way would entail a 
modification of the composition of their reserves as well as of those of the 
member central banks concerned. This would run counter to the limitation 
of Article 18(4) of the 13 March 1979 Agreement which rules out 
operations having the sole purpose of altering the composition of a central 
bank's reserves. The question oflifting this limitation for third holders or 
of abolishing it altogether would need to be further examined. 
surrender its ECU assets, if necessary, to allow EEC members 
to settle their obligations at the swap renewals and in the event 
of a definitive unwinding of the swap mechanisms. 
14. A second possibility would be for the EMCF to issue EC Us 
to third countries against the contribution of reserve assets, as 
it does with member central banks. The present legal texts 
empower the EMCF to issue ECUs against the transfer of 
reserves by the monetary authorities of the Member States 
alone. To authorize it to issue newly-created ECUs against the 
contribution of reserve assets by non-Community institutions 
would therefore require a modification of the relevant 
Regulation (EEC No 3181/78). Unlike the first case, new 
EC Us would be created by this operation and third countries 
would furthermore be given the possibility of mobilizing part of 
their gold holdings through the Fund, thereby increasing 
mobilizable international liquidity. 
This formula would seem particularly. if not exclusively, 
suitable for those European countries with particularly close 
economic and financial ties with the Community wishing to be 
associated to the EMS exchange rate and intervention 
mechanism. The association agreement would have to set out 
the conditions for acquiring and using ECUs on terms 
analogous to those applied to member central banks. It is 
doubiful that such an extension of the ECU would appeal to 
third countries unless the ECU were established as a full means 
of settlement within the system. 
15. In a broader perspective, an external role for the ECU 
could be envisaged as a reflection of a demand for reserve 
diversification by non-Community institutions. A possibility of 
this kind is examined in more detail in the note by the 
Commission departments on the external role of the ECU, 2 
already discussed in depth by the Alternates. In the majority 
view of the Alternates. such a development would presuppose 
inter alia, that the ECU were already a fully-fledged means of 
settlement and reserve asset for EMS participants, that it had a 
less precarious existence than that deriving from the present 
revolving swap mechanisms, and that the EMCF were 
transformed into an institution able lo· support an exchange 
rate risk and to offer real possibilities of substitution. The 
contrary view is that one could envisage a 'substitution 
account' without institutional convertibility: its attractiveness 
would obviously be reduced, but the conversion of EC Us into 
third currencies could be ensured at a market rate, in the 
framework of a negotiability formula between member central 
banks and third holders. There is therefore scope for a non-
institutional development in this regard and, according to this 
view, the matter deserves to be studied further. 
See Annex I -·S: Preparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund -
External role of the ECU. 
IV. How would the problems of legal tender 
arise in relation to the free circulation of an 
ECU coin minted according to national 
procedures? 
16. The Alternates examined this question in full awareness of 
the limits of their competence as regards the legal implications 
of such a step and the more technical aspects of the mint. These 
aspects, whose importance and potential difficulties should not 
be underestimated, would have to be studied by the competent 
experts at the· appropriate time. 
17. From a legal point of view, it appears that adaptation of 
national legislation concerning the minting and circulation of 
coins will be required in most or all countries, whether the ECU 
coin is granted full legal tender (i.e. compulsory acceptability 
by all economic agents within a certain amount, as with 
national coins) or whether it enjoys voluntary acceptability 
between agents. The question of the issuing authorities' 
commitment to repurchase the coins at a given rate would arise 
in both cases. 
18. As to the amount of the issue, the Alternates suggested that 
a global ceiling should be fixed for the Community as a whole, 
with quotas per member country based on some appropriate 
key (weight in the ECU, quota in the STMS, etc.). If the 
amount were a modest proportion of total coin circulation, it 
Annex C-2 
would be of negligible size vis-cl-vis the Community money 
supply and as such would not raise significant problems with 
respect to the likelihood of additional intra-Community capital 
flows. 
19. Doubts were raised as to whether the coin would effectively 
remain in circulation, given also past experience with certain 
national coinages issued in small amounts. Doubts were also 
expressed as to whether the coin would be used in transactions. 
The rules governing its conversion rate into national currencies 
would be an important element in determining its effective 
circulation. A first possibility would be for the ECU coin ·s 
value to be set at the level of the participating currencies' 
central rates, rounded off to an appropriate figure. This would 
confer a certain stability to its value between two realignments, 
but would raise a number of difficulties: the central rate rule 
could not be applied for conversion into pounds sterling or into 
Greek drachmas, nor into Belgian francs, given the existen·ce of 
a dual exchange market; it would introduce a distinction 
between the ECU coin converted at the central rate and ECU-
denominated deposits tO which market rates are applied; it 
would create arbitrage possibilities, in so far as national 
currencies could be exchanged at their central rates through the 
ECU coin. It should be noted, however, that the practical 
significance of these difficulties would be limited by the small 
denomination of the coin (which shu/d be of 1 ECU) and the 
modest amount of the issue in re/al 11 to total coin circulation. 
A second possibility would be Ji,r the ECU coin to be 
exchanged at market rates, though this would raise practical 
difficulties in transactions given the fluctuations in daily rates. 
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ANNEX C-3 
Supplementary report on some aspects of the non-institutional development 
of the European Monetary System presented on 26 February 1982 
by the Alternates of the Monetary Committee 
At the Monetary Commi//ee meeting of 11 February 1982, the 
Alternates were invited to examine the following question: 
'In the context of the abolition of the ECU's acceptance limit, 
what technical arrangements could ensure that holders of ECU 
net credit positions could mobilize such positions against other 
assets?' 
The Alternates met on 23 February 1982 and herewith submit 
their report to the Committee. As in their previous report, the 
Alternates refrained from discussing the desirability of 
amending the existing provisions of the system and confined 
their examination to technical aspects in the context of a non-
institutional development of the EMS. 
The first section of this report recalls the existing provisions for 
mobilizing ECUs and their limitations. The second and third 
sections discuss possible new schemes for ensuring such 
mobilization. The last section offers some concluding com-
ments regarding, inter alia, the difference between such 
schemes and full institutional convertibility. 1 
I. Preliimnary remarks 
1. According to the existing provisions of the Agreement of 
13 March 1979, a central bank may acquire dollars against 
ECUs either from the EMCF, by unwinding a swap 
transaction, or from another central bank. In the first case, 
mobilization can in practice only be used in the case af afa/1 in 
dollar reserves; it does not apply to the mobilization of ECU 
net credit positions. In the second case, the transaction is 
subject to mutual agreement. In both cases, mobilization is at 
present restricted by Article 18( 4 )of the Agreement stating 
that the operations referred to above 'shall not be carried out 
for the sole purpose of altering the composition of a central 
bank's reserves'. 
2. Although mobilization could conceivably be allowed more 
freely by removing this provision, it would not ensure that 
holders of ECU net credit positions could at any time mobilize 
such positions. Therefore, two types of schemes are examined 
below, which could be devised to offer this possibility, subject to 
amendments in the present arrangements. 
Under both schemes, the right to mobilize an ECU net credit 
position might either be unconditional, or be subject to some 
requirement of need, or be restricted to net credit positions 
exceeding a specified threshold. Any limitation on ECU 
mobilization would lessen liquidity problems for the system but 
would on the other hand restrict the degree of effective 
convertibility of net credit positions. 
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The convertibility issue was discussed by the Alternates in the context of 
the institutional phase of the system when assisting the Commission in its 
studies for the European Monetary Fund (see Annex 1-5). 
II. Mobilization through the EMCF 
3. The technical considerations concerning a scheme by which 
ECU mobilization is assured by the EMCF are mainly 
circumscribed by the swap system through which reserve assets 
are transferred. 
4. ECUs are created against both gold and dollars but 
mobilization would presumably only be against dollars. 
Depending therefore on the stringency of the conditions under 
which mobilization is possible and/or on the possible ability of 
the Fund to acquire currencies from outside the system, there 
could be a liquidity problem if large net credit positions arose 
and the central banks concerned sought to mobilize them, 
especially as the majority of ECUs are created against gold. 
5. The swap method of transfer limits the way in which dollars 
can be made available through the EMCF and mobilization 
could only be accomplished through a swap in the other 
direction between the Fund and the central bank concerned, 
thereby temporarily destroying ECUs. Such a swap would 
initially have to match the duration of the swap in force and 
would from then on be open for renewal on a quarterly basis 
under the same conditions as the original mobilization. 
6. The EMCF under existing arrangements returns the 
management of transferred assets to the participating central 
banks. These dollars are invested in various maturities 
according to the central bank's preferences, and the remuner-
ation is retained by them. It would.therefore be necessary to 
specify criteria under which the dollar assets to be used for 
mobilization would be selected, and provide compensation for 
the loss of remuneration, including the possible costs of 
unwinding investments before maturity. These costs would 
have to be charged to the central bank mobilizing ECUs. 
III. Mobilization with the other participants in 
the system 
7. This scheme provides for mobilization with the other 
participants according to a designation plan. lt would allow the 
ECU to be mobilized not only into dollars but also into SDRs. 
Mobilization in Community currencies could also be envisaged 
but this possibility should be assessed in the context of 
enhancing the scope for intra-marginal intervention or for 
reimbursement before maturity of ECU debts in the VSTF. 
8. The scheme raises the Jo/lowing issues: 
( a) criteria for the designation of the potential ECU recipients. 
Possible criteria are the following: 
( i) the balance of payments and the foreign reserves 
situation; 
(ii) the composition of reserves; 
(iii) the credit or debit position in ECUs in the VSTF; 
(iv) some quota system such as that in the STMS; 
( b) the mobilization technique: the actual mobilization could 
either take the form of a swap transaction or of a straight 
transfer; 
(c) constraints on the operation of the scheme: a major 
constraint would arise when all or most participants were 
simultaneously in a deficit position with the rest of the 
world. A possible solution to this problem might be found 
by the EMCF borrowing currencies outside the Com-
munity under conditions consistent with its present status, 
e.g. borrowing with the BIS. 
9. It was observed that, given its basic regional character, this 
scheme differs from the SD R designation system: first of all 
the present method of ECU creation implies that the ECU 
system is not a zero-sum mechanism, as is the SDR scheme. 
Moreover, the EMCF-unlike the !MF with the SDRs-
cannot become a holder of net creditor positions in ECUs. 
JO. The view was expressed that, irrespective of the mainten-
ance or abolition of the 50% rule, a designation scheme would 
imply another acceptance limit beyond which a central bank 
would not be obliged to accumulate ECUs by virtue of 
designation. 
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IV. Concluding remarks 
11. The Alternates examined the extent to which the above 
formulae differ from a technical point of view from full 
institutional convertibility for net ECU credit positions. In the 
first place, unless there were recourse toassetsfroin outside the 
system, the potential of mobilization would be limited, 
according to the formulae, either by the size of the Fund's 
dollar holdings or by the volume of assets which could be 
activated under a designation scheme. Secondly, the formula of 
mobilization with the EM CF would satisfy short-term liquidity 
needs. but would still leave the central bank with a net forward 
ECU position. Thirdly, mobilization with other participants 
through a designation scheme would, if done by transfer, have 
the same immediate result for the mobilizing central bank as 
institutional convertibility. However, the central bank con-
cerned might at a later stage find itself subject to obligations 
under the designation scheme. Furthermore, given the limited 
number of participants, the operation of such a scheme could be 
constrained if all members were in balance-of-payments 
deficit. For designated central banks with ECU net debtor 
positions it would be tantamount to a reconstitution obligation. 
12. In conclusion, none of the above formulae would seem to 
pose insurmountable technical difficulties. They are,from this 
point of view, feasible. They would, however, require rather 
elaborate rules and procedures, which could give the impression 
that there is some unwillingness to keep or acquire ECUs and 
might do a disservice to a system which should remain largely 
based on mutual cooperation and.flexibility. Against this, the 
schemes described could go some way to increase possibilities 
for central banks accumulating large ECU net creditor 
positions to mobilize these positions. 
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Commission communication to the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
of 15 March 1982 on the development of the European Monetary System . 
Consideration of the system's future began in May 1979. The 
subject was taken up by the Commission in close consultation 
with the Monetary Committee and the Committee of 
Governors. The discussions took into consideration and were 
modified by developments in the Community's economic 
situation and by upheavals in the international environment. 
On several occasions there were Council declarations on the 
subject and in March 1980 the Commission presented the 
European Council with a report on the European Monetary 
Fund. 
At its meeting on 15 February 1982, at the end of a wide-
ranging debate, the Council found that a number of measures 
could be taken to develop the EMS in the following four areas: 
improving the system's mechanisms, opening up the EMS to 
the exterior, promoting the private use of the ECU and 
reinforcing convergence. On this occasion, the Council took 
note of the Commission's intention to put forward specific 
proposals, in good time for its meeting on 15 March. 
The present communication is in response to that undertaking. 
In it, the Commission proposes the adoption of a group of 
measures to consolidate and develop the system; it insists on 
their importance by recalling the actual words of the foreword 
to the draft f'ifth medium-term economic policy programme: 
'With the European Monetary System, the Community has 
embarked on an ambitious, albeit gradualist, venture aimed at 
stabilization and convergence. The contribution made by the 
system - greater certainty in economic activity, a strong 
incentive to keep the key economic aggregates in balance, a 
stimulus to policy convergence and the added weight it gives to 
Europe in international monetary cooperation - should be a 
major factor in the success of the strategy set out in the f'ifth 
programme.' In other words, the Commission considers its 
proposed measures for developing the system to be a necessary 
and realistic step towards the institutional and final phase, 
which is still the ultimate objective of the European monetary 
edifice. 
The purpose of the system, clearly defined when it was 
launched, is to establish 'closer monetary cooperation leading 
to a zone of.monetary stability in Europe·. Three years of 
operation have shown that the EMS has succeeded in 
stabilizing the exchange rate relationships of the participating 
currencies, whereas the exchange rates of the major third 
currencies ( the dollar and the yen) and of the non-participating 
Community currencies have been very unstable. Altogether, 
five realignments of central rates have taken place, but tWo of 
them have involved one currency only; all have been made by 
mutual agreement in orderly market conditions, on the basis of 
a common procedure which has avoided competitive devalu-
ations. Throughout these three years, exchange rate manage-
ment has drawn heavily on the possibilities offered by th~ 
system's exchange rate and intervention mechanism; national 
monetary policies have been more closely coordinated than 
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before and generally adapted to the requirements of the system, 
even though hindered by the steep rise in US interest rates, 
which led to a level of interest rates in Europe incompatible 
with the low economic activity and the scale of unemployment. 
The system, however, has not led to a sufficient convergence of 
inflation rates:from 1979 to 1981, ·the inflation rate average 
rose, and the spread widened under the combined impact of the 
second oil price shock, the soaring dollar and insufficient 
internal discipline as regards costs and public finance. 
The successes attributable to the EMS are therefore fragile, 
and the object of the Commission proposals is to strengthen and 
consolidate the system from within so that its contribution to 
stability and its ability to resist outside shocks are increased. 
The following proposals, which are expressed in a text based on 
the format of the resolution of 5 December 1978 on the 
establishment of the EMS do not impinge on the re-
sponsibilities of the various Member States, over their 
monetary policies. Their implementation will stimulate the 
system towards its objectives and increase its contribution 
towards improving the general economic situation in Europe, 
since monetary stability, more certain prospects and increased 
employment are closely linked. The proposals respect the 
existing institutional framework and form a balanced whole, 
both from the viewpoint of creditors' and debtors' rights and 
obligations and of the elements of solidarity and strictness on 
which the system has been based. Further, as demonstrated by 
the work undertaken in close consultation with the competent 
committees, their adoption is technically possible. 
A. The ECU 
The role of the official ECU as the very centre of the system 
should be reinforced. Also the current extension of the private 
use of the ECU should be facilitated and organized. 
( a) ECU creation and use in the system 
The monetary nature of the ECU flows from its characteristics 
concerning: method of issue, convertibility aniacceptability. 
In this respect the present system is less than satisfacto_ry. 
Experience has proved the method of issuing the ECU not to be 
fully rational, and its convertibility has remained embryonic. 
Thus the limits imposed on its acceptability have, somewhat 
paradoxically, looked like a protective measure. The perspect-
ive must be reversed, so that it conforms with the role planned 
for the ECU in the EMS. The widest acceptability for the ECU 
must be sought, and the corollary must be some degree of 
control over the process of creating ECUs and the organization 
of arrangements for mobilizing it. 
The creation of EC Us against transfers of reserves has in/act 
been disorderly and potentially inflationary: as a result of the 
quarterly swaps, the 27 OOO million ECU created in March 
1979 became almost 50 OOO million in April /981; the figure 
has now.fallen to 42 OOO million. Although these variations are 
primarily linked to the variations in the price of gold, the 
volume of EC Us issued should be divorced from the two widely 
fluctuating variables, the price of gold and the dollar exchange 
rate, so that ECU creation can be controlled. At present, at 
each quarterly swap renewal, volume adjustments are made to 
take account of the variations in reserves held by each central 
bank, and value adjustments are made to take account of the 
variations in the ECU price of the assets transferred. The 
Commission proposes that ECU creation should be brought 
under control by retaining the same volume adjustments, but by 
applying the value adjustments to the quantities of gold and 
dollars transferred to the EMCF by the central banks, instead 
of to the outstanding amount of EC Us issued. 
Another less satisfactory possibility would be to dampen the 
effects of erratic gold price movements on the quantity of 
EC Us by lengthening the reference period used to calculate the 
average gold price from six months to two years. This would, 
however, entail the disadvantage of a difference between the 
price of gold on the market and that used within the system, 
With the inflationary danger involved in the present method of 
ECU creation eliminated, the use of the ECU should be 
encouraged. The abolition of the ECU's present acceptance 
limit for settlement of operations covered by the very short-
term financing would enable the debtor to clear his debt in full 
by using EC Us. In return, the creditor should receive a higher 
remuneration on his net ECU position (the rate of interest 
would be set by the Governors of the central banks at a level 
derived from the market levels) and be authorized to mobilize a 
net ECU credit position beyond 50% of its allocation, on the 
understanding that this mobilization possibility would not be 
used for the sole purpose of changing the composition of its 
reserves. 
The above modifications to the existing rules together with 
those proposed concerning intra-marginal interventions ( see 
point C(d) below) make up, in the Commission's view, a 
balanced package which would ensure a larger circulation for 
the ECU while respecting the interests of both debtors and 
creditors. 
(b) Private use of the ECU 
Alongside the official ECU circuit and unconnected with it, a 
private ECU circuit is now developing. It is natural for 
operators and markets to be interested in the monetary 
expression of a vast economic area in the process of 
integration. The Community should take care of its monetary 
image; it should not only promote, but also monitor, and even 
guide this expanding private use of the ECU. Whence the 
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importance of Proposals designed to supplement the existing 
provisions and to encourage and control the use of the ECU on 
the markets. 
It is important to define a sort of'ECU trademark' so that the 
term and the instrument 'ECU' is used correctly by the 
markets. The necessary Community legislation should 
therefore be adopted to protect the ECU 'trademark' and to 
define it. Such legislation would also have to set out the rules 
for its use, in order to ensure that the ECU is not deflected: 
thus.for example, prohibiting the attaching of an indexation 
clause to an ECU-denominated pecuniary liability would 
ensure that the ECU remained the instrument of stability which 
is its purpose. Jn this way the wider private use of the ECU 
would be solidly based. 
The various Community institutions and the EJB would have to 
promote the widest possible use of the ECU for their 
accounting and their operations. Further, they should set an 
example by developing the use of the ECU in their borrowing 
and lending operations to the full extent compatible with the 
ECU's proper establishment on the financial markets. Greater 
use of the ECU by issues which each represent another facet of 
the Community's institutional edifice would strengthen the 
ECU's role on the markets. 
Other steps should be taken to promote the wider use of the 
ECU and to make it a factor in the integration of the financial 
markets in Europe. First, the discriminations currently 
applying to the ECU in national regulations should be removed 
( being neither a national nor a foreign currency, it is subject to 
any regulation applying to either). In the Community countries 
the ECU should be given the status of a foreign currency and 
even a privileged one. The principle of free movement, within 
the Community, of £CU-denominated capital should also be 
established. Finally, the EMCF should be empowered to 
monitor ECU operations and issues. 
B. Convergence 
On an annual average over the last three years, and expressed 
in national currencies, movements of costs and prices in the 
countries participating in the EMS have diverged substan-
tially: consumer price rises range from 5,6% to 16,3% and 
variations in the relative unit costs of labour range from 
-14,5% to + 32,7"1,,. What is more, the deviations from the 
mean are increasing. It is true that these movements would have 
been even more unfavourable without the EMS, but the 
persistence of these divergences imperils the very nature of the 
system. The measures to strengthen the system would be 
useless if they too did not contribute to the convergence of 
economic and monetary policies. 
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All dimensions of economic policy should be reconsidered from 
the viewpoint of their contribution to convergence towards 
stability. It is clearly a long and difficult exercise. This goal 
should always be borne in mind when economic policies are 
formulated. Some concrete decisions should be taken at 
Community level and be implemented rapidly. The main 
objective would be to arrange for policies to be concerted more 
actively: 
( a) by the regular discussion of the national intermediate 
monetary policy targets, and the level of interest rates, in 
relation to their compatibility with the economic policy 
objectives pursued in common, without however affecting 
essential national responsibilities, especially those of the 
central banks; 
(b) by enumerating the economic and monetary policy 
measures and instruments which are incompatible with the 
proper functioning of the EMS; the use of these should be 
avoided; 
( c) by establishing the principle of the free movement of ECU-
denominated capital, and by reconsidering the restrictions 
on movements of capital currently authorized under 
safeguard clauses; 
( d) by improving the effectiveness of the monitoring of 
Member States' economic policies. Their results and 
methods will be assessed by reference to a set of 
comparative indicators and to objectives laid down by 
common agreement. Once they started to diverge signifi-
cantly, the Commission would have to make full use of the 
existing consultation and recommendation procedures; 
( e) by establishing a mutual information and monitoring 
procedure on the balance-of-payments situation and the 
external indebtedness of the Member States; in this 
context, an assessment could be made of the desirability of 
early recourse to Community financing. 
C. External relations of the system 
In the field of international monetary relations, the Com-
munity lacks the organization needed for it to play the role 
asked of it as one of the poles of the developing multiple reserve 
currency system. As a result, it is handicapped in the dialogue 
with the authorities responsible for the major third currencies, 
the US dollar and the yen, at a time when such a dialogue is 
essential in order to promote the orderly evolution of the 
international monetary system. 
The cohesion of the system might not withstand the repetition 
of shocks comparable to those caused, in the last two years, by 
the sudden and erratic changes in US interest rates ( which have 
doubled) and the dollar exchange rate ( which has appreciated 
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by over 50% against the major European currencies). 
Circumstances demand a common attitude to third currencies 
- particularly the dollar- and an expression of this by 
Community bodies. 
Actions in four areas could be foreseen: 
( a) Reinforcing the regular consultations should be proposed 
to the US and Japanese authorities. The various Com-
munity bodies (Council, Commission and specialist 
committees) should take part in these consultations. These 
would provide a regular forum, with periodicity to be 
decided, for an exchange of views on financial and 
monetary problems of common interest. The procedure 
should also be able to be activated at the request of one of 
the parties when the situation on the foreign exchange 
market appeared to be unrelated to the underlying 
economic data - i.e. manifestly outside the limits that 
economic likelihood would suggest - or when interest rate 
differentials caused excessive and undesirable strains on 
the Community's money and financial markets. 
(b) The Community monetary authorities should encourage 
the American and Japanese monetary authorities to 
participate in meaningful cooperation on exchange and 
interest rates. The US authorities in particular should be 
invited to abandon their laissez-aller exchange rate and 
interest rate policy. Also discussions with the US 
authorities should be started with a view to replacing the 
existing network of swaps between certain Community 
central banks and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
by a single credit line between the latter and the EMCF. 
This would provide tangible evidence of European 
determination to avoid appearing disunited from the 
United States point of view. 
( c) The coordination of Community central banks' interven-
tions in third currencies should be improved. The central 
banks should make regular and frequent common assess-
ments of the ECU's exchange relationships, paying regard 
to the average level of interest rates desirable in the 
Community. Their intervention policy should be based on 
this assessment. 
( d) With the same objective in view, it is important to organize 
the use of Community currencies in intra-marginal 
interventions. At present, a central bank's use of a 
Community currency for intervention inside the margins is 
subject to the good will of the central bank whose currency 
is requested. Interventions are instead made in dollars and 
this often has the effect of emphasizing an undesired 
movement of the US currency or of undermining the 
coherence of the participating central banks' attitudes 
towards that currency. Alternatively, if no intervention is 
made inside the margins, the currency under threat slides 
until it reaches its bilateral margin, at which point the 
intervention amounts may be far greater than those that 
would earlier have been necessary to reverse the trend. 
The use of Community currencies for intra-marginal interven-
tions would conform to the spirit of the system if it were 
specified that a central bank intervening inside the margins was 
presumed to be able to- do so in Community currencies with 
access to the i•ery short-term financing when its currency 
crossed the divergence threshold ( lowered to 50% for wider 
band currencies) or wizen the difference of its bilateral rate vis-
a-vis another participant was more than 85% of the permitted 
fluctuation margin. The central banks of currencies used for 
interventions would/or their part have the right of refusing the 
continued use of their currencies if such use were causing 
problems for their internal monetary policy. Nevertheless, the 
dollar would continue to be used/or intra-marginal interven-
tions in cases where, by use of this currency, the cohesion of the 
EMS could be maintained and, at the same time, an 
undesirable movement of the dollar in relation to the EMS 
could be acted upon. 
Determined action in line with the above could allow the 
Community the degree of autonomy necessary for it to be able 
to react, in a unified and coherent way, to tensions from the 
outside which have a large and excessive effect on European 
interest rates. 
The EMS is at present a closed system in which only the central 
banks of certain Member States participate, whereas the 
Community is open to the outside world. Opening it to third 
countries in the spirit of the European Council of Brussels and 
giving them access to EC Us would extend the system's zone of 
stability and increase the possibilities for using and mobilizing 
ECUs. 
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Central banks of countries which seek to have special economic 
and financial ties with the European Communities should be 
authorized to acquire existing ECUs freely from the 
participating central banks, and the EMCF should be 
empowered to create EC Us for them on the same conditions as 
those for the participants, i.e. against reserve transfers in the 
form of swaps. But first, agreements would have to be 
concluded specifying the terms and conditions for acquiring, 
mobilizing and restituting ECUs. 
The adoption of the measures proposed above to develop, 
strengthen and consolidate the EMS is technically feasible. 
While they respect the institutional framework, they represent 
a necessary step forward for the system. In devising them, care 
has been taken to preserve the balance between the principles of 
strictness and solidarity inherent in the system, and the 
measures form a whole in which the component parts reinforce 
each other. 
Following the method employed wizen the EMS was set up in 
December 1978 the Council decisions or guidelines could be the 
subject of a resolution. A draft resolution based on the 
suggestions of this communication is attached. ' 
The draft resolution can be found in Chapter VI. 
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Statement by the Chairman of the Monetary Committee 
on the non-institutional development of the EMS to the Council 
(Economic and Financial Affairs) of 15 March 1972 
Following the request of the Council of 15 February 1982, the 
Monetary Committee continued its work on the non-
institutional development of the European Monetary System. 
Its work centred on the f{)Ur areas indicated by the Council, i.e. 
the mechanisms of the system, the private use of the ECU, the 
strengthening of convergence and the system's external 
relations. 
The Committee concentrated in the first instance on the 
technical aspects of the system, in the expectation that if 
agreement could be reached on these, agreement might well be 
attainable on the other points also. It therefore attempted to 
assemble the elements of a package on the technical aspects to 
see whether these could command general acceptance. The 
proposals discussed in detail in the Committee were as follows: 
( i) raising the acceptance limit to a figure between 60 and 
70% and improving ECU remuneration by relating it to 
market interest rates for future debtor positions; 
(ii} supplementing the current possibilities for intra-marginal 
interventions in Community currencies by means of a 
presumption that such interventions would he generally 
justified, and access to the very short-term facility 
possible, when a given bilateral spread were reached or 
when the divergence threshold were crossed, while 
maintaining-under certain conditions-a right of veto 
for the creditor central bank; 
(iii) lengthening the reference period for gold valuation from 
the present six months to one year, in order to dampen the 
effects of an unstable gold price on ECU supply. Changes 
in the gold price have been the main cause of the marked 
growth and fluctuations in ECU volume: 
(iv) giving the system an external dimension by allowing 
central banks of European countries with particularly 
close economic and financial ties with the European 
Community to obtain ECUs by acquiring them from 
participant central banks. 
It was recognized that any set of proposals would have to strike 
a balance between the interests of potential creditor and debtor 
countries in the system. However, no general agreement proved 
possible on this group of proposals as a result of the 
Committee's discussion. 
Moving to another area indicated by the Council, that of the 
private use of the ECU, the Committee agreed that an 
exemplary use of the ECU in the borrowing and lending 
activities of the Community institutions should continue and be 
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expanded as Jar as market conditions permit. £CU-de-
nominated issues by Community institutions should con-
sequently be exempt from exchange controls where these exist. 
The Committee also supported the general direction of the 
other proposals regarding the private use of the ECU, but noted 
that these are largely a matter for the private sector itself and 
that the ECU has already come to be used substantially in the 
private sector without the need for official intervention. The 
Committee has furthermore not examined the technical and 
legal questions which might arise from the implementation of 
the various proposals on the private use of the ECU. 
As regards the strengthening of convergence, I already stressed 
at the last Council meeting the top priority which the 
Committee considers should be given to achieving progress in 
this area, both in terms of economic policies and performances 
and of rectifying existing imbalances between member 
countries. The Committee therefore welcomes the Com-
mission's intention to make full use of the existing consultation 
and recommendation procedures. Although the Committee has 
not addressed itself in full on the subject of convergence since 
the Council's last meeting, it has placed the issue at the centre 
of its work programme. It has agreed,for example, to regularly 
prepare and update a dossier on the fundamentals' of our 
economies, which would allow a better appraisal of the conduct 
of economic policies and performances and also be useful for 
realignment discussions. I already stressed the importance of a 
greater freedom of capital movements in my statement to the 
last Council meeting: in this regard the Committee will explore 
the scope/or action, keeping in mind the interrelation between 
the advancement of convergence and the liberalization of 
capital movements. 
As regards the final chapter indicated by the Council, that of 
the system's external relations, I have already mentioned one 
technical aspect, i.e. that of allowing central banks of certain 
European countries to acquire ECUsfrom participants. On the 
more general point of the system's relations with the dollar and 
other major currencies, the Committee-while acknowledging 
that our own policies have an important part to play in these 
relations-considers that it is also necessary to convince the 
US authorities to pursue policies which take full account of the 
importance of the US economy and of the dollar at world level. 
The Monetary Committee has on several occasions formulated 
a Community position on these issues and keeps the matter 
under constant review. During its meeting of 5 March, for 
example, members agreed to pass on to their national 
authorities a note by the Commission departments, prepared in 
response to a ministerial request, on the international 
implications of US fiscal and monetary policies. 
ANNEX F - Statement and letter from the Committee of Governors on the future of the 
EMS 
ANNEX F-1 
Oral statement from the Committee of Governors of the central banks of the 
Member States of the European Economic Community to the Council 
(Economic and Financial Affairs) of 15 March 1982 on the future of the EMS 
1. Following the meeting on 15 February 1982 of the Council 
of the European Communities ( Economic and Financial 
Affairs) the Committee of Governors has continued its studies 
on the future development of the EMS and has examined in 
particular the four areas which have been enumerated in the 
conclusions of that Council session, i.e. 
(i) the mechanisms of the system, 
(ii) opening the system to the outside world, 
(iii) private use of the ECU, 
(iv) strengthening convergence. 
The Committee of Governors wishes to reiterate that the 
system so far has worked well; it must nevertheless be 
recognized that this was partly due to the realistic central rates 
selected at the start of the system and to the weakness of the 
German mark over prolonged periods. More generally, the 
good functioning owed much to the high degree of cooperation 
between central banks in managing the system. The lack of 
convergence of economic policies and of fundamental economic 
variables in participating countries means, however, that, at 
present, conditions are not appropriate for major institutional 
changes in the EMS. 
2. Accordingly, the strengthening of convergence is a 
prerequisite for any significant future development of the 
EMS. Such strengthening of convergence should apply to all 
economic policy areas ( in particular budgetary policy) and be 
achieved by implementing coordinated domestic and Com-
munity policies designed to rectify existing imbalances within 
and between EEC countries. The ultimate success of these 
policies will, however, depend more on the determination of 
national authorities to ensure the attainment of economic 
objectives than on consultation procedure. 
The EMS itself can assist this process because, notably, the 
exchange rate constraints which it imposes have doubtless 
influenced participant countries' monetary and other policies in 
the direction of greater discipline. But that is not enough. If 
divergences in other areas are building up, then monetary 
policies in individual countries ultimately cannot withstand the 
pressure. Nor can exchange rate realignments be counted upon 
to relieve the strains: if they are too frequent or too large they 
detract from the system's credibility and risk further 
accentuating diverging developments. 
In these circumstances, technical improvements to particular 
elements of the system cannot be regarded as a viable 
alternative to closer convergence of economic policies.. 
Progress in this area is of crucial importance for the continued 
existence of the EMS. 
Concerning mofletary policies, the Committee of Governors 
will continue to monitor developments in the Member States of 
the EEC, as well as their compatibility with one another and 
with the objectives of achieving greater domestic and external 
stability. To this end, the Committee of Governors evaluates 
regularly the adaptations that may be required to foster the 
cohesion of monetary and exchange rate developments within 
the Community. In particular, the Governors are analysing the 
recent growth in borrowing abroad by EEC members and its 
implications for the pursuit of monetary policy. 
3. The Governors have carefully examined a number of 
possible adaptations to the mechanisms of the EMS, which/a/I 
within their sphere of competence. These adjustments relate to: 
(i) intervention and financing within the system, and (ii) 
creation and acceptability of ECUs. 
The Governors, however, did not reach a consensus on the 
introduction of amendments to existing arrangements and 
agreements at the present time. They wish to point out that 
their in-depth review of the operation of the EMS in its first 
three years has led to the conclusion that the system is 
functioning satisfactorily from a technical point of view. 
The Committee of Governors will continue to monitor closely 
the performance of the EMS and stand ready to introduce 
those adaptations to its mechanisms that might become 
appropriate as circumstances develop. 
4. With regard to the relations of the EMS with the outside 
world, the Committee o/Governorsfocused its attention on the 
desirability of obtaining a higher degree of exchange rate 
stability, in particular between the EMS and the US dollar. 
However, this cannot be achieved merely through exchange 
market intervention. Rather, the solution of present problems 
requires increased coordination of economic policies within the 
Coml11unity and also between EEC countries and the United 
States of America. It should be recalled in this respect that 
EEC central banks already have adequate opportunity for 
constant communication with their American colleagues both 
through the concertation procedure and through- their monthly 
meetings. 
The extension of the use of EC Us issued by the EMCF outside 
the circle of EMS member central banks is difficult to envisage, 
given the precarious nature of the ECU and the fact that its 
convertibility into third currencies has not been defined. This 
does not exclude the possibility of central banks of 'European 
countries with particularly close economic and financial ties 
with the European Communities' obtaining ECUs by acquiring 
them from an EMS central bank. The legal implications of this 
change, however, would have to be examined. 
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5. EEC central banks do not have objections to the 
development of the use of ECUs in private markets, and, 
indeed, progress in this field is taking place in several countries. 
Care must, however, be taken to prevent developments which 
would interfere with the proper conduct of domestic monetary 
policies. 
The Governors specifically wish to draw attention to the 
following issues: 
( i) There is a danger that, if Community institutions were 
forced to borrow in ECUs beyond the possibilities offered 
by the developing ECU market, these institutions might 
suffer a financial burden. 
(ii) Ahhough there would be ad,•antages in exempting ECU-
denominated loans from restrictions on capital move-
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ments, this step would create segmentation within the 
national capital market as long as these restrictions 
persisted; efforts must therefore be made to facilitate the 
issue of ECU loans through a progressive removal of 
capital controls. 
(iii) By permitting the opening of £CU-denominated bank 
accounts by residents there is the danger of circumventing 
exchange control measures where they are still in force. 
Difficulties for monetary control would also arise. 
The nature of these problems and their implications for legal 
and structural conditions in individual EEC countries, in the 
Governors' view, mean that appropriate measures fall to be 
taken by individual countries. 
ANNEX F-2 
Letter of 29 April 1982 from the Chairman of the Committee of Governors of 
the central banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community 
to the President of the Council of the European Communities 
Dear Mr President, 
I refer to my letter of 30 March in which I confirmed 
that, in response to the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council's request, the Committee of EEC Governors would 
undertake discussions in April about the European Monetary 
System. 
At its meeting of 20 April !982 the Committee of 
Governors re-examined the question, with particular regard to 
the four areas specified in the conclusions to the February 1982 
meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council. 
During their discussion, the Governors confirmed the position 
taken in the attached note verbale ' that I presented to the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council in March 1982. 
Furthermore, developments, and in particular the tensions, of 
the past weeks only underline further the need to give priority 
to strengthening the convergence of national economic policies 
and ID coordinating these policies with Community policies. 
Indeed, action to improve convergence appears necessary to 
preserve the very viability of the European Monetary System. 
Yours sincerely. 
I See Annex F-1. 
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Oral statement of the Chairman of the Monetary Committee 
on the development of the EMS to the informal meeting 
of Economic and Finance Ministers on 17 May 1982 
I. On 21 April and 5 May 1982, pursuant to the Council's 
request, the Monetary Committee again examined the 
Commission's proposal for a draft Council resolution on the 
development of the European Monetary System. 1 
2. With regard to the propositions covering the technical 
aspects of the system (i.e. ECU creation, acceptance and 
remuneration, intra-marginal interventions and the external 
role of the ECU), the Committee continues to find that no 
general agreement proves possible at present, either on the 
proposals as they stand in the draft resolution or on an 
alternative grOup of proposals as set out.for example, in my 
previous statement to the Council of 15 March 1982. You will 
recall that the Committee had attempted to assemble the 
elements of a package on the technical aspects of the system to 
see whether these could command general acceptance, in the . 
expectation that if agreement could be reached on these, 
agreement might well be attainable on the other points of the 
draft resolution as well. That had not been the case at the time, 
and today I cannot but confirm that outcome. The Committee 
felt that under these circumstances a continuation of the 
discussion would not alter the situation. 
3. As to the other group of proposals, covering the private use 
of the ECU~ the measures to enhance convergence, and the 
external aspects of the system, the Committee's Alternates 
have examined their technical implications and, although they 
found that technical problems persist in some cases, the 
Committee's view is that the general direction of several of the 
proposals should be supported and encouraged. The Commit-
tee expressed.for example, its support for the promotion of the 
private use of the ECU. This is an area where developments are 
largely spontaneous and can proceed at a pace of their own: 
thus, for example, the ECU is already treated as a foreign 
currency in the majority of Member States. The Committee 
also agreed that the use of the ECU for the borrowing and 
lending activities of the Community institutions should be 
expanded as far as market conditions permit. As regards 
external relations, the Committee has often contributed to a 
common Community position, for example in the field of 
See <;hapter VI. 
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exchange rate and interest rate developments, where it insists 
on the need to persevere in our efforts to persuade the US 
authorities to pursue policies which take full account of their 
responsibilities to the world economy. 
4. There was general agreement within the Committee that the 
top priority area for our future efforts must be the 
strengthening of convergence, both in terms of economic 
policies and performances and of reducing existing imbalances 
between member countries. It is clear that the system's 
prospects hinge crucially on our ability to make progress in this 
area, and that there is thus a parallelism between an 
improvement in convergence and the system's development. 
The EMS has in fact already become an increasingly 
important part of our economic policy framework. In its three 
years of existence, the coordination and consultation process at 
Community level has been intensified; at national level, the 
system has promoted the adoption of stability-oriented policies 
in a number of member countries, and notably in those where 
they were most needed. But disappointing results in the 
fundamental areas of domestic cost and price trends and of 
public finances, underlying the recent tensions within the 
system, indicate the urgent need for a renewed and incisfre 
effort. It is along this road, in the daily implementation of our 
economic policies and in our capacity to direct them towards 
stability, that the system can continue to give its support and 
must progress further. Such progress is not a question of new 
procedures, but of resolute and forceful cooperation at all 
levels, and especially in the· bodies where views may be 
exchanged most frankly and confidentially. It is the firm 
intention of members to actively use the forum provided by the 
Monetary Committee to this end. and to keep matters having a 
bearing on convergence at the centre of our work programme. 
5. In conclusion, therefore, although the proposals contained 
in the draft resolution do not appear to be acceptable in their 
totality at the present stage, notably for the absence of 
agreement on a technical package which is at the same time 
significant and balanced, there are possibilities and scope for 
pragmatic progress on a number of issues, and most notably 
that of convergence. It is my intentiOn that the Monetary 
Committee play its full part in contributing to such progress. 
ANNEXH 
Report from the Commission ( of 20 March 1980) 
to the European Council on the European Monetary Fund 1. 
I. At the Dublin meeting on 29 and 30 November 1979, the 
European Council invited the Commission to submit, for the 
meeting in March 1980, a report setting out the progress made 
in studying the establishment of the European Monetary Fund 
and pointing out any difficulties. 
The studies on the European Mof!elary Fund were started by 
the Commission as early as May 1979. Since then, the 
Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors have 
looked into this question, and their respective chairmen have 
reported to the Council on the progress of work. This work has 
not yet been· completed; rather than producing specific 
guidelines, it has so Jar made it possible to identify problems 
and possible choices between solutions. However, as can be 
seen from the analySis below, the preliminary technical work 
has shown that, if it is to make a real extra contribution, the 
transition to the institutional stage of the European Monetary 
System can be carried out only if certain basic questions have 
been resolved which have not yet been fully clarified. 
//. Current work is based on three main elements: 
A. The first is the desire expressed by the European Council in 
Bremen an~ Brussels, to transform the European Monetary 
System into a 'durable scheme' guaranteeing the creation of a 
zone of monetary stability in Europe. For the purpose of 
attaining this objective, the European Council defined the 
operating rules of the system in the first stage and indicated 
certain characteristics of the 'final stage'. 
B. The second is the lessons to be learnt from the first year of 
operation of the European Monetary System and from 
monetary and exchange-rate developments in the Community 
since 13 March 1979. 
The assessment of the operation of the European Monetary 
System in its first year is largely positive. The procedures for 
consultation between the authorities of the Member States in 
the various Community bodies have been improved. Despite 
sharp economic and monetary disturbances which entailed 
interest rate increases ranging from 3 to 5 points according to 
the country, the group of participating currencies maintained a 
greater degree of cohesion than that recorded since 1972. Two 
adjustments of central rates in September andNovember 1979 
were carried out in good time and fairly smoothly. Lastly, the 
monetary compensatory amounts were reduced appreciably, 
reflecting progress towards the objective of uniform prices on 
the European agricultural market. 
In stressing the positive factors, the Commission is expressing 
its conviction that it would have been much more difficult to 
achieve these results if there had been no European Monetary 
System. However, between the end of 1978 and the end of 1979, 
Previously published in European Economy Number 7, November 1980: 
Chapter 6 of the Annual Economic Review 1980-81. 
the average rate of inflation in the Community rose from 6,9% 
to 9,0%, and the spread between the lowest and the highest rate 
of inflation in the Member States widened from JO to 17 points. 
Although progress has thus been made towards exchange-rate 
stability, the same has not been the case in the field of prices. 
Consequently, the European Monetary System must be 
consolidated and strengthened so as to make its own active 
contribution to better economic equilibrium in Europe. 
Economic policies for their part will have to be brought to 
converge more closely to ensure the stability of the monetary 
system. 
C. The third element is the developments in the international 
economic, financial and monetary situation. In 1978, the 
serious disruption of exchange rates, payments balances, prices 
and financial markets caused by the 1971-74 monetary and 
energy crises, seemed to be about to ease. Today, the threat of 
renewed disequilibria in international payments relations is 
growing. 
The future development of the European Monetary System 
must therefore be such as to contribute actively to the overall 
stability of the international financial and monetary system 
and to meet the Community's general interests in the trade and 
financial fields-both its own interests and those of the 
countries with which it has particularly close relations. 
Ill. The Commission and the committees concerned have 
primarily concentrated on the role of the ECU and on the 
organization of the credit mechanisms in the European 
Monetary Fund. They have examined the institutional aspects, 
which will be largely governed by the solutions adopted to the 
questions of substance discussed above. 
I. The credit mechanisms 
Two.features of the credits granted under present agreements 
should be noted: to a large extent they_are bilateral credits, the 
accounting procedures for which are haildled by a Community 
body, the EMCF; and since the body which issued the ECUs-
the EMCF-is only an accounting intermediary in the credit 
operations, these do not give rise to the direct creation of 
ECUs. 
Two problems have been studied in particular: first, the 
consolidation of existing credits ( short-term and medium-
term) and of very short-term credit facilities. It became clear 
that, whatever solution is adopted, this is not a fundamental 
problem in the transition to the institutional stage of the 
European Monetary Fund. 
Second, the EMF's ability to create ECUs against credits, 
which is a crucial issue. This ability raises the problem of the 
limits and conditions under which these EC Us could be created 
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or the credits could be granted, and therefore that of the means 
which would be available to the European Monetary Fund to 
impose tighter monetary discipline in the Community. The 
solutions to this problem will depend to a large extent on the 
role of the ECU in the institutional stage of the European 
Monetary System. 
2. The ECU 
( a) In the present system, the ECU serves as thenumerairefor 
the exchange-rate mechanism, as the basis for the 
divergence indicator, as the denominator for intervention 
operations and as a means of settlement between the 
Community's monetary authorities. 
However, the ECU lacks the principal features of a 
currency: it is not an instrument of payment; there can be 
no autonomous creation of ECUs through the credit 
operations; and though it appears in the central hank's 
balance-sheets, this does not mean that it is a genuine 
reserve instrument, since it is merely the expression in the 
accounts of the assets ( dollars and gold) against which it 
has been· issued and whose movements it reflects automati-
cally. 
(b) The decisions taken at Bremen and Brussels, certain 
fundamental considerations and recent monetary trends 
together mean that the development of the ECU will be the 
locomotive for transition to the institutional stage of the 
European Monetary System: it is by expanding the role of 
the ECU that the Community will be able to organize 
internal(v the coordinated action necessary to achieve a 
greater degree of monetary stability and establish its 
monetary identity at international level. 
(c) The full and complete use of the ECU as a means of 
payment and the regulation of the creation of ECUs to 
serve the objective of monetary stability raise the question 
whether, to what extent and under what conditions the 
future Monetary Fund could possess an independent power 
of money creation. 
If it were given such power, the future European Monetary 
Fund could create EC Us in two ways: against a 
contribution of reserves ( as is done under the present 
agreements), or through credit operations; these two 
methods could even be combined. 
The full use of the ECU as a means of payment or reserve 
instrument within the Community would require that 
several conditions be met: 
(i) certain legislative measures would have to be taken to 
abolish the limits to the acceptability of ECUs to the 
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central banks, to provide that a certain percentage of 
reserves must be held in the form of ECUs, and possibly to 
impose the exclusive use of the ECU as an instrument of 
settlement between the Community's central banks; 
( ii) if the limits to the acceptability of the ECU were abolished, 
the ECUs inherent characteristics ( convertibility and 
yield) would have to be strengthened to make it as 
attractive as the other possible reserve instruments; 
( d) Apart from the role to be performed by the ECU in the 
areas described above, a second major decision of principle 
will have to be taken; this concerns the wider use of the 
ECU outside the system of Community central banks, both 
on the private financial markets and by the authorities of 
non-Community countries, so as to ensure the full 
negotiability of the ECU and to enhance its status as a 
reserve asset. In this context, the question arises as to 
whether the strengthening of the role of the ECU might 
allow it to play a part in recycling the surpluses of the oil-
producing countries. 
IV. Once the European Monetary System enters into its 
institutional stage, consistency between domestic monetary 
policies, credit mechanisms and exchange-rate agreements will 
have to be ensured within a single system of procedures, so as to 
provide a full and proper basis for the smooth operation of the 
system and the achievement of monetary stability., 
This raises the questions firstly, of the institutional powers with 
which the Fund will be endowed in order to administer the 
system itself and, secondly, of the back-up measures which will 
have to be taken so as to ensure the smooth working of the 
system, including measures such as the coordination of 
exchange-rate policies vis-cl-vis non-Community currencies 
and the achievement of a sufficient degree of convergence in the 
economic and monetary policies pursued in the Member States. 
Examination of the institutional aspects has already begun. It 
has started from the principle that a Fund endowed with 
increased powers should be integrated into the institutional 
system of the Community and of the existing international 
monetary organizations on the basis of clear precise legal 
arrangements. Fuller examination of the institutional aspects 
must necessarily be carried out in parallel with the basic 
questions raised above; it is on the solutions arrived at with 
regard to these basic questions that the powers of the European 
Monetary Fund and the nature of the bodies running it will to a 
large extent depend. It will at all events be necessary to work 
out a balanced system of tasks, responsibilities and safeguards 
for the European Monetary Fund; this is essential to the 
exercise of any function of a monetary nature. A balanced 
system of this kind is, moreover, to be found in all the Member 
States, though the features of each system differ in accordance 
with national legal and institutional circumstances. 
Some of the functions or tasks allotted to the European 
Monetary Fund once it is established will probably have to be 
taken up only gradually depending on how the relevant political 
authorities assess the way in which the situation is developing 
and on whether they find the mechanisms suitable. 
In conclusion, the Commission proposes that the European 
Annex H 
Council request ·the relevant Community bodies to pursue their 
work along the lines set out in this report. The Commission is 
ready to provide the European Council with further inform· 
ation on the progress achieved and difficulties encountered in 
setting up the European Monetary Fund proposed in the texts 
that were released after the meetings of the European Council 
in July and December 1978. 
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ANNEX I 
Preparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund 
Notes prepared by Commission departments in 1980 and 1981 
The papers in this annex were drafted in execution of the 
mandate given by the Monetary Committee on 26 February 
1980 on the study of different aspects of the transition to the 
institutional phase of the European Monetary System. Though 
they have been discussed in depth by the Alternates, they 
remain technical notes of the Commission departments. In 
accordance with the Committee's request, each topic is treated 
in a separate paper which develops the different options which 
may be envisaged. 
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The subjects studied are the following: 
(I) acceptability and convertibility/negotiability of the ECU; 
(2) the liquidity of the Fund; 
( 3) arrangements for transferring reserves to the EMF; 
( 4) consolidation of Community credits in the European 
Monetary Fund; 
(5) external role of the ECU; 
( 6) the EMF-institutional aspects. 
ANNEX I-1 
Preparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund 
- Acceptability and convertibility /negotiability of the ECU 
Contents 
I. Introduction 
1. Nature of the paper 
2. Definitions 
II. The present situation 
1. Acceptability/exclusivity 
2. Convertibility or negotiability 
111. The institutional stage of the EMS 
1. Acceptability/ exclusivity 
2. Convertibility or negotiability 
IV. implications for the Fund 
I. Introduction 
I. Nature of the paper 
The purpose of this paper is to raise some questions for 
discussion of the development of the ECU towards its full 
utilization as a reserve asset and settlement instrument as 
outlined in the Resolution of the European Council of 
5 December 1978. The approach adopted is to consider in a 
first section some particular characteristics of existing 
currencies, reserve assets and settlement instruments and to 
consider whether implications· can be drawn for the develop-
ment of the ECU. The characteristics examined are accept-
ability, exclusivity, convertibility and negotiability, chosen 
mainly because it is thought that there are limitations on the 
ECU in these areas in the existing phase of the EMS. These 
will be examined in the second section of the paper. The third 
section will examine possible developments for the next stage 
and the final section attempts to identify possible links between 
the choices to be made and the role of the Fund. 
The findings of ihis paper should be regarded as tentative both 
because the characteristics examined are not exhaustive and 
also because existing currencies and reserve assets can only 
shed some light on what qualities should be given to the ECU, 
which will necessarily be a new and to some extent different 
type of instrument, issued by an institution, the EMF, whose 
role and characteristics remain to be agreed upon. 
2. Definitions 
Within a currency area transactions are normally denominated 
and settled in the national currency, which has the qualities of 
both acceptability and exclusivity. Jn general, the national 
currency is the only instrument recognized by the law; a 
creditor must accept it in discharge of a debt. Although two 
parties could in principle agree on something else, there are in 
many countries restrictions on residents acquiring or holding 
other currencies. These concepts cannot be directly applied to 
the ECU, but it is convenient in what follows to call the degree 
to which creditors are obliged to accept ECUs in settlement, 
the degree of acceptability; and to employ the word exclusive 
when a debtor must use ECUs in settlement. 
Between currency areas there is a limited number of settlement 
instruments that are normally used. For any transaction the 
denomination and the means of payment are generally part of 
the contract, and important elements in the choice are the 
convertibility or negotiability of the instrument. As the 
meaning of the term convertibility has changed along with 
developments over time in the international monetary system, 
some definitions are necessary. Until August 1971, the US 
dollar, the major reserve currency, was said to be convertible 
because it could be officially converted through its issuing 
authority into gold at a known and fixed price. Although 
neither the dollar nor the European currencies now possess this 
quality, 1 they are still said to be convertible because, for 
eligible transactions with other currency areas, domestic 
nationals may sell their own currency to purchase the necessary 
foreign currency on an organized market but not necessarily at 
a fixed price, and foreign nationals with balances in that 
currency may sell these balances on the same market. As these 
are market rather than official transactions, the currencies 
could be said to be negotiable rather than convertible. The 
ECU will not necessarily develop into either an instrument 
exactly like the dollar was nor with all the characteristics of 
existing currencies. In transposing these concepts to the ECU 
in what follows the word convertibility will be reserved for 
transactions through the Fund: and the word negotiability for 
transactions in ECUs between participants. 
The EMS to some extent restores the previous situation for transactions 
between the participating currencies for which price fluctuations are 
limited to a narrow band. 
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II. The present situation 
l. Acceptability/exclusivity 
In the present transitional phase, as well as being used by 
agreement between participants, the use of the ECU as a 
denominator for claims and liabilities and its use as a 
settlement and reserve instrument is prescribed in specific 
instances. Each central bank must transfer at least 20% of its 
gold and dollar holdings to the Fund. Against these transfers it 
receives ECUs which can be used as follows. When an 
intervention is made at the margin, the debtor may choose 
whether or not to activate the very short-time financing 
(VSTF}. Jf he chooses to do so, the debt is denominated in 
ECUs but settlement may be made at any time before the 
financing operation falls due in the currency of the creditor. Jf 
there is no advance repayment the creditor is not obliged to 
accept settlement by means of EC Us of an amount more than 
50% of the claim. Jn cases where the financing mechanism is 
not acth'ated, the transaction is not denominated in EC Us but 
the two banks can agree that all or some part of the settlement 
should be made in ECUs. When intra-marginal intervention 
takes place, the debtor has no right to the VSTF, but it may be 
granted with the agreement of the creditor in which case the 
above settlement rules would again apply. These types of 
transactions give rise to net ECU positions, the interest on 
which is fully settled in EC Us. The settlement arrangements 
using EC Us do not therefore involve absolute exclusivity since 
the provisions are without prejudice to other mutually agreed 
forms of se!tlement; and as indicated above acceptability is 
limited to 50% of a claim at the end of the financing period of 
the VSTF. 
2. Convertibility or negotiability 
The present arrangements for the transitional period exclude 
the possibility of ECU convertibility by the Fund into other 
reserve assets, except to the extent that swaps may be 
unwound. The initial allocation of ECU is made against three-
month swaps of gold and reserves. This system, together with 
the arrangement that the management of the assets is entrusted 
to the contributing central banks, does not allow the Fund any 
discretionary powers or control over the· reserve assets. 
Moreover, since participants may reobtain their assets by 
unwinding the swaps at two working days' notice, it is 
impossible for the Fund to convert any net ECU position by 
spot buying and selling operations. 
Subject to the restriction that the transactions should not be 
made solely with a purpose of altering the composition of 
reserves, the ECU is however negotiable between central 
banks. This implies that when two central banks agree, EC Us 
can be used in spot transactions to acquire other reserve assets 
or Community currencies, and that these currencies and assets 
can be used to acquire ECUs. 
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III. The institutional stage of the EMS 
I. Acceptability/exclusivity 
The ECU would be given the characteristics of acceptability 
and exclusivity if debts and claims between the central banks 
had to be denominated and settled in ECUs. Denomination and 
settlement are closely linked. Normally a transaction will be 
settled in the instrument in which it is denominated, although 
this is not always true and is not true in the existing 
arrangements for the VSTF. These arrangements were, 
however, substantially taken over from the previous system in 
which it was not possible for settlement to be made in EMU As 
in which the debts were denominated. In the EMS however, the 
ECU is to be fully used as a settlement instrument which can be 
taken to imply that more transactions should be denominated 
and settled in EC Us. It is not foreseen at this stage that the 
ECU itself will be usedfor interventions but it would still be 
possible for these transactions in national currencies to be 
denominated in ECU, as they would be if they were to pass 
through the Fund. 
For acceptability, it is necessary to specify not only the type of 
obligation requiring settlement but also the extent to which a 
participating bank is obliged to accept ECU. In the present 
system, as seen above, there is a 50% lower acceptance limit on 
each settlement. Consideration could also be given to other 
percentages or the abandoning of all limits as well as to 
different types of limits. An example of the latter is full 
acceptance until a central bank holds more than a given 
percentage of its reserves in EC Us. 
It is evident that a monetary instrument cannot usefully be 
given the qualities of exclusivity and acceptability if its supply 
is not regulated. The monopoly power of central banks is 
closely connected with their responsibilities for their currency. 
The implication for the ECU is that questions of exclusivity 
and-acceptability cannot be determined without reference to 
the way in which it is created, its supply regulated and the 
facilities by which participants may obtain more either through 
credit from the Fund or through transactions with other 
participants. Important elements in these topics are the 
convertibility/negotiability of the ECU to which tl,is note now 
turns. 
2. Convertibility or negotiability 
There are two basic approaches to the questions of how 
participants can acquire more EC Us when needed or exchange 
EC Us for other reserve assets when they consider that they 
hold too many ECUs. One is that these transactions should be 
made mainly through the Fund by emphasizing the convert-
ibility of the ECU through its issuing authority. The other is 
that the transactions should be made mainly with other 
participants, i.e. by putting the emphasison negotiability. The 
two approaches are, however, not mutually exclusive. The 
following considerations should be taken into account in 
considering the correct balance between the approaches. 
The negotiability approach would imply that participants 
would rely predominantly on each other rather than on the 
Fund for acquiring more ECU or for disposing of ECU in case 
it was thought that net balances in either direction were too 
large. With this approach considerations of what assets can be 
acquired against a positive position or used to replenish stocks 
of ECU and the rules and conditions under which it can be done 
are relatively unimportant beyond the parties concerned when 
transactions are voluntary. If there are two central banks 
willing to make the transaction there would seem to be no 
purpose in restricting them. The principal question to be asked 
about the approach is whether the 'market', which at this stage 
is composed only of the participating central banks, is large 
enough relative to the supply of EC Us to ensure that the ECU 
is sufficiently negotiable to be a fully usable asset. It is also 
worth noting that with this approach the yield characteristics of 
the ECU become very important because, with its value being 
fixed by a formula, changing its attractiveness depends upon 
varying the xield. It will not be used in a negotiability approach 
if it is either too attractive or not attractive enough as it will not 
be possible to find two willing sides to a transaction. 
In the case that it was thought that the 'market' composed only 
of the participants was too restricted it would be possible to 
supplement negotiability with a designation scheme. In this 
case, when a participant required dollars, it could call on the 
Fund to raise them from the other members. This could be done 
through a designation plan. Once a key had been agreed upon, 
participants would be required to supply dollars. The key could 
either be prespecified or determined on an ad hoe basis 
according to circumstances. For the former, experience with 
the !MF would suggest that the procedure risks being rather 
rigid; whereas for the latter, the Fund would have to have 
powers to impose its decisions on participants. This type of 
scheme would be available in cases where a participant could 
show that it had a need/or dollars. In a regional scheme, it is 
possible that the prm'ision of dollars under a designation plan 
could pose difficulties for the participants at a time when the 
Fund's holdings of dollars had not been tapped. In such cases, it 
would then be possible for the Fund to use its own resources to 
supply dollars on a temporary basis. In a later stage, if the 
international role of the ECU is developed, this possibility 
could be extended through operations in which non-EEC 
monetary authorities acquired ECUs against their own 
currencies or other reserve assets. 
ECU convertibility through the Fund raises two important 
issues: (i) into what should the ECU be convertible and with 
what ECUs can be acquired, and (ii) according to what rules 
and conditions? 
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(i) In the existing system each participant acquires an initial 
allocation of ECUs against gold and dollars through the 
swap operations. For the next phase it will be necessary to 
consider arrangements for issues against these and other 
reserve assets and also perhaps for allocations against 
national currency. The way in which any subsequent EC Us 
can be acquired through the Fund will be influenced by 
these arrangements. For example, if the original arrange-
ments involve all banks transferring a similar proportion of 
their contributions in gold, so that exchange risks are 
equalized, any subsequent acquisitions of ECUs would 
require a transfer of the same proportion of gold if the 
exchange risk position was not to be changed. The degree 
to which excess balances of ECUs can be converted into 
reserve assets could also be influenced by the way in which 
the initial allocation of ECUs was created. Furthermore, 
convertibility into gold would be likely to raise many 
problems such as those regarding any conditions based on 
need ( see below). Convertibility into dollars raises the 
questions of whether the Fund has enough in a sufficiently 
liquid form, and if not, how it can use, either through selling 
or by borrowing against, any other of its assets ( especially 
gold) to supplement its dollar holdings. This is of course 
linked with the question of the way in which assets are 
transferred to the Fund. 
(ii) Two types of conditions can be considered, quantitative or 
qualitative. With quantitative type conditions, participants 
would have the right to convert other reserves into ECUs 
when their ECU holdings fell below a certain percentage, 
and to convert EC Us into other reserves when their ECU 
holdings rose above a certain percentage. The two 
percentages should neither be the same nor be permanently 
fixed. With qualitative type conditions.participants would 
have the right to convert ECUs into reserve assets or vice 
versa when they could show that the transaction was 
Justified by need, defined in some way. Whether the 
conditions are qualitative or quantitative the role of the 
Fund remains to be determined. For quantitative con-
ditions if the percentages are fixed, and for qualitative 
conditions if the criteria are prespecified, the Fund's role is 
limited to that of managing its assets to ensure a 
satisfactory rate of return and sufficient liquidity. At the 
other extreme the Fund could have extensive powers over 
varying the percentages or over specifying conditions 
depending upon circumstances. 
IV. Implications for the Fund 
The characteristics of the ECU cannot be determined in 
isolation from the role that the Fund is expected to play and the 
whole monetary environment developed by the system. Some 
implications for the ECU can be drawn from the charac-
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teristics of acceptability, exclusivity, convertibility and 
negotiability present in national currencies but these must be 
regarded as tentative because the ECU may at least for the 
foreseeable future be·dijferent in some very important ways 
from national currencies: it has a limited number of users. who 
are all official authorities, as a basket of currencies its value is 
not directly determined by supply and demand, it is not used for 
interventions, etc. 
Acceptability and exclusivity are complementary charac-
teristics related to the use of a currency within its own domain. 
The more the ECU possesses these qualities the more it will be 
equivalent to a riationa/ currency, and to the extent that the 
Fund is end<iwed with discretionary powers over ECU supply, 
the greater will be the potential of this institution to act in a way 
similar to that of a national central bank. The important issue 
is the domain of the ECU, i.e. the range of transactions over 
which the ECU will be used and within this the degree of 
prescriptive use. This question cannot be settled without taking 
into consideration other important characteristics of the ECU 
104 
like its va/uatiOn and yield as well as its convertibility or 
negotiability. 
Convertibility and negotiability are to some extent alternatives 
and so a choice has to be made over the degree of emphasis to be 
given to one or the other. This choice has important 
implications both for the Fund and for the ECU. With a 
convertibility-type approach the question has to be settled as to 
whether the Fund has the power to set and vary the 
( quantitative or qualitative) rules or whether these are 
prespecified and fixed. In the case that they are fixed the 
Fund's powers are limited to surveillance and to managing its 
assets. The Fund's degree of control over the quantity and use 
of the ECU is also influenced by the extent to which 
participants have the right to convert ECUs. With the 
convertibility approach therefore any possible powers confer-
red to the Fund over the control of ECU supply would be 
limited by prefixing rules for automatic convertibility. A 
negotiability approach could be compatible with a swap system 
if the Fund could mobilize the reserves by some designation 
plan. To the extent that ECUs cannot be exchanged for reserve 
assets not restricted to regional use, it would, however, increase 
the importance of any powers that the Fund has to determine 
the quantity of ECUs in circulation. 
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Introduction 
Generally speaking, a financial institution's liquidity relates to 
its ability to meet its liabilities on demand or at an agreed date; 
it is therefore dependent both on the quality of its assets and the 
maturity profile of its assets and liabilities alike. 
In the context of the EMF, the concept of liquidity should be 
assessed in the light of the system's special characteristics. 
When used as an instrument of settlement between participants 
in the EMS, the ECU does not pose any direct liquidity 
problem for the Fund, since an ECU settlement is simply an 
accounting exercise, namely transfer by the Fund, in its books, 
of ECU liabilities vis-a-vis one central bank to another. The 
operation does not in itself involve a call on the Fund's assets. 
However. as well as being a regional settlement instrument, the 
ECU is a reserve asset, and reserves are normally held as a 
cushion against any payment imbalances. not merely those 
arising out of intra-Community operations. Since the ECU is 
acceptable in the settlement of debt only within the EMS, any 
solution adopted with a view to acquiring other, more widely 
used assets against ECUs could co,ifront the Fund with a 
liquidity problem since, in certain circumstances, it would be 
obliged to repurchase its liabilities against· its assets. The 
extent of this obligation will depend largely on the choice made 
in the matter of the convertibility and negotiability of the ECU. 
If the ECU were convertible, and if the Fund were obliged to 
exchange it for other assets, a liquidity problem could arise. 
If the ECU were negotiable, there could be no demand on the 
Fund's assets from holders of its liability and hence, strictly 
speaking, no liquidity problem. In this case, the question would 
then be whether the 'market' formed by the participating 
central banks ( and, possibly, by associated central banks) was 
wide and flexible enough to ensure that the ECU was 
sufficiently negotiable to be a fully utilizahle asset.' The ECU's 
negotiability could be supplemented by a designation formula 
and by temporary mobilization with the Fund. Here too, if the 
Fund were obliged to lend some of its assets to members who 
wished to mobilize their ECU assets temporarily, a liquidity 
problem might arise, even though it would he temporary and 
less acute. 
Below we examine these two cases in turn, although obviously 
the convertible ECU is dealt with in more detail. 
I. Liquidity and convertibility 
In the case of a convertible ECU, the Fund's liquidity 
requirement would be determined, first, by the demand for 
converting EC Us into reserve assets and, second, by the Fund's 
ability to supply the assets required. 
A. Conversion demand 
The demand for conversion would depend on the following 
factors: 
I. Total volume of ECUs outstanding 
Since all ECUs, whether issued against reserves or against 
credit operations, will have the same characteristics, the 
maximum potential conversion demand will be well below the 
total volume of EC Us outstanding. It will partly depend on the 
distribution of surpluses and deficits within the EMS, and also 
on the balance of payments of the Community as a whole with 
the rest of the world. Potential conversion demand will 
therefore vary over a period with circumstances, but the Fund 
will naturally have to conduct its affairs in such a way as to be 
able. easily to satisfy all potential demand. 
2. Degree of convertibility of the ECU 
The second factor affecting the Fund's liquidity is the degree of 
convertibility of the ECU.2 
There are two possible alternatives: 
(i) convertibility on demand or convertibility in case of need: 
the right to convert ECUs may be unconditional or 
As discussed in the paper' Acceptability and convertibility/negotiability of 
the ECU' (Annex 1-1). 
2 This document discusses only the convertibility of the ECU within the 
Community; the problems arising in connection with ECU holdings built 
up by other hOlders are dealt with in Annex 1-5 on the external role of the 
ECU. 
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subject either to the existence of need arising from 
balance-of-payments difficulties, or to other rules to he 
agreed. Existence of such a need could he recognized with 
full benefit of" the doubt being given or could he 
challenged. The right to convertibility might also be made 
dependent on whether or not ECU assets exceeded a 
predetermined threshold defined either as a proportion of 
the iniJial allocation or as a percentage of total reserves; 
( ii) convertibility subject to predetermined rules or insistence 
on the general principle of Fund responsibility: 
under the first solution, the emphasis is on the right of 
conversion for holders of ECUs or on the limits to these 
rights; the second solution places emphasis on the 
responsibility of the Fund for the smooth working of the 
system, including the quality of the ECU as a duly 
mobilizable reserve instrument. 
3. Attractiveness of the ECU 
A convertible ECU would entitle, but not oblige, a holder of this 
instrument to obtain other reserve assets. Whether or not this 
right is actually exercised will depend mainly on the 
attractiveness of the ECU, which itself is dependent on a 
variety of factors, such as its acceptability, its movement 
against the dollar, its remuneration and the fact that the ECU 
is the monetary expression of a region in the process of 
integration. 
B. The Fund's ability to satisfy the demand for assets 
First, it is important to determine the assets into which the 
ECU could be converted. Liquidity is not the same as solvency, 
and the Fund might possess assets which do not correspond to 
its members' needs. Thus, if ECU convertibility were to be used 
to satisfy the need to finance an external deficit, the participant 
in question would want to convert his EC Us into dollars and not 
into gold. Then again, even if ECU convertibility were 
introduced in order to prevent an excessive accumulation of 
EC Us, this formula would also have to take account of the 
needs flowing from any external imbalances. 
In the light of the above considerations, a convertible ECU 
would impose on the Fund the burden of providing priman1y 
dollars. The Fund's ability to satisfy any demand for dollars 
would depend mainly on: 
( a) the size of the Fund's dollar holdings. 
Under the present arrangements for transferring reserves 
to it, the Fund holds close on 80% of its assets in gold and 
only 20% in dollars; · 
( h) the Fund's ability to dispose of its assets. 
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A convertible ECU is feasible only if reserves are 
transferred to the Fund in such a way that the Fund enjoy.s 
full control over all or some of its assets, including the right 
of sale; 
( c) the possibilities of acquiring new dollar assets. 
In theory, these would include: 
(i) the sale of gold against dollars. 
This possibility will depend on the formula adopted 
for the transfer of gold in the Fund. However, even if 
the Fund enjoyed full control over its gold assets, it 
would probably be as reluctant as its members to sell 
them; 
(ii) mobilization of its assets. 
The Fund could conclude swap agreements with the 
Federal Reserve, and by activating them, temporarily 
mobilize its assets; 
(iii) borrowing directly from countries in surplus and 
borrowing on the Eurodollar market. 
The source, the form and the maturity of such 
borrowing would have to be consistent with the 
prospects for reconstituting the Fund's stock of 
dollars; 
(iv) new transfers of reserves to the Fund. 
Such new transfers could take place under rules 
requiring the maintenance of a minimum percentage 
of reserves with the Fund, as is the case at present, 
under an obligation to reconstitute ECU assets or 
under a designation formula allowing the Fund to 
purchase dollars from its members against ECUs. 
This would not always be possible, however, par-
ticularly if the Fund's liquidity problems arose from 
excessive creation of ECUs. 
II. Liquidity and negotiability 
In the case of a negotiable ECU, the conversion of EC Us into 
dollars would not, in theory, be the responsibility of the Fund 
but would essentially be a matter for the participants in the 
EMS. The Fund could, however, contribute to the proper 
functioning of this system by placing at its members' disposal 
the dollars they required. These dollars could be supplied by 
other participants through the Fund according to a designation 
formula or by the Fund directly if members were allowed to 
mobilize their ECUs through its offices. This would be 
tantamount to the Fund lending its dollars temporarily 
according to a formula to be determined (e.g. dollar-ECU 
swaps}. 
Use of this mobilization facility could present the Fund with a 
liquidity problem, depending on the extent of its mobilization 
obligation. As distinct from the problem of liquidity that arises 
with a convertible ECU, this problem would be temporary since 
the Fund would merely be engaging in a lending operation; 
moreover, it would be less serious and less likely to arise. 
In this context. since priority ought to be given to the smooth 
working of the EMS, the Fund would, in the management of its 
assets, have to take account not only of the yield on its portfolio 
but also of the need to maintain a certain margin of liquidity in 
the interests of its members. 
III. Conclusions 
The matter of liquidity cannot be considered independently of 
the choices to be made as regards convertibility or negotiability 
of the ECU. It would also be closely linked to the arrangements 
for transferring reserves to the Fund and to regulation of the 
issue and circulation of ECUs. 
If the ECU were to be negotiable rather than convertible, the 
liquidity problem would be replaced by a management problem. 
Annex 1-2 
In the case of a convertible ECU, the Fund's liquidity would 
depend on its ability to satisfy the demand for conversion of its 
liability, the ECU, into more commonly used international 
reserve assets. The main factors affecting the Fund's liquidity 
would be: 
(i) the attractiveness of the ECU in relation to other assets; 
(ii) the quantity of ECUs created; 
(iii) the terms on which conversion took place; 
(iv) the types of asset into which conversion would be 
guaranteed; 
( v) the ability of the Fund to acquire further amounts of these 
assets. 
It should also be noted that, as the ECU becomes established as 
a means of settlement and international reserve asset, the 
potential demand for assets other than the £CU-mainly 
dollars-will tend to fall relative to the Fund's total balance 
sheet, thereby reducing the threats to the Fund's liquidity. 
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Introduction 
( a) Transfer of reserves under the existing system 
Under the existing system, the central banks transfer to the 
EMCF 20"/o of their gold assets and 20% of their dollar assets 
in the form of three-month swaps against EC Us. It has been 
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agreed that these swaps will be renewed until 13 March 1983 
unless transition to the institutional phase before that date 
leads to the adoption of another transfer formula. Any volume 
or price adjustments needed are made at each quarterly 
renewal. On 13 March 1983, if no unanimous decision to the 
contrary has been taken, the swaps will be unwound. 
This system is marred by serious limitations, notably the 
following: 
(i} the fact that the system reverts to its starting point at the 
end of the transitional period tends to make the existence 
of the ECU precarious; 
(ii) the quarterly value adjustments, and in particular those 
carried out for ECUs created against gold swaps, have 
produced substantial automatic variations in ECU 
liquidity; 
(iii) the transfer of reserves is not definitive; 
(iv) the EMCF plays a passive role and has no discretionary 
power either over the amount of EC Us created or over the 
use of reserves deposited with it. 
These limitations are not compatible with the full utilization of 
the ECU as a reserve asset and a means of settlement as had 
· been laid down by the European Council of 5 December 1978 
for the institutional phase of the EMS. 
(b) Transfer of reserves in the institutional phase 
It must first be stressed that the different formulae for 
transferring reserves to the EMF cannot be looked at in 
abstracto; the basis must be the solutions envisaged for a whole 
range of more general problems relating more particularly to 
the Junctions of the Fund and to the characteristics of the 
ECU.' 
However, the different assumptions possible in this connection 
have one feature in common: they all lead to the idea of 
'permanence' for the transfers of reserves to the Fund. The 
following considerations are behind this conclusion, those of: 
(i) etting up a permanent ECU system with no automatic and 
parallel increase in liquidity; 
(ii) enabling the Fund to help finance and adjust the 
disequilibria which exist between the Community and the 
rest of the world; 
See 'The EMF: institutional aspects' - Annex I-6, 'Acceptability and 
convertibility/negotiability of the ECU' - Annex 1-1. 
(iii) providing the Fund with a guarantee v1s-a-v1s third 
parties; this would be necessary should the Fund be 
authorized to contract loans on the international capital 
market and if ECU holdings were built up by other official 
holders. 
Below, we deal first with the various formulae for initial 
transfer; we then discuss the problems connected with the 
periodic adjustment in the volume of these transfers, and end by 
considering the questions raised by the return on the ECU. 
I. Formulae for initial transfer 
A. Retention of the swap system in a modified fonn 
The first question to ask is the following: could the swap 
system as it operates at the moment be modified sufficiently to 
remedy its deficiencies? The idea has been mooted in this 
context thdt the swaps be accompanied by a renewal 
obligation, until an agreement has been reached on a definitive 
formula/or transferring reserves. The precarious nature of the 
ECU could be reduced without, however, implying a definitive 
surrender of reserves. 
Consideration might also be given to either a 'freeze' on the 
gold and dollar price for the duration of the system, while 
retaining the volume adjustment, or non-automatic dis-
cretionary acfjustments to either the volume alone or to volume 
and prices. A midway solution might be to reduce the frequency 
of the price adjustment. 
In a 'closed pool' context, the reverse procedure might also be 
contemplated: price adjustments would no longer be reflected 
in the amount of ECUs outstanding but in the volume of 
reserves swapped. This method would have the effect of 
imposing a tight ceiling on the overall amount of ECUs 
outstanding. 
Even so, introduction of a modified swap arrangement would 
not resolve the problem of the permanent nature of the ECU. 
This is because the swaps would have to be unwound at the time 
of the changeover to a definitive system. The prospect of the 
Fund reverting to its starting point would not completely 
eliminate the precarious nature of the ECU and the Fund would 
have control over its assets only to the extent of holding them 
itself in the form of swaps. The situation would, in principle, be 
different if it were agreed at the outset to consolidate the ECU 
positions when the changeover to a definitive arrangement took 
place. A commitment of this kind would, however, be difficult 
to reconcile with the actual concept of a 'swap'. 
Annex 1-3 
B. Definitive surrender of reserves transferred to the Fund 
The gold and dollar reserves would be definitively surrendered 
to the Fund, which would have full control over them. ' This 
could take .place by sale/purchase, although other legal 
formulae are also possible. 
( a) Transformation of present swaps into the sale of reserves 
to the Fund 
The purchase of reserves against ECUs by the Fund is an 
operation similar to that carried out by a central bank when it 
issues its currency by, for example, purchasing foreign 
currencies on the exchange markets. Both operations are 
definitive and irreversible. The bank becomes the owner of the 
assets purchased and, unless the operation in question resulted 
from an intervention at the bilateral limits in accordance with 
the EMS exchange rate mechanism, it is not required to buy 
back its currency. Likewise, the Fund, after selling ECUs 
against reserves, would become the owner of these reserves in 
exchange for EC Us definitively acquired by their purchasers; 
this arrangement would result in the setting-up of a permanent 
ECU system. 
This formula calls for the following comments: 
( i) By the sale, the central banks would definitively ,~rrender 
a fraction of their reserves to the Fund. For some of them 
this solution would have the disadvantage of severing, too 
sharply, all links with the gold which had been sur-
rendered. In any event, they would all have to be sure of 
acquiring in return for the definitive transfer of assets, an 
asset with similar characteristics, including the one of 
being itself fully and easily usable and exchangeable 
against other assets. The sale would give the EMF full 
control over its assets, so that the Fund would be able 
· - but not obliged - to confer a measure of convertibility 
on the ECU. 
(ii) By the sale, transferors of gold and dollars would be 
passing over to the Fund the risk of losses or gains 
resulting from variations in the price of the surrendered 
assets. Then again, if the arrangements laid down in 1978 
at Bremen were to be adopted/or reserve transfers to the 
Fund, the central banks would be contributing in differing 
proportions, to the constitution of the Fund's gold and 
dollar assets, and consequently, they would also be 
contributing in differing proportions to the Fund's income 
and to the return on the ECU to the extent that the Fund 
distributed its income between all the ECUs. 
The transfer Of other reserve assets (SDRs) is not discussed, but this is a 
problem on which a decision would have to be taken. 
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(b) Transfer of gold and dollars in standard proportions 
It is conceivable that, while the 20%figure would be .retained 
for calculating transfers, this figure would no longer apply to 
gold and dollars separately but to the whole of the reserves 
(gold and dollars) of each participant, expressed in ECU. 
With each participant's overall contribution having thus been 
determined, a standard percentage would be fixed indicating 
the share of the transfer to be made in gold. With this transfer 
technique, some countries would have to add to their gold 
transfer and reduce their dollar transfer, while other countries 
would be in the reverse situation. The result would be changes in 
the composition of national reserves; the scale of the changes 
would depend on the key used. 
The advantage of this formula over the one discussed above is 
that it would establish for each participant equality between his 
share in the constitution of the Fund's assets and his share in the 
Fund's income. But this advantage would be temporary, in that 
the application of this solution, in the event of subsequent 
transfers of reserves, would pose considerable problems. 
C. Ad hoe fonnulae based on the specific character of gold 
assets 
Given the specific problems linked to the tranifer of gold, it 
seemed useful to examine the alternative options for transfer-
ring gold to the Fund I which leave the transferor of gold with 
rights over his transfer. In each of these cases, dollar transfers 
would take the form of a surrender pure and simple. 
( a) Transfer of gold as capital 
Under this formula, gold transfers made by the central banks 
would represent participation in the Fund's capital. The 
transferor of gold would receive a title of ownership, not 
transferable, expressed in gold weight, and not a means of 
settlement. The Fund would also allocate simultaneously to the 
participating central banks an amount of money in ECUs 
proportionate to their capital participation; these EC Us would 
be permanent in character. In order to maintain the accounting 
equilibrium of the EMF's balance sheet, the latter operation, 
which would increase the Fund's liabilities, would require the 
entry of an equivalent amount. on the assets side. 
This formula thus consists of two separate, albeit coordinated 
operations: a transfer of reserves as capital and the creation ex 
nihilo of a quantity of ECUs which might be equal to, or 
different from, the countervalue of the reserves transferred. 
The retention of swaps for gold transfers alone could also be regarded as 
an ad hoe formula, but this would not really eliminate the precarious 
nature of the ECU. 
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At first sight, the advantage of this formula would be that each 
participant would retain a right of recovery over the assets 
transferred to the Fund, and that the profits from any 
reJ1aluation would be reserved for that participant. 
On closer examination, however, the situation is not so clear-
cut. 
(i) The holder of a title representing a participation in capital 
can, in theory, exercise his right only if the organization is 
wound up. In the event of the Fund being wound up, the 
claim would be exercised over the net assets of the Fund; 
there would therefore be no guarantee that the initial 
deposit of gold would be recovered. 
(ii) The guarantee of recovery also depends on the extent of 
the Fund's control over the assets received as capital. This 
is a grey area. According to the reasoning behind the 
'capital' formula, the Fund could lend its assets, i.e. 
contribute to mobilization of the ECU, but ;.,,ould not be 
able to ensure its convertibility since the latter operation 
could be interpreted as an indirect recovery by the 
participants of their capital contribution. It could here be 
argued that this would not be the case, however, where a 
participant wished to convert EC Us accumulated over and 
above his initial allocation. Because of the difficulties of 
interpretation raised by the question of the extent of the 
Fund's control over its assets, there would seem to be a 
need for the 'capital' formula, in any event, to be 
supplemented by precise statutory clauses. 
(iii) The link between participation in the capital and the 
creation of money in ECUs should be clarified. More than 
one hypothesis is possible: 
- ECU issue equal to the entire capital; money creation 
would occur to the extent that the capital was not fully 
paid up; 
- ECU issue independent of the amount of capital; the 
Fund would have the right to decide, depending on 
circumstances, on the amount of ECV to be created. 
(b) Gold transfer against issues of mobilizable certificates of 
deposit 
The gold transfer would give rise to the issue of a non-interest-
bearing certificate of deposit, expressed in gold weight; the 
risks on gold would continue to be borne by the depositing 
central bank. 
For the certificate of deposit to be converted into an instrument 
of settlement- the ECU - it would have to be mobilized; at 
the holder's request, the Fund would 'rediscount' the gold 
certificate. This mobilization, which could be automatic and 
for an indeterminate period, would entail the payment of 
interest. Being a liquid instrument, the gold certificate would be 
recorded as a reserve asset in central bank balance sheets while 
the gold deposited would be shown among the Fund's assets. 
This option, while ensuring that the gold was mobilized, would 
reserve for the transferor of gold the profits from any 
revaluation. 
However, since it would only be the holder of the gold, the Fund 
could not release it: this could have implications for the Fund's 
liquidity assuming that it had to ensure a fairly high degree of 
ECU convertibility. 
This solution would also mean that the creation of ECUs 
against gold would keep pace with the mobilization of these 
certificates. As a result, the volume of ECUs created at the 
start of the final phase would be smaller than the amount in 
circulation at the end of the transitional period, unless there is a 
substantial ( and perhaps temporary) increase in the propor-
tion of dollar transfers. Although this formula achieves a 
relatively satisfactory solution with regard to the return, it does 
not lead to a genuine transfer of reserves. For this reason, it 
might be agreed that the participants would have the right to 
convert gold certificates into a definitive surrender. Such an 
operation would have to be done collectively at an agreed time, 
if it is considered necessary to avoid any problems that might 
arise from the coexistence of several formulae for the transfer 
of gold. 
(c) Transfer of gold with preservation of rights over 
rel'aluation profits 
Under this option, the transfer of gold against EC Us would be 
accompanied by the preservation of a right to the profit from 
any revaluation of the gold. Since the Fund would pay interest 
on all EC Us held by the participants, and since gold does not 
produce interest, each member country would have to pay back 
compensatory interest on its share of ECUs received against 
gold. 
Like the previous formula, this form of transfer would not 
amount to a definitive transfer; it would pose scarcely any 
accounting problems. Nor would it show up a reduction in the 
amount of EC Us outstanding at the time of transition to the 
institutional phase. 
II. Links to be established between the volume 
of reserves transferred to the Fund and the 
stock of ECUs outstanding 
Under the present system, participants are required to keep at 
least 20% of the volume of their gold and dollar reserves 
permanently with the EMCF. This means that, when the 
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participants recOrd an increase in their reserves after the initial 
deposit, there is an obligation for them to make further 
transfers; in the opposite case, they would receive a refund. 
The adjustment in the volume of the reserves deposited and, 
consequently, the stock of EC Us outstanding takes place when 
the swaps are renewed each quarter. 
In the institutional phase, several formulae can be considered 
for new transfers and the final choice will be influenced by the 
method of transfer used initially and by the option chosen as 
regards the control of ECU creation. The possible formulae are 
based on the following principles: 
A. Retention of volume adjustment 
The retention of the existing formula for adjusting the volume 
of reserves transferred would continue to link the stock of 
ECUs outstanding to changes in the participants_' gold assets 
and to their exchange rate policy vis-3.-vis third currencies; it 
would involve agreement on the price at which the new transfers 
were made. Consequently, the rate of ECU creation, as well as 
the rate of new transfers of reserves, would continue to be 
highly automatic in character. Assuming a convertible ECU, 
this formula would be something of a brake on the conversion of 
EC Us on the sole gounds of reserve diversification. 
B. Imposition of a ratio for ECU holdings 
Instead of the requirement to keep a minimum percentage of 
reserves ( gold and dollars) with the Fund, participants would 
be required to hold a certain percentage of their reserves in the 
form of ECUs. Such a rule would establish a degree of 
parallelism between the use of the ECU and the use of national 
reserves. From this point of view, it would moderate the 
possible convertibility of the ECU as, when a participant's 
ECU holdings fell to the level determined by the ratio, any 
conversions of ECUs would have to be accompanied by a 
proportional reduction in the reserves held on own account by 
the participant in question. However, this rule would inhibit the 
use of the ECU for Community settlements since it would 
require the user to reconstitute them. Although the period for 
reconstitution could, by agreement, vary in length, the effect of 
such a rule would be to make the ECU more like a credit 
instrument than an instrument of settlement. 
C. Non-automatic subsequent transfers 
In this case, there would be no subsequent automatic transfers. 
They would either be decided collectively by the Fund 
authorities or made, with the agreement of the Fund, on the 
initiative of the participants who wished to reconstitute or to 
increase their ECU assets. This practice would be the one most 
compatible with an effective control of ECU liquidity. 
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III. The return payable on the ECU and the 
various formulae for transferring reserves 
A close link exists between the problem of the return payable 
and the problem of transferring reserves. The return on the 
ECU is in essence a distribution of the Fund"s income; the level 
of this income, as well as the amount of ECU liabilities on 
which a return had to be paid, depends on which of the various 
transfer formulae is chosen. 
The return payable on the Fund's ECU liabilities is one of the 
factors which will determine the attractiveness of this 
instrument as a reserve asset. The return would be paid in 
ECUs. 
Without embarking on inflationary ECU creation, the return 
payable on the Fund's ECU liabilities as a whole can in no way 
be greater than the income obtained by the Fund on its own 
assets, i.e. the reserve assets transferred by the participants and 
the credits granted by the Fund. In other words, with regard to 
yield, the ECU cannot be better than the assets backing it. 
Within the limits of its own income, the Fund will be able to 
modify the return on the ECU. However, its power to influence 
its income is more restricted: it is non-existent as regards 
revaluation gains and very limited for dollar income, but the 
interest rates for the credits granted (Community credits, 
mobilization of gold certificates) are fixed discretionally by 
the Fund. 
The main questions raised by the distribution of the Fund's 
income, and consequently the return payable on the ECU, are 
the following: 
(i) What income will the Fund possess and what will be the 
amount of liabilities on which a return has to be paid? 
( ii) Given the heterogeneous nature of the assets transferred to 
the Fund against EC Us, how could the income arising from 
these different kinds of assets be fairly redistributed by the 
Fund in the form of a return which ought to be identical/or 
all ECUs? 
The answers provided by the different transfer formulae are 
briefly reviewed below. 
I. Sale of gold and dollars against EC Us 
Under this formula, the Fund would possess the following types 
of resources: 
( i) current income: interest received on dollar investments and 
on credits granted to members; 
(ii) potential gains ( or losses): gold or dollar revaluation 
profits. 
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The return paid on the ECU would be relatively low ifit were to 
be based on the Fund's current income alone ( interest received 
on its dollar investments and on its loans). This return might, 
however, be considered satisfactory if it were borne in mind 
that the ECU enabled a relatively illiquid, non-interest-bearing 
asset, i.e. gold, to be mobilized. 
A higher return could be paid if not only current income but 
also the revaluation profits on the Fund's gold and dollar assets 
were taken into account. 
If the return were topped up in this way, this would presuppose 
( a) that there were capital gains on the assets transferred 
(which will depend on the transfer prices of the gold and dollars 
and on subsequent changes in them) and (b) that agreement 
has been reached on the arrangements for realizing and 
distributing these capital gains. If the Fund were to effect 
payment of the return in ECUs, the problem arises, in 
connection with the equilibrium of its balance sheet, of the 
contra-entry on the assets side for some portion of the interest 
paid. Several solutions can be envisaged: 
( i) the Fund would make these interest payments by imputing 
purely accounting gains. Such a formula, which would not 
involve realizing such gains, could in particular be adopted 
in the event of an official price/or gold being reintroduced, 
or of the central banks regularizing rates; in this system, 
the payment of a return in ECUs would result in the 
Fund's liabilities being inflated against assets which were 
unchanged in volume but revalued in value; 
(ii) the Fund would realize its capital gains by the sale of gold 
and dollars to the participants. It would acquire the ECUs 
needed to pay the return; the effect of this formula would 
be to reduce the volume of the Fund's assets, while leaving 
the stock of ECU outstanding unchanged; 
(iii) the Fund would realize its capital gains by the sale of gold 
.and dollars on the market. In this case, the Fund would 
acquire Community or third CZJrrencies against which 
ECUs would be created when the return was paid. 
Whatever the formula adopted for this payment, the continuity 
of a high remuneration on the ECU cannot be assured in all 
circumstances and the Fund's solvency would require the 
participants to guarantee the Fund against a turn-round in the 
situation, i.e. against capital losses. It therefore follows that a 
distribution of interest payments to the Member States is liable 
to involve them in incurring expenditure at a later stage. 
2. Transfer of gold as capital 
Should the Fund create ECU ex nihilo, in parallel with 
transfers of gold as capital, the return payable on these EC Us 
would have to·be the same as that payable on ECU created in 
other ways. As in the case of the formula discussed above, 
distribution of the Fund's current income alone would provide a 
low return on the ECUs. If. moreover, any exchange-rate 
profits on the gold capital were reserved for the shareholders 
alone, their distribution would not represent a topping up of the 
return on the EC Us. Large transferors of gold would receive a 
return on the EC Us created ex nihilo, while retaining a right to 
the revaluation profit on their gold transfer. For their part, 
participants who had made a greater transfer of dollars - an 
asset whose income and exchange rate gains would be spread 
over all the ECU - would be at a disadvantage. 
3. Transfer of gold against issues of mobilizable certificates of 
deposit 
The gold certificates would not constitute ECUs; con-
sequently, no return would be paid on them. As a result, the 
Fund's obligation to pay a return would be limited, at the 
outset, to the ECUs it had created against the acquisition of 
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assets generati'ng current income ( dollars and Community 
loans). Since interest would have to be paid on the creation of 
additional ECUs by the mobilization of gold certificates, the 
Fund's income would be sufficient, in any event.for ii to pay a 
relatively high return on the ECUs. 
4. Transfer of gold with preservation of rights over revaluation 
profits 
The transfer of gold would give rise to the immediate creation 
of EC Us on which the Fund would be required to pay the same 
return as on ECUs created in other ways. However, gold 
transferors would have to pay the Fund interest in order to 
reserve any revaluation profits for themselves alone. This 
would give the Fund substantial current income. The 
accounting implications of this formula are comparable to 
those of solution 3 above since all the gold certificates would 
have been permanently mobilized. 
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Preparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund 
- Consolidation of Community credits in the European Monetary Fund 
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Introduction 
This note analyses the consolidation of the credit mechanisms 
in the Fund. It does not prejudge the range of mechanisms to be 
included in such consolidation, either from the start of the 
institutional phase or at a later stage depending on the way in 
which the EMS develops. 
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The note begins by recalling the main characteristics of the 
mechanisms in force and the EMCF's role in these mechan-
isms. It then goes on to analyse the possible role of the Fund in 
the consolidation of these mechanisms; lastly, it comments on 
some of the major problems which such consolidation would 
raise. 
I. Role of the EMCF in the mechanisms in force 
Under the present credit system, the. EMCF's role varies 
according to the type of credit, but, in any event, its role is a 
minor one. 
I. Very short-term financing 
This is not strictly speaking a credit at all, but a reciprocal cash 
facility between central banks in the context of interventions in 
Community currencies. This type of financing is automatic and 
unlimited when it relates to interventions made at the 
fluctuation margins, such interventions themselves being 
obligatory and unlimited in nature. However, interventions 
within the margins are subject to agreement by the bank issuing 
the currency sold; the agreement on making the currency 
available also relates to other arrangements: immediate 
settlement or recourse to very short-term financing. 
A/Jhough the system is a strictly bilateral One ( central bank 
making the currencies lent directly available to central bank, 
agreement between the parties concerned as regards intra-
marginal interventions), the EMCF fits into it as a mandatory 
but purely formal intermediary, being both creditor and debtor 
for identical amounts. It also keeps the accounts for these 
operations. 
2. Short-term monetary support 
This is a reciprocal credit system between the EEC central 
banks under which each of the members is assigned a creditor 
quota determining the proportion of support which it 
undertakes to finance and a debtor quota determining the 
amount of support which it may receive on application. This 
quota system is supplemented by non-individualized creditor 
and debtor rallonges which enable the volume of such support 
to be increased. Support, which is for a period of three months 
(renewable twice), can be obtained almost automatically and 
is unconditional within the limits of the debtor quota, but 
subject to the discretion of the Committee of Governors when 
the amount requested necessitates recourse to a rallonge. The 
creditor central banks exercise a certain power of assessment 
as to their individual ability ( balance of payments and reserves 
situation) to participate in a credit operation. The support is 
denominated in the currency actually supplied; it is de-
nominated in ECUs in the case of an operation which replaces a 
very short-term financing arrangement. 
In ralSlng the amount of short-term monetary support to 
14 OOO million ECU, the Brussels Resolution introduced the 
new concept, accepted by the central banks, of the maximum 
amount of effectively available credit: the quotas and 
rallonges were adapted accordingly. 
The role of the EMCF is limited to keeping the accounts of this 
mechanism. 
3. Medium-term financial assistance 
The Brussels Resolution set at 11 OOO million ECU the 
maximum amount of effectively available credit under this 
form of assistance: it is granted by Council decision and carries 
economic policy conditions laid down by the Council. The 
credit, which is normally granted in successive tranches, is 
denominated in ECUs and paid up in a national currency. This 
is a reciprocal credit system, but the credit is granted by the 
Member States instead of the central banks. 
The EMCF has no role in operating this mechanism. 
4. Community loans for balance-of-payments support 
This mechanism, established by specific Council decisions in 
1975, has just been modified and renewed. Its purpose is to raise 
capital, either directly from third countries and financial 
institutions, or on the capital markets, with the aim of re/ending 
the funds raised lo Member States, in order to help them 
overcome balance-of-payments difficulties directly or in-
directly related to an increase in prices of petroleum products. 
The funds lent carry economic conditions fixed by the Council. 
The outstanding amount of borrowings authorized has been set 
at 6 OOO million ECU in principal. 
The funds are borrowed by the Commission on behalf of the 
EEC after authorization by the Council. The financial 
operations pass through the accounts of the EMCF, which is 
responsible for managing the borrowings. However, the 
operations are self-balancing: the borrowing and lending 
operations are carried out on the same terms and with the same 
value dates, with the result that the EM CF is never required to 
manage cash funds. 
II. Consolidation of the credit mechanisms and 
role of the Fund 
The above exposition shows that the EMCF has no significant 
role in the Community credit mechanisms: even though it is a 
necessary intermediary for very short-term financing, this is a 
legal device of no real consequence; in fact its role is confined 
to tasks of managing the accounts, and these are, moreover, 
carried out by the agent on the Fund's behalf 
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The principle of these mechanisms, or at least some of them, 
being taken over by a Community body has been laid down by 
the following instruments: 
(i) as regards the EMCF: Article 3 of the Council Regulation 
of 3 April 1973 establishing the EMCF made the Fund 
responsible for the administration of very short-term 
financing and of short-term monetary support and for the 
regrouping of these mechanisms in a renewed mechan-
ism; 1 
(ii) as regards the EMF: the Annex to the Conclusions of the 
Presidency of the Bremen European Council provides for 
the creation of ECUs for credit purposes against the 
contribution of national currencies and for the existing 
arrangements and institutions to be consolidated in a 
European Monetary Fund. The Brussels European 
Council confirmed these conclusions, giving particular 
emphasis to short and medium-term credit. 
The term consolidation is interpreted, in this note, as the 
regrouping ~f disparate mechanisms, introduced at different 
times by different authorities, into a single and definitive 
structure. The advantages to be gained from consolidation 
would be that a more effective mechanism better suited to 
requirements would be established, the status of the ECU 
would be enhanced and the economic convergence of Member 
States would be furthered. 
( i) The transition to a system in which the Fund had a central 
role would be equivalent lo effectively putting Community 
credits on a multilateral basis. It would necessarily mean a 
revision of at least some of the rules governing the present 
mechanisms and would result in an important change in 
the nature of the system of Community credits: the 
mechanisms in force - which are, in fact, a network of 
bilateral relationships - would be replaced by a Com-
munity institution granting a range of credits in its own 
·name: the comprehensiveness of the range would depend 
on the option chosen. This would allow the duration and 
amount of credit as well as its terms to be adapted to the 
specific requirements of each Member State. 
(ii) The fact that the Fund granted credits in ECUs would 
enhance the role of the ECU as a means of settlement 
between participants in the EMS; consequently, the 
Community could gradually switch to using its reserve 
assets other than EC Us solely for external settlements. 
(iii) Through its role both on exchange markets and in defining 
the conditions attached to the credits it grants, the Fund 
could increasingly help to foster economic convergence 
between the Member States. 
This task has not been carried out. 
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A. Powers of the different types of Fund as regards credit 
Consolidation of the credit mechanisms within the EMF would 
constitute only one of- the functions attributed to this new 
institution. It is consequently clear that the decision to choose 
one or other of the credit options will flow from the 
fundamental choice which will be made between the different 
options concerning the nature and purpose of the Fund. 
Other notes addressed to the Monetary Committee have 
distinguished/our possible types for the European Monetary 
Fund: 
(i) an 'accounting' type Fund similar to the present EMCF; 
(ii} a 'central bank' type Fund, which would be assigned 
monetary powers; 
(iii) a 'regiona/JMF' type Fund, which would be essentially an 
economically-oriented institution; 
(iv) a 'sui generis' Fund: whereas in the two preceding 
options, either the monetary function or the economic 
function predominates, a 'sui generis' Fund would be 
endowed with both monetary and economic powers. 
The choice between the different types of Fund would govern 
the nature and extent of this body's power as regards credit. 
(i) The sole task of an EMCF-type Fund would be to 
administer all the mechanisms; its powers would vary 
according to the interpretation given to this administrat-
ive function which, moreover, had already been laid down 
in Article 3 of the Council Regulation of 3 April 1973 
establishing the EMCF. The powers of the EMF would 
enable it as a minimum to administer the accounts of all 
credit mechanisms, from very short-term financing to 
Community loans. 
( ii) A central bank type Fund would in its own name take over 
responsibility for the credits of a monetary nature which 
the central banks grant each other in the event of 
difficulties considered to be temporary: cash credit for 
very short-term financing, credit lasting some months for 
short-term monetary support. It could also be responsible 
for administering the accounts of the other credits. 
(iii) Under a regional !MF type Fund, very short-term 
financing would remain the responsibility of the central 
banks, ' and short and medium-term credit would be 
consolidated in a single mechanism ranging from three 
Except for the renewing of such financing which would be regarded as 
forming part of shorMerm monetary support. 
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months to five years. However, ifit were felt important to 
retain the principles at present governing these two credit 
mechanisms, the Fund would grant short-term monetary 
support to the central banks, as under the present rules; 
medium-term credit ( over one year) would be granted to 
Treasuries and would carry economic and monetary 
policy conditions. 
(iv) A 'sui generis' Fund with both economic and monetary 
powers could unify, in a homogeneous structure, all 
credits, ranging from the very short-term financing to 
medium-term financial assistance and, possibly, Com-
munity loans. These credits are complementary in purpose 
but up to now they have been separated and are the 
responsibility of different authorities; if they were 
consolidated, credit could, without any break in con-
tinuity, be tailored to the specific needs of each 
participant, both in terms of duration and amount and in 
terms of conditions. 
Instead of taking each of these different types of Fund in tum, 
and studying their powers as regards credit - which would be 
repetitious- we propose, in the paragraphs which follow, to 
discuss the consolidation of very short-term financing 
separately from the consolidation of the other credits. The 
problems raised by very short-term financing are different from 
the problems concerning the consolidation of the other credits 
which, whatever the option contemplated, are similar and can 
therefore be examined together. 
B. Very short-term financing 
There are two aspects to very short-term financing: the first is 
the provision of the currency requested, and the second the 
possible financing operation involved; the currency provided 
can either be settled on the spot, or be the subject of a financing 
operation. It is important to distinguish between these two 
aspects in analysing consolidation. 
1. Provision of the currency 
Two solutions are possible as regards consolidation. 
1.1. In line with current practice, the bank issuing the currency 
requested would supply it directly and compulsorily to the 
intervening bank when interventions at the margin were 
involved. It might be possible to envisage extending the 
obligation to supply national currency ( up to a certain 
amount) to intramarginal interventions justified in particular 
by a currency crossing the divergence threshold; at the request 
of the intervening central bank, these interventions would be 
the subject of a financing operation. 
1.2. Alternatively, in order to establish a genuinely mu/tilate-
ralized mechanism, the intervening central bank ought to be 
able to obtain directly from the EMF the foreign exchange 
required/or interventions, whether these were interventions at 
the margins or interventions made after the divergence 
threshold had been crossed. 
One way by which the EMF could obtain this foreign exchange 
could be through swap facilities, automatic and unlimited in 
amount, at least/or interventions at the margins, between the 
Fund and each of the Community central banks, whereas the 
present arrangements operate bilaterally between all the 
central banks concerned. 
2. Financing procedures 
A choice is also possible between two financing procedures 
depending on whether or not the Fund creates ECUs for 
financing interventions. 
2.1. In the first case, the central bank supplying the currency 
would immediately be settled in ECUs by the Fund, 1 on the 
debtor's behalf, unless the parties had agreed otherwise. The 
Fund would create the EC Us delivered to the creditor against a 
claim in ECUs on the debtor central bank. 
The proposed system would not affect the present practice 
whereby the debtor repurchases the currency sold and refunds 
it to the issuer as an advance repayment. The interest of the 
debtor would, as previously, continue to lie in limiting, as far as 
possible, the definitive loss of reserves. Only the procedure 
would be different: the debtor, having repurchased the 
currency previously sold, would exchange it against ECUs with 
the issuer; with the EC Us obtained in this way, he would clear 
his debt with the Fund. So as to reinforce the present practice of 
repurchase, it could also conceivably be extended, under the 
auspices of the Fund, to all the partners wishing, in connection 
with the ECU's negotiability, to obtain this reserve asset 
against remittance of the currency which the issuer wanted to 
Jn the proposed system, the central bank issuing the currency sold, instead 
of holding a very shorMerm claim in ECUs on the Fund, would 
immediately be settled by a transfer of ECUs which would be recorded as 
an increase in the heading 'ECU'. The outstanding amount of this heading 
could then decrease rapidly to the extent that the central bank concerned 
re-entered into possession of the national currency previously issued. 
Some central banks already group ECUs held as reserves or as claims in 
respect of very short-term financing together in their balance sheets under 
a single heading 'ECU' or 'claims on the EMCF'. For these banks, 
immediate settlement in ECUs would involve no change in the way in 
which their balance sheets were presented. But those central banks which 
now divide these operations into two separate headings in their present 
balance sheets, would have to merge them into a single heading, 'ECU'. 
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see mopped up from the market. Thus, the procedure in force 
under the present bilateral arrangements could be extended to 
all the participants in the system. 
2.2. [fit were thought that ECU creation for very short-term 
financing would not offer any real advantages over the present 
situation and would even be a source of difficulties for 
controlling the amount of the overall issue of ECU, one could 
fall back on a solution whereby the creditor acquired a claim in 
ECU on the Fund, with the debtor settling the EMF at the 
settlement date, either by remitting the currency previously 
surrendered ( and possibly repurchased in the meantime), or by 
remitting ECUs. In so far as the issuer, and not the Fund, 
supplied the currency requested, and in so far as this operation 
gave rise to a claim in ECUs instead of a settlement, a system 
would still exist under which the Fund fulfilled only a formal 
role, with the very short-term financing mechanism then 
remaining the responsibility of the central banks alone. 
2.3. Each of the two financing procedures outlined above is 
compatible with one or other of the two methods of providing 
currency, i.e. directly by the central bank (point 1.1. above) or 
indirectly through the Fund (point 1.2. above). 
C. Other financing operations 
The mechanisms involved are the following: short-term 
monetary support, medium-term financial assistance and 
possibly Community loans raised for the purpose of giving 
balance-of-payments support. 
Examination of the consolidation of these mechanisms cannot 
be confined to the questions flowing from their simple 
juxtaposition within the Fund, but extends to certain connected 
questions - in particular, the amounts, cost and duration of 
the credit. This approach must not be considered as going 
outside the problem of credit consolidation; on the contrary, it 
is justified by the concern to merge mechanisms which up to 
now have not really been linked. 
I. Financing procedures 
While starting from the principle that credits are denominated 
in EC Us, the financing procedure differs depending on whether 
the liquidity is created through the issue of ECUs or through 
the lending of existing assets: the adoption of one or other of 
these options will flow from the choice made between the 
different types of Fund. 
1.1. Financing by ECU creation 
In so far as the Fund has a role to play in the financing of 
credits, it is logical for it to finance them by means of ECUs it 
creates itself. 
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1 .2. Financing by the redistribution of existing assets 
There are several possibilities here: 
( i) redistribution of the Fund's assets. 
Under the operation, the Fund would temporarily make its 
assets available to participants; such financing would be 
carried out by putting back into circulation assets held as 
a result of the transfer of reserves; 
(ii) redistribution of central bank assets. 
This procedure would make no change to the present 
situation with regard to the financing of the various credit 
mechanisms, and the Fund would create no liquidity of its 
own: the credits, although denominated in EC Us, would 
be paid in monetary instruments which already exist 
( dollars, ECUsorSDRs) and which would be drawn from 
the reserves of the participating central banks. 
However, it should be noted that such redistribution would 
itself generate new liquidity, unless the creditor renounced 
the liquidity of his claim. This method of financing would 
mean that the concept of creditor quotas would have to be 
retained; 
(iii) redistribution of international assets. 
The Fund could make available to its members assets 
which it had its"elf borrowed, either under swap agree-
ments or on the international markets. 
2. Principles for determining the credit amounts 
The principles governing the determination of the overall or 
individual credit amount do not depend on the option chosen, 
but the solutions envisaged would differ according to whether 
or not the credit were financed by ECU creation. 
2.1. Overall credit amount 
If the Fund were to take over financing by means of ECU 
creation, this would lead to the ending of creditor quotas: since 
they determine individual contributions, they would become 
pointless. It would then be possible to fix a maximum amoum 
for the volume of credit and medium-term financial assistdnce. 
Another approach might conceivably be to determine no ceiling 
in advance for the volume of credit, which would be 
incorporated into a general ceiling set for the issue of ECUs 
whether they were created against the transfer of reserves or 
credit. This is because the danger that monetary discipline in 
the system might be weakened lies not so much in an excess of 
credit as in an excessive creation of ECUs, whatever the 
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source. In that Case, however, assuming that very short-term 
financing gave rise to immediate settlement with the creditor in 
ECUs, the ceiling should not include the volume of ECUs 
corresponding to the outstanding amount of very short-term 
financing, which should remain unlimited. If financing were 
carried out through the redistribution of the central banks' 
assets on the basis of creditor quotas, the overall amount of 
available credit would vary with the circumstances ( particular 
difficulties of potential lenders) and the borrower, while not 
excluding providing some of the credit through a rallonge as in 
the current arrangements. 
2.2. Individual credit amount 
Severa/formulae are possible, but whether or not the individual 
credit amount is determined, the potential beneficiary would in 
all cases have to be guaranteed being able, as under the present 
system, to count on a virtually automatic minimum credit 
amount. Perhaps the total individual amount might not be 
determined,for example if an amount were set for the overall 
volume of credit which could be granted by the EMF. The 
absence of a ceiling set in advance would in no way mean that a 
beneficiary could run up unlimited debt, but on the contrary 
would give the Fund discretionary power over the conditions 
and procedures for granting the credit. 
If, however, the creditor quota solution were adopted, one 
might consider whether it would not be necessary, in return, to 
assign to each Member State an overall debtor quota which 
determined the maximum ceiling on the credit which that State 
could receive. If a system of ralJonges were relained, this would 
introduce an element of flexibility. 
3. Automatic nature of the credit and discretionary power of 
the Fund 
The system at present inforcefor short-term monetary support 
comprises an automatic part, the quotas, and a discretionary 
part, the rallonges. It is proposed that, under the consolidated 
system, each participant be guaranteed the availability of a 
credit that would be virtually automatic, though limited in 
amount and duration. 
According to the circumstances, this virtually automatic credit 
would either be a part of its debtor quota, under the new system, 
or the guaranteed part of an indeterminate credit potential left 
to the Fund's discretion. The discretionary power of the Fund 
would be exercised from the outset if the amount which could be 
granted automatically was exceeded, and on renewal of a credit 
granted automatically. 
The sum of these individual amounts which could be obtained 
automatically within the overall credit - fixed in advance or 
not - would determine a credit amount: the Fund would, 
whatever the circumstances, have to be sure of having the 
necessary resources available to finance this credit amount. 
4. Conditionality and cost of the credit 
Beyond narrow limits of amount and duration, within which a 
credit could be obtained automatically, the granting of 
assistance would justify an examination of the monetary 
situation similar to that currently made for the granting of 
short-term monetary support. For longer periods and greater 
amounts, should consolidation extend to medium-term credits, 
whether or not they are part of debtor quotas, economic policy 
conditions would be imposed as is now the case for 'medium-
term financing assistance and Community loans. 
For very short-term financing, the present rules impose an 
interest rate based on the average of national discount rates, 
weighted in accordance with the weight of each currency in the 
ECU. By contrast, interest rates on short and medium-term 
credit are left to the discretion of the authorities granting the 
credit. If the Fund were given discretionary power, it would be 
logical for it also to be able to set the rates at which it lends. 
III. Problems raised by the consolidation of 
credits 
The consolidation of credits raises the following three 
problems: 
I. Choice of the credits to be consolidated 
The answer to this problem will depend on the choice made in 
institutional terms between the different types of Fund. This 
question was examined in Chapter /I.A. 
2. Method of financing consolidated credits 
Two types of solution may be applied to this problem, 
depending on whether or not financing is carried out through 
the issue of ECUs created for this purpose. 
The problem differs according to the type of Fund: 
An accounting type Fund could finance a credit only by 
redistribution of existing assets. 
A central bank type Fund should logically finance the credits it 
grants in its own monetary instrument, the ECU. 
The issue of ECU for short-term financing - which theoreti-
cally can be unlimited- is liable to be permanent if the debtor, 
when the credit matures, repays the Fund in reserve assets other 
than ECUs. However, it must be stated that this would not 
increase the overall volume of credit but would add to the 
balance sheet of the Fund, since the counterpart of these 
permanently created ECUs would not then be the credits 
granted, but an additional deposit of reserves. 
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Although a regional !MF type Fund is more an economic than a 
monetary institution, it would, however, be conceivable for 
such a Fund to assume certain monetary functions such as the 
issue of liquidity in EC Us or the administration of reserves and 
for it thus to be able to finance the credits it grants by creating 
ECUs. 
However, problems could be created by such an institution 
creating EC Us to finance medium-term financial assistance: 
the duration of medium-term assistance exceeds that generally 
accepted for monetary financing and as a rule needs to be 
financed by redistribution of pre-existing assets. 
The sui generis Fund would be structured so as to possess 
monetary powers, like the 'central bank' Fund, and economic 
powers, like the 'regional !MF' Fund. These closely associated 
powers by definition ought to open the way to the financing in 
ECU of these credits as a consolidated whole. 
It should be recalled that if a credit were financed by ECU 
creation, there would be no difference between the ECUs 
created against the transfer of reserves and those created 
through a credit operation. In both cases, they would be 
'money' ECUs. For transactions between partners, the origin 
of these ECUs would not be known and they would all enjoy the 
same characteristics of acceptability, convertibility/negoti-
ability and remuneration. 
Because ii would be impossible to identify the origin of such an 
ECU, a central bank could not avoid accumulating them by 
seeking to limit its contribution to the financing of the credit in 
the form of a creditor quota. A country accumulating too many 
ECUs for its liking would find itself in a surplus payment 
situation and its monetary authorities could not settle this 
problem by limiting their contribution to a credit which would 
now be granted by the Fund: they would have lo find other 
solutions so as not to have to bear the burden of financing 
deficit partners: opportunities for converting the ECU and, in 
the last resort, exchange rate adjustments. 
3. 'Checks and balances' 
For credit to cease to be granted on the basis of individual 
contributions and to be granted by a central institution with the 
power of money creation would be a major change, which would 
pose the problem of checks and balances, i.e. of the 
demarcation and interaction of the competent authorities' 
respective powers as regards money creation. These questions 
are part of the larger group of institutional problems posed by 
the establishment of the Fund. Consequently, we confine 
ourselves below to studying the problems posed/or institutional 
equilibrium by the disappearance of the link existing in the 
present system between creditor quotas and liquidity creation. 
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In this connection, it is felt by some that the existence of 
creditor quotas is an adequate answer to the problem of checks 
and balances. Changes in these quotas, made in response to a 
request by the political authorities, require the individual 
assent of each participating central hank. It is these quotas as a 
whole which determine the potential scale of liquidity which can 
be activated by the system. 1 Fears have been expressed that 
this balance may be disturbed in the context of a Fund which as 
regards the financing of the credit did not confine itself to 
redistributing the liquidity available within the quotas agreed 
However, when such activation takes place, the central banks record, in 
their balance sheets, the corresponding claims as the maintenance of their 
available reserves. 
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by the central banks, but which itself granted these credits by 
means of ECUs created for the purpose. 
It can. however, be argued that an institutional balance similar 
to the one which exists at present could be introduced into such 
a system. The practicalities of creating this balance would 
clearly vary according to the type of Fund chosen. Thus.for 
example, in a central bank type Fund, it is conceivable that any 
raising .of the credit ceiling requested by the political 
authorities could not take place until it was agreed by the body 
managing the Fund, i.e. all the central banks. However, the 
decision to raise the ceiling would be a collective one taken 
within the Fund and no longer the adding together of individual 
decisions. Consequently, the decision-making procedure within 
the Fund ( unanimity or majority) would determine the degree 
of influence which each cen/ral bank, Jaken separaJe/y, would 
continue to exercise in this area. 
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Introduction 
1. This note is a preliminary attempt to present and analyse 
the objectives and the technical implications of conferring an 
external role on the ECU issued by the Fund. 
The ECU will have an external role as a reserve asset and 
means of settlement when it will be used by the monetary 
authorities of countries outside the Community, and when, in 
order to do so, they will hold ECU in an account with the Fund. 
Whether these ECUs are drawn from the ECU reserves of 
Community central banks, or whether they are issued directly 
by the EMF to third countries, they would in essence be reserve 
asset-ECUs. 
This extension .of the ECU's role presupposes that it would 
already have become a fully-fledged reserve asset and means of 
settlement for EMS participants, i.e. the extension of the 
external role of the ECU is dependent on the strengthening of 
its internal role: consequently, extension belongs to the 
institutional phase of the system. Having said that, certain 
forms of use of the ECU can be envisaged in a nearer future, iri 
the Fund's relations with third country central banks, e.g. the 
use of the ECU as a· simple unit of account. 
2. The external use of the ECU will in the first instance result 
from a decision by the Fund, but in the end, it will depend on 
how the instrument will be received by third countries. The task 
of the Community auJhorities, if they were Jo decide Jo give the 
ECU an external role, would be that of creating favourable 
conditions for enlarging the circle of official ECU holders. 
3. There already is, moreover, a certain use of ECU 
denomination by the private sector; the development is 
spontaneous, and independent of the ECUs issued by the 
EMCF. It consists particularly in ECU bank deposits, 
certificates and issues. The possible holding of such assets by 
monetary authorities cannot, however, be assimilated to 
reserve asset-ECUs proper. 
4. The first part of the note examines the interest which the 
Community and third countries might have in extending the 
role of the ECU and the areas of application which can be 
envisaged. Next, it deals with the techniques by which third 
countries would acquire and use ECU claims on the Fund and 
the implications of such techniques for the characteristics of the 
ECU and the functioning of the EMF. 
I. Interests of those involved and areas 
of application 
5. The question of the external role of the ECU must first be 
considered from the viewpoint of the interest which the 
Community might have in such a development, while also 
taking into account the possible effects on the functioning of 
the international monetary system. The internationalization of 
the ECU must also be placed in the context of an international 
monetary system evolving towards a mu/tipolar system. 
The Community 
6. The possibilities of mobilizing the ECU would be increased 
by extending its zone of transferability. If the EMF were to 
empower authorities other than the Community central banks 
to acquire and hold ECU, the question of the con-
vertibility/negotiability of the ECU held by the Community 
central banks might no longer arise in the same terms: the 
Community central banks would be able to obtain dollars 
against ECU from sources other than the Fund or EMS 
participating banks. With the development of the ECU's 
external role, the demand to convert or mobilize the ECU with 
the Fund would tend to decrease, since the main reason for such 
operations-the regional nature of the ECU's acceptability--
would tend to disappear. The Fund would, however, have to 
continue to guarantee, in the last resort, the convertibility or 
possibility of mobilizing the ECU. 
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7. The Community might have an interest in an extension of 
the zone of exchange rate stability, in accordance with the 
Brussels Resolution of 5 December 1978, to 'European 
countries with particularly close economic and financial ties 
with the European Communities'. Furthermore, to the extent 
that the Community might wish to favour a moderation in the 
fluctuations of major third currencies, it could accept certain 
forms of association with other central banks, authorizing 
them to intervene in Community currencies. The techniques of 
association would be varied, ranging from the accounting 
centralization by the EMF and the use of Community 
currencies to avoid accentuating the undesired fluctuations in 
third currencies' exchange rates, to participation in the 
exchange rate and intervention mechanism on an equal footing 
with Community central banks. The ECU's role would differ 
according to which formula was proposed: a unit of account if 
the agreement was for operations in Community currencies to 
be centralized and recorded in EC Us with the EMF; a reserve 
asset and means of settlement if these operations were to be 
settled in EC Us and if, for this purpose, the EMF were to 
empower third country central banks to acquire and hold 
ECUs. 
8. The tendencies toward reserve diversification, which have 
been evident for some years, add to the instability of 
international monetary relations. The Community would 
therefore have an interest, in order to preserve the cohesiveness 
of the EMS, to give third countries which were holders of large 
reserves and wanted to diversify into Community currencies the 
possibility of acquiring and holding ECUs. Such a possibility 
would in fact help to avoid the destabilizing effects on the 
exchange markets provoked by massive purchases and sales of 
certain Community currencies and the unsettling consequences 
of such transactions on the domestic monetary policy of the 
countries issuing the currencies concerned. The ECU can, 
however,fulfil this role only if it is competitive in comparison to 
the national currencies one would wish to substitute it to. 
The third country acquisition and holding of ECUs would also 
make it possible to finance a current account deficit, if one 
existed, of the Community as an entity, by the EMF becoming 
indebted in ECU. The ECU would thus gradually become an 
official reserve instrument, and the Community- the EMF -
would administer this instrument, and become a reserve centre. 
An internationalization of the ECU in this way is not without 
its dangers, both for the autonomy of the Community's 
monetary policy and for the control of international liquidity. 
However, with its progressive emergence as the monetary 
symbol of a vast economic area in the process of integration, 
the ECU will, like all major currencies, spontaneously begin to 
play an international role. 
Third countries 
9. Outside the Community, certain third countries may have 
the same interest in reducing the effects of the exchange rate 
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fluctuations of major third currencies. Certain European 
countries with very close economic and financial ties with the 
Community might wish to participate de jure in the EMS 
exchange rate and intervention mechanism, in order to form 
part of the zone of exchange rate stability which it defines. Yet 
other countries might wish to have access to the ECU ~ and to 
extend its zone of transferability~ and to have ECU accounts 
with the EMF in order to use them as a reserve instrument, or 
even as a means of settlement with member and associated 
countries. 
JO. Third countries holding large reserves might also be 
interested in the ECU as a diversification medium. In 
particular, the surplus OPEC countries, whose reserves are 
mainly in dollars, might wish to match the composition of their 
reserves more closely to the structure of their imports, of which 
Community products represent a large share. Their decision to 
hold ECU reserves will, however, be influenced by the yield and 
exchange risk of the ECU. 
Coincidence of interests 
I 1. The areas in which the external role of the ECU applies 
will be defined by the conjunction of the Community's interests 
with those of third countries. A preliminary examination 
suggests that these interests coincide where the extension of the 
ECU's zone of transferability or the zone of stability of EMS 
exchange rates are concerned; and, although different, they 
seem to meet in seeing the ECU as an answer to the wish for 
diversification. For the Community, the decision to promote 
the external role of the ECU would not be taken until a more 
thorough analysis had been made of its advantages and costs: 
for the extension of the role of the ECU might involve changing 
its characteristics to make them more attractive. 
II. Techniques by which third countries could 
acquire and use ECU claims on the Fund 
12. Giving authority to third countries to acquire and use 
ECUs means, in effect, giving the Fund the right to open ECU 
accounts for these countries. 
13. In the present situation, the EMCF is not empowered to 
issue ECUs, as a means of settlement, except to and/or the use 
of Member State central banks alone. 1 However, not all 
claims on the Fund are by nature ECU reserve assets. Thus, 
interventions in Community currencies can give rise to ECU 
claims to be settled at least partially in other reserve assets than 
the ECU. In this case, the ECU is used as an instrument of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3181/78 of 18 December 1978 relating to 
the European Monetary System. 
denomination only and not as a means of settlement. Such third 
country use of the ECU would pose legal and technical 
problems less complex than the ones raised by the holding of 
reserve ECUs. 
14. The third country acquisition and use of ECUs which 
would be a means of settlement raises a number of questions 
concerning the criteria to be used to define the external role of 
the £CU, the origin of the £CU acquired by third countries, the 
techniques for acquiring them and the implications for the 
ECU's characteristics and the functioning of the Fund. These 
questions are briefly exa~ined below. 
A. Criteria for enlarging the 'ECU zone' 
15. Any enlargement of the '£CU zone' for official holders 
requires, at the l'ery least, the Fund's assent.for not only is the 
Fund the sole authority entitled to create ECUs but, since there 
is no market in ECUs, the transfer of ECUs between 
participants must be carried out by debit or credit entries in the 
Fund's books. Consequently, the Fund is in a monopoly 
position which enables it to lay down the criteria which the 
extension of the ECU's role should satisfy. These criteria 
might cover: • 
(i) the demarcation of the geographical area: the Fund could, 
for example, limit the circulation of the £CU to the 
countries associated with the exchange rate mechanism; 
(ii) the laying-down of general terms on which third country 
official authorities or international monetary organiz-
ations could acquire, hold and use ECUs. 
In the absence of general criteria, the Fund could authorize, on 
an ad hoe basis, a third country to acquire ECUs. 
B. Origin of the ECU 
16. One possibility would be to permit third countries to 
acquire EC Us from EMS members. In this case, the stock of 
ECUs would remain unchanged since no new ECUs would be 
issued; there would merely be a transfer, in the Fund's books, 
of ECUs held by members to official third holders. For 
example, a central bank could 'swap' ECUsfor dollars with a 
third country central bank; this would improve the possibilities 
of mobilizing the ECU. Ora member country whose currency is 
used by third official holders as a reserve currency could buy it 
back outside the market in exchange for ECUs which would 
help to regulate the diversification of reserves. Or again, an 
EMS member could surrender ECUs to associated countries in 
settlement for their interventions to support its currency. 
17. A second, wider-ranging alternative, would be/or the Fund 
to issue EC Us to third countries. Unlike the first solution, new 
EC Us would be created by a direct operation between the Fund 
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and third countries. This would be the case if.for example, the 
present swap network between EC central banks and the FED 
were replaced by a single dollar/ECU swap between the FED 
and the Fund; or if the Fund contributed directly to the 
diversification process by buying dollars against ECU, or 
contributed to recycling for the purposes of balance-of-
payments financing, by issuing ECU-denominated securities 
against.for example, dollars for on-lending to Member States. 
The significance of these operations would differ since, for 
some of them, ECU creation would be only temporary 
(swaps}, while for others (diversification), it could be more 
lasting. 
C. Techniques for the acquisition of the ECU by third 
countries 
18. In exchange/or 'what' will the official third country holder 
be able to acquire the £CU? The answer is obvious for ECUs 
surrendered by another participant in the context of the wider 
negotiability of the £CU: the counterpart would be the one 
agreed between the parties. 
19. For ECUs issued to third countries by the Fund, the 
counterpart could vary according to the circumstances 
surrounding such an operation. Thus, the issue of ECUs to 
third countries or the offer of ECU-denominated investment 
instruments is conceivable: 
(i) against surrender of reserve assets,: 
(ii} against surrender of Community currencies;' 
(iii) in the form of credits. 
D. Implications for the characteristics of the ECU 
20. Co,iferring an external role on the ECU means that the 
£CU, as it exists within the EMS, will be made available to 
official third holders. This should not, in theory, have much 
influence on the unity of the ECU. A monetary instrument does 
not change its nature just'because it changes hands. 
21. Nevertheless, the extension of the ECU's role beyond the 
Community, or the mere prospect of it being so extended, 
should perhaps be taken into consideration from the start of 
transition to the institutional phase. The areas likely to be 
affected are the following: 
The possibility of a third country acquiring EC Us against the surrender of 
Community currencies should not be dismissed out of hand if only in order 
to avoid the case of a third country which held Community currencies 
exchanging them for doJlars on the foreign exchange market, since this 
would have the effect of upsetting exchange rates. In this case, steps would, 
however, have to be taken to prevent the financing of a Member State's 
external deficit by its own currency: the central bank issuing the currency 
in question could be required to buy back against ECUs the amounts of its 
currency acquired by the Fund. 
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4. Tasks in the.field of exchange rate policy: 
( i) coordination of intra-marginal and third-currency inter-
ventions; 
(ii) coordination and multi/ateralization of relations with 
non-member countries: 
(iii) Fund intervention on the foreign exchange market, where 
appropriate against EC Us, which would presuppose the 
existence of an ECU market. 
Func1io11s 
(I) Accounting and executive functions: 
5. Granting on own account and financing of the credits 
available under the system. 
6. Definition of (i) monetary or (ii) economic conditions 
that may be attached to Fund credits, and monitoring of 
compliance. 
7. Implementation of enabling clauses; in other words, action 
to ensure that the Fund's development is endogenous. 
Type of Fund: 
EMCF central regional sui 
accounting bank !MF generis 
agent 
X X X X 
(i) recording debts and claims arising from interventions in EEC currencies and from 
activating the STMS mechanism 
(ii) creating ECUs against the temporary deposit or reserves (present swap system) 
(iii) managing the MTFA mechanism and Community loan operations to support 
Member States' balances of payments 
(2) Management of reserves held on own account: 
(i) in the case of reversible transfers (amended swap system) 
(ii) in the case of definitive transfers to the Fund 
(J) Regulation of the issue and circulation of ECUs: 
(i) among EMS members 
(ii) in relations with official other holders 
(iii) for use by the private sector 
(4) Tasks in the field of exchange rate policy: 
(i) coordination of intra-marginal and third-currency interventions 
(ii) coordination and multi\ateralization of relations with third countries 
(iii) Fund intervention on the foreign exchange market 
(5) Granting and financing of credits available under the consolidated system: 
(i) very short-term and short-term 
(ii) short-term and medium-term 
(iii) all three types of credit 
(6) Definition and administration of loan conditionality: 
(i) monetary conditionality 
(ii) monetary and economic conditionality 
(7) Implementation of enabling clauses 
(8) Issuing of Community loans to give Member States balance-of-payments support 
X X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X X 
X X 
X X X 
X X 
8. Issuing of Community loans to give Member States 
balance-of-payments support. 
9. Decision-making centre for adjustments of central rates 
and amendments to the definition of the ECU. 
JO. Tasks in the monetary policy field: 
(i) coordination of domestic monetary policies; 
(ii} formulation of a Community monetary policy; 
(iii) Fund intervention on national money markets. 
B. Respective functions of the different types of Fund 
The Committee earlier distinguished four broad types of Fund. 
This is necessarily a rough but none the less useful 
classification in that it provides a reference framework for the 
Committee's future work. The four types of Fund were as 
follows: 
(i) an 'accounting agent' Fund along the lines of the present 
EMCF. Since such a Fund would perform merely an 
accounting function, it would not require any new 
institutional structure; 
(ii) a 'central bank' type Fund. Such a Fund would be assigned 
monetary powers and its governing bodies would basically 
be modelled on those of central banks. However, since 
participation by the political authorities in the exercise of 
monetary powers differs from one country to another, it 
would be necessary to determine what place and what role 
these authorities would have in such a Fund. 
A variant of this would be an institution which, while 
providing support for the general course of Community 
economic policy, would be completely independent of the 
political authorities, at least as regards the means used to 
achieve its statutory objectives; 
(iii} a 'regional !MF' type Fund. The functions assigned to 
such a Fund would be those currently carried out by 
government authorities ( exchange rate regime and 
balance-of-payments financing normally with conditions 
attached), the implication being that it would be largely 
governed by those same authorities. Since a Fund of this 
type could also assume certain monetary functions 
(liquidity creation in ECUs, reserve management), the 
central banks would have to be represented on its 
governing bodies; 
(iv) a sui generis Fund. Whereas monetary or economic 
functions would be predominant in the two preceding types 
of Fund, a sui generis Fund would have both monetary and 
economic functions. The problem would then be to create 
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an appropriate institutional set-.up, say a multi-tier 
structure, within which all the participants, i.e. central 
banks and national Treasuries, would be able to play their 
respective roles. 
The table on the preceding page relates the four types of Fund 
to the different spheres of activity listed above, making it 
possible to identify the powers that could be exercised by each 
type of Fund. 
III. General observations on institutional 
matters 
In view of the evolving nature of the European Monetary Fund, 
the Junctions listed above could be assigned to it only gradually. 
Leaving aside the 'accounting agent' Fund, the institutional 
structures of all the other types of Fund would have to reflect 
the division of powers and responsibilities that exists at the 
national level between central banks and governments. Since 
powers and responsibilities are allocated quite differently from 
one country to another, a compromise will have to be found 
when this new body is set up. The problems of 'checks and 
balances' that are encountered in relations between the 
different decision-making centres both at· national and at 
Community level can be resolved only on the basis of 
appropriate national and Community legislation. 
The EMF would be the common decision-making body, and its 
actions could not but reflect the joint resolve of the EMS 
participants. Two points should be emphasized here :first, the 
Fund would operate within a framework in which the general 
policy choices remained the responsibility of the government 
authorities; second, as regards the exercise by the Fund of its 
own powers, one needs to stress the importance of its internal 
decision-making process. Questions . t~at may arise in this 
respect concern the following points in particular: 
(i) the balance to be struck between prescribed rules and 
discretionary powers. When conferring powers on the 
Fund, the national authorities could also spell out how 
these powers should be exercised. If. as a result, it did not 
possess any powers of appraisal, the Fund would have no 
competence of its own; its role would be restricted to that 
of a managing body; 
(ii) general direction of the Fund's activities. The Fund will 
have to assist in framing and in giving expression to a 
Community policy in the monetary and economic field. 
Whatever type of FWld is chosen, its activities will have to 
further the objectives set at Community level; 
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(iii) unanimity or majority. Although unanimity may be 
required for the most importa11/ decisions, it ought not to 
be the rule. In view of the need to strike a balance between 
the collective interest and the individual interest, decisions 
could be taken, depending on their purpose, either 
unanimously, by a qualified majority or by a simple 
majority ;furthermore, the nature of this distinction could 
itself evolve: as time went by and the Fund developed, a 
decision for which unanimity had been required at the 
beginning could subsequently be taken by a majority. 
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If a decision-making procedure were adopted for the Fund that, 
at least in certain matters, did not require unanimity, it would 
have to be accepted that action by the Fund would not always 
meet with the approval of all its members. A unanimity 
requirement would downgrade the Fund's functions to those of 
a managing body or would make it impossible in practice for 
the Fund to take any decisions. 
